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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Sudanese, Egyptians Discuss Security Issues

92AF0058A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
11 Oct 91 p 4

[Report from Cairo: "Al-Bashir Receives Egyptian Envoy for Talks on Pending Security Issues"]

[Text] Yesterday Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir, President of the Command Council of the National Salvation Revolution [council name as published] in the Sudan received Maj. Gen. 'Umar Sulayman, Egyptian Minister for Presidential Affairs. The meeting was attended by Brig. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih, member of Sudan's Revolutionary Command Council and head of its security apparatus.

The nature of the meeting was not revealed but the presence of Brig. Gen. Bakri indicates that it had to do with security issues between the two countries. These issues were often raised by Egypt, especially after the Gulf war.

The Sudanese media reported that a meeting took place last Tuesday between Maj. Gen. al-Zubayr Muhammad Salih, Vice President of the Sudanese military council and Egyptian Minister of Information Safwat al-Sharif.

The Sudanese media said that the meeting was held at the initiative of the populist leader, referring to Libyan President Mu'ammara al-Qadhafi. It was agreed during the meeting to clear the air between Egypt and the Sudan and to develop and strengthen their bilateral relations.

Efforts and good offices to improve Egyptian-Sudanese relations have been ongoing for several months but a number of Sudanese officials and writers are continuing to attack Egypt. Dr. 'Abd-al-Sami' 'Umar, member of the Political Committee, wrote an article on the importance of normalizing relations between the two countries and raised several issues that could have an adverse effect at this juncture. He demanded the establishment of a Nile Valley Arbitration Authority to resolve the disputes he believes will arise over Nile waters.

Newspapers continued to serialize an article by another writer and politician, in which he strikes at Egypt. The papers published an article titled "About Ancient Egyptian History" in which the writer attempted to belittle ancient Egyptian civilization.

Informed sources said in Cairo that a Sudanese official may visit Cairo in the next few days for talks with Egyptian officials within the framework of Libyan mediation between the two countries.

It was noted that such good offices were renewed in the wake of discussions the day before yesterday between presidents Husni Mubarak of Egypt and al-Qadhafi of Libya. The latter, who is currently visiting Egypt, was assured by Maj. Gen. al-Zubayr Muhammad Salih that Sudan was ready to resume normal relations with Egypt. Salih was recently in Libya on an official visit.

Al-Qadhafi also relayed to President Mubarak official Sudanese Government assurances that it considers relations with Egypt essential and that it is anxious to remove the reasons for the coolness and to reconcile.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT learned that Egypt received a report on the talks in Tripoli between Safwat al-Sharif and Gen. Al-Zubayr in the presence of 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud, and that the report dealt fully with the Sudanese viewpoint on the various issues that caused the coolness in relations.

In another development, the opposition Sudanese National Democratic Alliance issued a statement in London yesterday in which it reiterated commitment to Sudanese unity and rejection of the separatist viewpoint advocated by some in both north and south. The statement said: "The National Democratic Alliance, the legitimate representative of the Sudanese people, in light of the historical and fundamental tenets of the Sudanese national movement, reiterates its steadfastness and determination to defend the country's unity; and forcefully denounces any attempt at factionalism".

The statement entreated dissidents of the Garang movement, and specifically Dr. Lam Akol and his colleague Riek Mashar to [preserve Sudanese] unity "for the sake of the quest to regain freedom and democracy."

It added that it is the conviction of the Sudanese people that the "motherland can achieve progress and security only under the banners of freedom and national unity."

Nuclear Experts Protected by Egyptian Security

92P40033A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic
18 Oct 91 p 15

[Text] Egyptian security agencies have been assigned to [protect] a number of Egyptian nuclear scientists who worked in Iraq and returned to Egypt after the international inspection team monitoring the Iraqi nuclear program found documents containing the names of Arab and foreign scientists who contributed to the building of Iraqi nuclear facilities. Egyptian security agencies fear that Mosad, the Israeli intelligence agency, and other intelligence agencies will engage in assassination operations against those scientists. It is known that Dr. Yahya al-Mashd, the Egyptian nuclear scientist who died in mysterious circumstances in 1988 in a Paris hotel, was working on the Iraqi nuclear program.

Egyptian Officials on Palestinian Peace Efforts

92AF0058B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
15 Oct 91 p 3

[Report from Cairo: "The Palestinians Have Done All They Can for Peace"]

[Text] Dr. Mufid Shihab, chairman of the Committee on National Security and Arab and Foreign Affairs of the Egyptian Consultative Council, said in an exclusive

statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the Palestinians have offered all the positives they can in order to contribute empirically to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He added that the Palestine National Council, through recent resolutions, has laid all the positive foundations for the fundamentals of the new Arab orientation towards peace.

Shihab said that Arab security faces several challenges, especially on the issues of borders and water, and emphasized that there will be no real security or stability without a just and fair resolution of water rights. He said that the importance of water is indicated by Israeli persistence and insistence on including water among the fundamental issues to be covered by any comprehensive settlement, and that Israel remains the only country in the region that has not declared its borders.

The committee chairman emphatically rejected Israeli attempts at insisting on it what it calls "the dictates and requirements" of Israeli security. He added that a straightforward implementation of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 in no way involves changes to the borders of the West Bank or the Golan Heights in order to make them secure. That would be contrary to international resolutions disallowing the taking of land by force. Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands would be an affirmation of that maxim.

Dr. Shihab added that the concept of secure borders can only be applied lawfully, or to land that is legally yours. Such borders [of Arab territories] can not be changed, otherwise the international posture towards borders will also have to change.

The chairman of the Arab Affairs Committee said that he is fully convinced that there is no disagreement over interpreting the essence of Resolution 242, but that Israel makes it a practice to challenge even the obvious.

Zones of Influence in South Lebanon

92AE0022A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew (Weekend Supplement) 11 Oct 91 p 5

[Article by Ron Ben Yishai: "Redividing Lebanon"]

[Text] From the embrasures of the SLA [South Lebanese Army] post one can see a small fabric sheet. Gray with dirt and torn, with a green triangle in the center, it waves above a house at the end of the village, at the slope of the range. Several sandbags are sloppily placed in the windows of the house. This is what purports to be the Lebanese Army post in one of the most sensitive spots in southern Lebanon. I looked at it for some time, but saw no movement. There was no sign of the soldiers of the company that was supposed to man it. "They are sleeping," explained Captain Raymond Marad, a battalion commander in the SLA. "Every so often they wake up, go out, put up a blockade on one of the roads, check documents, and go back to sleep."

"And if a Hizbollah unit comes and starts to fire at you, what will you do," asks Major General Yitzhaq Mordechai. "We will return fire and they will not do anything," says Marad and adds, "we have already had experience in situations of this type more than once."

Marad did not have to exert himself in order to be persuasive. That same morning, not far from there, a road explosive and mine exploded, injuring four Lebanese Army soldiers. The four were travelling in an armored personnel carrier to a Lebanese Army post on Jebel Tsafi. The incident took place several hours before CO Northern Command and General Lahad were to visit the SLA post there, during a tour of the Jazin district.

When we arrived at the turn in the road going up to the mountain, we could still smell the remainders of the explosives. But the charge clearly was directed toward Lebanese Army personnel. It was operated manually via a remote control, from a place where the gray-spotted uniforms of the Lebanese Army could clearly be seen. It is almost impossible to err, even from a great distance, between these uniforms and the khaki green uniforms of the IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the SLA. The traces showed that the operators, members of the Hizbollah, came from the nearby village of Jeba, the same village where battalion headquarters of Brigade 9 of the Lebanese Army is located, the battalion of the soldiers who were hurt.

Four months ago, when the Lebanese Army went out with a blast to enforce the authority of the Lebanese Government over the entire area of the torn country, it was thought in Damascus and in Beirut that it was possible to do things differently. In Jerusalem, as well, there were many who maintained that a new age had begun in Lebanon: the age of "Pax Syriana" (Syrian peace), in which the government of President Harawi, with guidance from Damascus and the active assistance of the Syrian Army, would succeed in restoring order and stability to Lebanon, including the area of southern Lebanon located north of the security zone.

Israeli politicians spoke a great deal, and justly, of the strategic risks to Israel deriving from the agreement that was signed between the government of Lebanon and Syria. However, there were those among the policy-makers in Israel who also thought of the opportunities and advantages embedded in the new situation. Thus, for example, Israel will now be able to rely upon the Syrians to see to the quiet in the area in which they come into contact with us in Lebanon, just as they maintain the cease-fire agreements in the Golan Heights. There were people who maintained that Israel could even stop supporting Lahad's control over the Jazin enclave, if this were the price necessary in exchange for an accord with the Syrians for the de facto division of the control of Lebanon between us and them.

It initially appeared that the "Syrian peace" indeed was being realized, in effect. After the Lebanese Army succeeded in divesting the Hizbollah and 'Amal of their weapons in Beirut and northern Lebanon, the government of President Harawi embarked upon a coordinated military-political move to regain control in the south. While the expeditionary units of the Lebanese Army made their way to Sidon and Tyre, the Lebanese Government appealed to the United States and the United Nations, demanding that Israel order General Lahad to restore control over the security zone and Jezin to the government.

The political moves did not produce results, but on the ground the Lebanese Army, without resistance, took control of several posts that had been previously held by the Palestinians and 'Amal. Moreover, according to the agreement that was signed between the governments of Syria, Lebanon, and the armed militias, the Palestinians and 'Amal handed over a substantial amount of their "heavy" weapons to the Lebanese Army. In order to prevent a clash with the Syrian army, the Palestinians lowered their profile, stayed in the refugee camps—where they were permitted to keep the other weapons in their possession—and refrained from exhibitionistic activities. This fact in and of itself brought a calmness to the area, and an appearance of success to the Harawi Government. But here, in effect, the momentum ended, leading to a stalemate.

Of all of the armed militias operating in the south, only 'Amal really disarmed and scattered its fighters. All of the rest—Hizbollah, the Palestinian organizations, and the SLA—maintained their strength and their weapons. The Hizbollah even increased its power by entering the empty space left by 'Amal in the area and among the Shiite militants. The Lebanese Army, which initially tried to fulfill the role of creators of order, was slowly assimilated into the ground. The great swamp of the south swallowed it, too, and dissolved the motivation of its soldiers, just as it did to other, larger, and more experienced armies.

The current situation is that Lebanon has been effectually divided between two bordering regional powers into two zones of influence: * The Syrian zone of influence—the bigger slice of the two, including almost the entire territory of Lebanon, from north of the line between Sidon in the west and the Kar'oun lake in the east. The Lebanese element managing the life of the residents is the government of President Harawi, which receives orders from Damascus. * The small Israeli zone of influence, in effect covering the security zone. The Lebanese element in control there is General Lahad. *Between these two zones of influence there is a no man's land, approximately 10-15 miles wide, where matters are currently dictated by two largely independent power elements: the Hizbollah and the Christians in the Jezin area. While the Hizbollah is influenced and supported by the Iranians and the Christians in the Jezin

area are dependent upon General Lahad and condemnation from Israel, each of them maintains a large degree of independence and political flexibility.

Recently, when it still seemed that the Lebanese Army was about to enter Jezin, as well, several Lebanese dignitaries requested a meeting with General Lahad. When the meeting took place, the dignitaries said: we thank you for helping us in our dark hours, when the Palestinians and the Sunni militias tried to run us over from Sidon. But enough now. We cannot withstand joint Syrian-American pressure, and the SLA personnel defending Jezin should leave and allow the Lebanese Army to establish its authority. Moreover, we are speaking of Brigade 9, which is a Christian brigade. "Do not hurry," they were told. "Before you so easily give up the presence of the special SLA battalion and the backing of Israel, you should think twice. You are like a father whose house is surrounded by tigers with his son inside. He calls the neighbor with a hunting rifle, and when he fires a few shots and the tigers are frightened, he decides that he no longer requires the neighbor's assistance. But the tigers remained in the area, and they are waiting for their turn." The dignitaries of Jezin understood the parable.

Hardly a day goes by when the Hizbollah does not plant explosives, launch Katyusha rockets, or try to strike the city of Jezin or one of the 36 villages near it. The reason is that Christian Jezin is like a bone in the throat of the Hizbollah: a mountainous mass blocking the way from the Bekaa valley to the Sidon area, and from the Shouf mountains to the slopes of the Druze villages at the slopes of the Hermon.

Israel's interest in this area was limited. The main interest was to prevent the Syrians from gaining control over this mountainous pass, thus enabling rapid and convenient passage of troops between the Bekaa valley and the coastal area and the hills above Sidon.

Actually, there is controversy in Israel over this matter. There are those who claim that in order to defend the Galilee settlements it is sufficient for Israel to maintain the security zone with the SLA controlling it. Others claim that the ability of the Hizbollah to act against the security zone will be greater if the SLA does not control Jezin. Besides, claim the proponents of support for Jezin, the peace agreement that will someday be signed between Israel and Syria will also include a Lebanese component, in which Jezin will be very valuable as a bargaining card. Why relinquish this card prior to the commencement of negotiations?

But the decisive consideration right now, leading Israel to support Jezin, is the adamant demand of General Lahad to control the area. "We do not need to send troops and invest funds, and therefore, it is definitely worthwhile to fulfill Lahad's requests." The area is dear to him and to the elements supporting him in the Lebanese political system," said a senior Israeli figure proficient in zone affairs.

When we traveled to the Jezin area this week, it appeared that, like always, matters were more complex in actuality than in theory. The tour of the [Israeli] general and General Lahad's convoy in the Jenin area was undertaken under heavy guard, and was conducted as a military campaign in every respect. Notwithstanding, it appears that the Israeli demonstration of presence achieved its objectives.

In the posts of the village of Pallous, where bloody battles were waged between the SLA soldiers defending Jezin and Palestinian terrorists, Major General Mordechai was received with wide smiles. "We will remain here in any event," an unshaven Christian soldier, leaning on a heavy gun, told me, "but it is good to see that someone still remembers us."

Egyptian Ministry Intervenes in Libyan Payment Collection

92P40034A Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Oct 91 p 1

[Text] 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haqq, [Egyptian] minister of manpower and training, announced that the ministry is currently collecting [unhonored] checks in the possession of Egyptian workers who are due compensation [for work done in Libya] to present them to their Libyan counterparts for payment of the outstanding balance. He said that the ministry has received a second check [from Libya] to compensate Egyptian workers and that the total amount to be paid amounts to \$6 million, in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect in Libya at the time.

He added that the ministry is currently examining the dossiers and records of Egyptian workers who returned from Libya in 1985 and have not yet received compensation. Those workers due compensation will be contacted at their addresses by the Ministry of Manpower offices at the governorate level as soon as the ministry completes its estimates for compensation.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Nusaybah Analyzes U.S. Peace Process Moves

92AE0034B Jerusalem AL-USBU' AL-JADID in Arabic 1 Oct pp 72, 53

[Interview with Dr. Sirri Nusaybah; date and place not given; "America Does Not Desire A Palestinian Entity Tied to Jordan; Arab Coordination Will Be Verbal, Will Not Rise To Expectations"]

[Text] Dr. Sirri Nusaybah said in response to questions by AL-USBU' AL-JADID that if America did not give the Palestinian people its right to self-determination, "we would have to return to where we were in 1985, when there was talk of a joint delegation."

He said that the West seeks to realize its ambitious economic dream over the next decade, rendering the Third World a satellite of the First World and "making

us part of an economic system that includes Israel and other countries in the region." He pointed out that everything is in constant flux and that there is no such thing as stability in politics.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] The Palestine National Council [PNC] will be taking a position on the proposed Peace Conference proposed by various initiatives. Do you think we are close to agreement on a point of stability?

[Dr. Sirri Nusaybah] There is no point of stability in politics or in life. Things, as the ancient philosophers would say, are in constant flux. The world stands today at the crossroads of a new political order that will no doubt impact us. A fundamental change would be to participate in the political development process sought by Europe and America, and through which the West will realize its ambitious economic and developmental dream over the next decade. The cards of the Mediterranean basin are expected to be shuffled in a manner consistent with this Western development strategy.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] How do you think the Americans visualize the road to the peace conference?

[Nusaybah] The United States has followed an unyielding position adopted by President Reagan in 1982 and pursued prior to that by President Carter and other politicians. That concept entails giving Palestinians in the occupied territories a political entity linked to Jordan, as was advanced by the Reagan initiative. The change we witness today has less to do with this concept or position than with the effort to make it a reality. We find that the American administration today is more diligent than its predecessors in the actualization of that concept. We vividly remember Baker's statement to Congress at the time of his appointment to the State Department. He said he would oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state, but that he would work for a Palestinian entity linked to Jordan.

The United States is today diligently pursuing a peace conference that would ultimately lead to that objective. That is the reason for its insistence on a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and for its reluctance to acknowledge the Palestinian people's absolute right to self-determination.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Are the Arabs capable of coordinating among themselves to ensure that the talks have positive results?

[Nusaybah] The bitter truth to be recognized is that the Arab world is backward and incapable of dealing efficiently with 20th-century requisites, which include coordination. I personally do not count much on the ability of the confrontation states to efficiently coordinate among themselves, diplomatically or otherwise. We will, of course, be seeing outward manifestations of coordination, including reassuring meetings and statements, but this will never rise to the level required by the challenges we face.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] How do you visualize the new world order?

[Nusaybah] I imagine that we will be witnessing an ever-widening economic and cultural gap between countries of the First World (America, Western Europe, Japan, and certain Asian countries) and those of the Third World, including the Arab countries. The latter will have no prospect or place, except as satellites of the First World. The only option they have is either to enlist in that axis and benefit from its discards or to keep their distance and suffer mounting economic pressures.

We in this region would have an option to accept being part of an economic system that includes Israel and other countries in the region, including the Mediterranean basin. An option such as that would allow us to preserve a minimum of fundamentals that might enable us to really get going at a later date.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] How can the PLO acquiesce to not naming the Palestinian delegation to the conference?

[Nusaybah] If this is true, we must recognize the difference between "appointing" and "naming." It is possible, should this be the only obstacle to peace, to find another way to announce a list of delegates that the PLO had appointed in the first place. I personally do not think that this is a central point as long as we maintain the ties of membership that link the PLO with members of the negotiating team.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Do you believe that the Palestine National Council will ratify the joint delegation format?

[Nusaybah] Joint delegations are nothing new to the National Council. A few years back, it sanctioned the creation of confederate relations between Jordan and the Palestinian State. We recall that in 1985 Hanna Sinyurah and Fayiz Abu-Rahmah held contacts with the U.S. under the direction of the PLO, in the hope of putting together a joint delegation to the peace conference, but the fundamental obstacle they faced at the time was U.S. reluctance to recognize the right to self-determination. It is said today that the American position has improved in that respect. We hope that is so, of course. Otherwise, we will be back to where we were then.

Pros, Cons of Joint Conference Delegation

92AE0007A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 7 Sep 91 p 11

[Text] The visiting American Secretary of State, James Baker, told Palestinian notables at a meeting during one of his recent tours that they had three choices to bring about their participation in the regional conference: an independent delegation, a joint one with Jordan, or a joint Arab delegation. At the same time, he stressed the necessity of two-track negotiations so that there would be parallel advances in solving the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli dispute.

No doubt everyone is aware that Israel is behind Baker's request for two-track negotiations, for it provides both strength for the Israeli position and the ability to maneuver in order to insure important achievements along on one track, while ignoring the other. The joint Arab delegation is the one Palestinian choice that creates a conflict for Israel and provides many advantages for both the Arab and Palestinian sides. The most important are:

1. Frustrating Israeli efforts to arrive at a separate peace with any of the parties to the dispute with Israel, especially since this delegation has the authority to negotiate, on an individual basis, all disputed issues. It is also required to endorse any secondary agreement generated by the negotiations.

2. Entering the negotiations with a joint Arab delegation introduces a modicum of Arab power in the absence of international equilibrium and Arab weakness after the Gulf war, which pushed Iraq aside for a period of time. If any of the Arab states, especially Jordan, the Palestinian people, or even Syria, were to enter into separate negotiations with Israel, then the broken-down balance of forces will strengthen the Israeli position and weaken the Arab side. This would permit unilateral Israeli arrangements.

3. Joint Arab participation will lend nationalist depth to the details of the agreements, especially in relation to national security statements on strategic concerns like borders, water, and future relations.

4. If negotiations were to flounder in one area, the existence of a joint delegation is a guarantee that other participants would not continue to negotiate with Israel, or enter into a separate peace. Similarly, the success of the negotiations would be considered a success for all participants, and could be reflected in regional stability. On the other hand, there are huge sensitivities on the Palestinian side, which could be summarized as follows:

1. Syria will inevitably lead the joint delegation. This could push its leadership, which is against the PLO and its leadership, to return to its practice of interfering in Palestinian affairs in an effort to upset their internal equilibrium in support of the position of those groups that owe it allegiance. This threatens the independence of Palestinian decisions and the united manner in which they are represented, reinstituting them as an appendage of the Arab states after long efforts to crystalize their independence from the regimes.

2. The bitter Palestinian experience with the Arab regimes in 1947, 1967, 1970, 1973 and all the past years has filled the Palestinians, promised the moon and national liberation by the Arabs, with misgivings. It is finally clear that they are incapable of fulfilling their demands. This experience has driven the Palestinians to doubt official Arab positions, Iraq being one of the recent victims.

3. The incorporation of the Arab states that will participate in the joint delegation under the American umbrella might turn those states into the ideal device to strike at the Palestinian cause and liquidate it. This, especially as a state like Jordan or a force like the PLO are unable to challenge American plans or decisions in the area, at least at this stage.

Palestinian participation in the peace conference through a joint Arab delegation has its possible pros and cons. In spite of the fact that the shape of the delegation, as part of the Arab delegation, nullifies the American and Israeli ability to place conditions on the make-up of Palestinian representation, and the fact that the Arab states are committed to the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO faces many pitfalls. It recognizes in advance that the conference is a trap set for the Arab regimes and the PLO to force all of them to sign a peace document that is nothing but an abandonment of Arab rights.

The coming sessions of the [Palestine] National Council are expected to concentrate, in an extraordinary manner, on the joint delegation option, it being both the most dangerous as well as the most positive option, as measured by the existing situation.

On the other hand, Israel is also expected to reject the joint delegation format because it clashes with its concern that negotiations should proceed on two tracks, and to enable it to gain enough room to maneuver.

The United States, which previously proposed the option of forming a joint Arab delegation, will necessarily support the Israeli position. In the end this could lead to the failure of the conference if the Arabs do not comply and offer the required concessions.

West Banker Ghayth Questions Value of Conference

92AE0007B Jerusalem AL-USBU' AL-JADID in Arabic 15 Sep 91 pp 18-21

[Interview with West Bank notable 'Abd-al-Latif Gayth; place and date not given; "Regional Conference Leaves International Legality Behind; Our Single United Position Is Source of Our Strength, Pledge"]

[Text] Professor 'Abd al-Latif Gayth stressed the need to abide by legitimate Palestinian principles, using them as a basis to unify our position. He said that boycotting the proposed regional conference would not be to our disadvantage, as the conference would be useless without both Arab guarantees on linkage for a comprehensive solution and other international guarantees to insure implementation of international legitimacy.

He said in an interview with AL-USBU' AL-JADID that America is offering ideas and opinions without requiring anyone to implement them and is unable to guarantee anything except what it finds suitable and in accordance with its conditions and aims.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Will our attendance of the regional conference produce any results that would be in our interests?

[Gayth] All Palestinian factions agree that American moves in this area, which were initiated to exploit the outcome of the Gulf war, do not provide Palestinians with the minimum of their national rights. All agree that these moves aim to liquidate the problem and eliminate any power opposing American hegemony in the Middle East.

The American understanding of the regional conference envisages liquidating the Palestinian problem by separating it from the other Arab problems through two-track negotiations, one limited to each Arab state and Israel, and the other to the Palestinians and Israel.

One Palestinian position maintains that so long as the American proposal aims at liquidating the problem, fails to satisfy minimum Palestinian demands, ignores and flagrantly oversteps international legitimacy, then Palestinians cannot permit themselves to gamble on such a solution and on such conduct by participating in the negotiations. They realize beforehand that they will not arrive at achievable positive results. A very large percentage of citizens interpret our participation in the conference as merging into the American position and abandoning ours. This will expose the Palestinian national cause to real dangers.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] What are we to do to counter this?

[Gayth] We have to approach the world with a single, clear, fixed, and unified position that adheres to our Palestinian national principles. We must not submit to any blackmailing attempt, or to one that would force us into concessions. We lose nothing by refusing to attend, because we have nothing to lose to begin with. All that is being said about the opportunity, and the isolation from the international political process is worthless when compared with our concession or our attending the conference.

A Sensitive Issue

There are those who would say that we should not absent ourselves from the political process, but ought to maneuver within it, and, at the same time, maintain our Palestinian principles. We have to be part of a dynamic process, and that is where the danger lies. How is one to be part of the process without making concessions? This is a delicate and, at the same time, a dangerous problem. In order to participate in a conference of this kind, one has to make concessions. The simplest example of this is the problem of representing the Palestinians, a problem that brooks no debate, as the PLO is the legitimate and sole representative that is entitled to negotiate, explain the aims of the Palestinian people, form the delegation, and so forth.

The conference would require sending a non-Palestinian delegation that they have termed as "joint." The truth is otherwise, since, of the three degrees of participation—a joint, combined, or attached delegation—we have been offered the latter, and not a joint or combined delegation. That means that the Palestinian delegation will be attached to the Jordanian delegation. For this reason, I think that if we were to boycott the conference, we would not be absenting ourselves from the political process. Our participation, however, would be an unguaranteed gamble even if we were to declare adherence to our Palestinian principles, and we could explode the situation at any moment.

I believe that the Palestinians will have to think hard and have a thorough debate in their council so as to arrive at the right decision that will serve their cause. We should not rush to cooperate with this conference, especially since we risk losing everything. When we address the nations of the world demanding the implementation of international legitimacy and their resolutions on our problem, as well as the convening of an international conference on that basis, then we are giving the greatest indication and proof of our good intentions.

A Position of Strength

We are addressing the entire world, and we want it to come together to accept its responsibility for this problem and to implement its own decisions. For that reason, this would be considered a position of strength for the Palestinians, not one of weakness. Going to the Americans on the basis of American conditions and demands would be the position of weakness. We demand an international stance, international legitimacy, and an international conference. This is something great, and there are many nations that would support such a position. But if we were to compromise and attend such a conference, then those nations that respect international legitimacy and see the necessity of convening an international conference will ask: How, then, are we to defend them? This is what Europeans tell us in some of their debates when they say: 'You, the Palestinians, are yourselves able to come to a decision. Our option to support you or not would then follow.' When we demand an international conference to be attended by the European nations, China, the Soviet Union, and others, we demonstrate our commitment to the participation of those nations and to cooperation with them. Those nations would then look at us with respect. If, on the other hand, we were to abandon those nations then we would be unable to ask them to stand with us at the conference, because they will intrinsically have no presence at the proposed conference.

I think that it is up to the National Council to debate this problem. Are we to reject the regional conference and propound our principles, creed, and demands, or are we to agree to it, but with certain conditions? My hope is

that there will be sufficient access to democratic expression to reveal, in all of our people's motivating force, - organizations and groups, the people's expectations, views, and leanings, be it to express a 'no' or a conditional 'yes'.

Until we arrive at the correct decision, we have to deal with this matter with democratic practices and go with the Palestinian majority's view. This would be possible with the participation of such organizations as the National Council, the Central Committee and through discovering the leanings of the common people. If we want to be ruled by our conscience and if we want to be democratic, then let us evaluate the position of the Palestinian man on the street. What does he want? Any other approach will be non-democratic and denominational and could lead to future dangers and struggles.

What Kind of Struggles?

Struggles will arise if we have two contradictory and conflicting points of view in the Palestinian arena which, in turn, begins to be reflected in the Palestinian street, leading it to become bi-axial. For the Palestinians now, a united, solid front is the basic ingredient of strength, so that those who wish to attend the regional conference will find that they are in a weak position. Or, if there were to be a consensus for attending the conference, then participants would find themselves in a strong position and possessing a greater ability to maneuver.

I demand a united Palestinian position that will firmly adhere to Palestinian principles. There is no going back on this. I would like to mention here that, in its last session, the Central Committee adopted a clear, unqualified resolution on the regional conference. It clearly said 'no' to the regional conference, and up to this moment, we are bound by this resolution. Any other approach that negates its spirit is a breach of an official resolution of the Palestine National Council or the Central Committee.

Our Principles Are Fixed

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] There is a current of opinion that is demanding that the National Council should consider submitting the Palestinian peace initiative in a new form. What is your opinion?

[Gayth] Does that mean that we want to close ranks on principles? Do we want to reformulate them? Our principles are clear and fixed, and I see no possibility of reformulating them. For example, when we speak about the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people, does this right have two interpretations? We understand it to mean our right to exercise our sovereignty on our land by creating a Palestinian state on Palestinian land. This is the principle; how is it possible to act on it? How are we to treat it? When I demand the right of return, may I arrive at a decision or a new formulation of half-return? When I say that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, would it be possible to arrive at a resolution assigning it half or a

quarter of the representation? These are clear principles. Either we say that they are erroneous and that we do not want them, but wish to change them, or we affirm that those are our principles, that our people have adopted and struggled for. I see no new possibility of altering those principles, especially if it were to include formulations involving concessions. Any recommendations should not alter the essence of those principles in any way. Why, after all, have they been called principles? Is it not because they represent the minimum, which the Palestinian people will not concede? Those are historic principles which one cannot alter or change as one desires. That is why I see no possibility of further clarifying or pulling back from those principles. They are, after all, principles that have been ratified by international legitimacy and recognized by most countries.

If the National Council merely intends to deepen the Palestinian people's understanding of those principles, then we do not want our people to waste time. I do not believe that there is any possibility of coming out with new Palestinian initiatives that include any concessions.

Guarantees!

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] When would attending the conference prove useful?

[GAYTH] When the following points are met:

First, Arab guarantees that a solution to the Palestinian problem would be linked to a solution of Arab problems, and that there would be no unilateral Arab solution by any Arab side or country. We want this guarantee because unilateral solutions harm our cause enormously and place a very dangerous national responsibility on the Arab people and countries.

We want the Arabs to guarantee that they will not abandon the Palestinian problem and that they will link it to a solution of their problems, because the essence of the struggle is Palestinian and not merely an Israeli disagreement with this country or that. I ask the Arabs to rally around past legitimate Arab resolutions that were passed by Arab summit conferences, especially at Rabat and Baghdad.

The second guarantee that I seek is an international one to implement legitimate international resolutions. No matter how strong a country America is, or even if it is currently the ruler of the world, its guarantees differ from international ones. When I say international guarantees, that means that I am demanding international legitimacy, while when I speak of American guarantees, that means that America provides its guarantees when it finds them suitable and desirable. Hence, I want the five great powers to guarantee the implementation of their resolutions, and in order to do that, those countries must participate in the conference. As long as the proposed conference is under the chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union alone, and not the United Nations or the Security Council, then the guarantees become unattainable, inappropriate, and unenforceable.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] But it the United States is the one piloting the world and dictating the composition of the conference and the conditions for participation. Why not obligate it to provide us with fixed guarantees?

[Gayth] This is a very important question, and we have to clarify the answer for public opinion.

America has not proposed guarantees to the Palestinians, and has not mentioned anything called guarantees even once. It speaks about its ideas, but does not require anyone to implement them. We cannot accept American ideas and opinions on peace in the region as guarantees, because America itself says that it cannot give guarantees on this issue. If we were to demand them from America, it would not be ready to give those guarantees.

If we were to ask America to give us a guarantee that all those are occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and to say that the outcome would be a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the creation of a Palestinian state on them, then America will definitely not issue such a guarantee. Hence, there is no outlet for me as far as American guarantees are concerned. There are American ideas. America, for example, mentions the right to self-determination, but how does it envision it? Perhaps it means self-government, or perhaps, confederation, and that is the American position. It speaks of occupied territories, but it also speaks of border adjustments. Its position on Jerusalem is still unclear, postponing the issue for negotiations at a later stage. Why? Is the intent to wait until we sink completely in the mud? In the final analysis, America is not speaking of guarantees.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Will the Palestinian side be able to torpedo the conference if it were to participate and fail to achieve any worthwhile results?

[Gayth] If the Palestinian side had not made any prior commitments. Those who are talking about the possibility of participating maintain that they would be able to withdraw at any time. That means that they would leave the door open for any developments that would provide them with an opportunity to withdraw. Then they would say: Stop, we have arrived at a blind alley and we are not ready to betray our national cause, so goodbye.' That is the solution and there is no other choice.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] What if the negotiations were to be conducted along separate tracks? Would they continue after the withdrawal of the Palestinian side, with unilateral Arab-Israeli agreements to our detriment as the outcome? Or would the negotiations be halted on the other tracks?

[Gayth] That depends on the Arab position. Is the Arab side going to link proceeding with the negotiations to the continuation of the Palestinian negotiations or not? The indicators are pointing to the possibility of them proceeding, and that would mean a national calamity demonstrating their abandonment of the Palestinian cause and people. Hence, those Arab states that are headed for

the negotiating table are now required to insist on the comprehensive, and not the unilateral, solution. This, in the first place, is to guarantee their own rights. In the second place, each Arab state has national obligations that it cannot shirk if it is to survive in history. Therefore, the danger is in proceeding with the negotiations after their failure with the Palestinian side. Hence the necessity of demanding a comprehensive solution, and of linking the national problems.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] But this demand must precede the negotiations, as it would, of course, not be fulfilled during them.

[Gayth] Of course, I consider this to be something like a guarantee, that is, Arab guarantees might be just what is needed to encourage the PLO to participate.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] But as long as the Israeli position remains clear and firm, and the American side says that any demands from any Arab side must be submitted directly to Israel, how can matters proceed in the direction of linkage?

[Gayth] I don't believe that Israel would respond to this situation, because it does not want to solve the problem in a peaceful, just, or genuine, manner. For this reason, it will oppose such a trend, and the choice will become one between the Arab states proceeding with the negotiations or halting them.

The conditions they are imposing increase the difficulties for Palestinian participation in the conference.

In truth, the Palestinian people want peace, and it is the side that is suffering and that needs peace and profits by it more than others. Therefore, it has to be provided with the expectation that it would be possible to solve its national problems.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Would the absence of the Palestinians from the conference push the Arab states to reject participation?

[Gayth] It seems that there is an Arab tendency to participate, but a single, united, and conclusive Palestinian position on this problem will increase difficulties for the Arab states. However, if the Arab states were to find a Palestinian group or side that would negotiate, then they would ease their burden and save their guilty conscience. The negotiations will be easy for them and they will claim that they have not caused others harm.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] But do you think that America will continue to dominate the world indefinitely?

[Gayth] The logic of history is otherwise, as America, too, will experience struggles. There are two basic issues. In the first place, Europe is growing and becoming stronger. It is demanding a greater role for itself than it now enjoys. It wants a larger share of the international pie. Hence, Europe will continue its advance until it arrives at a friction-laden competitive stance with

America. It will not remain an American dependency, but will rise and attempt to compete with it worldwide.

The struggle will also explode in the future through the countries of the Third World, whose problems and crises are increasing. At a certain historical moment, these problems and contradictions will reach the explosion stage in opposition to the hegemony of international forces that are sucking dry their resources and preventing their development, treating them as their local market. This international dimension of the struggle will limit America's hegemony and control.

America, now becoming the single axis, will one day face international struggles that will cause its star to begin to fade. This is in the nature of things and in the nature of the struggle. America will not dominate the world exclusively, and history has never indicated any such thing. All civilizations have come and gone and are in a state of flux, and the same applies to America. Contradictions will arise and grow in the world, especially as America does not respond to problems involving security and justice in a progressive manner that aims at the solving problems of various peoples and at helping to deal with the calamities of the world. America aims to serve its own interests in their greatest measure, and this will create big contradictions for itself, both with the Third World and with Western Europe.

Poll Shows Territories Split on Conference

92AE0034A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 28 Sep 91 p 22

[Article: "Our People Are Democratic, Support Just Peace, Are Not Duped by Attempts To Isolate It From its Leaders"]

[Text] AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI magazine surveyed public opinion in the occupied territories to discern how Palestinians view political issues, some of which, if not all, are momentous at this critical period of our history. The survey, the scholarly manner in which it was conducted, and the conclusions deduced, prove that our people is democratic, is forthcoming, and expresses opinions only after careful thought rooted in belief in Palestinian tenets that are the common denominator among Palestinian groups, elements, and trends. This common denominator will ensure the solidarity of our people as they face the challenges to come.

Dozens of our young people canvassed cities, villages, and camps and knocked on doors of educational institutions. They returned with 1,734 completed forms, cognizant of the diligence of our people—elders and youths, women and young women, students and construction workers, in alleys or in kitchens, and every place else where our brethren toil to earn a living for themselves and their families. All of them aspire to help draw a Palestinian strategy and to map the road to the future that will have to lead us to a safe harbor despite the storms and mighty currents that seek to steer our vessel

off course. Proof is that only 5 percent of those surveyed said that they had no opinion!

Such responsiveness to AL-BAYADIR representatives reflects our people's belief that their leaders are attentive, that they listen, and that they really want to know what goes on in the hearts and minds of the people. Public opinion surveys are one way of bringing the message to leaders, so that they may be fully knowledgeable and informed before they make decisions and plan future moves.

No Dissension Despite Divergence

At first glance, it seems that Palestinian public opinion in the occupied territories is divided on the issue of participation in the proposed peace conference. Those in favor were calculated at 48.6 percent, but 46 percent were opposed to the initiative. Responses to subsequent questions, however, explain the reasons for opposition to the peace conference. These responses, in essence, reflect our people's attitude towards the United States of America, which has never been fair in dealing with the Arab world and with our cause. It has always discriminated in favor of the other party, as proven by the tons of weapons it donated to Israel on top of tens of billions of dollars. Its policies supported Israeli interests, such as by repeated vetos to defeat Security Council resolutions condemning Israel for its policies on settlements, expulsion, demolition of homes, and the bombing of encampments in Lebanon.

Our people do not trust the Americans. It was no surprise that 93.1 percent responded negatively to the third question in the AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI survey: Do you believe that the U.S. administration is earnest in its quest for peace? That is the reason why Palestinians do not believe that conference will lead to a modicum of Palestinian aspirations. The U.S. is sole sponsor of the conference now that the other great power has collapsed. Israel, meanwhile, will have recognized its dream of Arab recognition by partially accepting that honor without paying a price for it.

By comparison, the simple majority that favors participation in the conference also doubts U.S. sincerity but believes that participation is necessary—after the conditions of Palestinian leadership are met, of course—in order to unmask statements by Israeli leaders feigning a quest for peace, and in order to persuade moderate Israeli elements, which are still in the minority, to maintain their struggle for a just peace with the Palestinian people. It would be a mistake to believe that the Palestinian people are duped by U.S.-Israeli strategies to isolate their aspirations and end their solidarity behind their sole, legitimate leadership. Our overwhelming majority, in telling President George Bush that "We do not believe the sincerity of your peace initiative," has emphasized that our people is not duped by such tactics, which were dashed on the rock of our determination, and that our people insists on all our national rights.

Why Opposition To Further Discussions

The opposition (61.5 percent) to further meetings between James Baker and Palestinian notables is attributed to the lack of trust in Baker, who has conceded to Shamir's conditions by insisting on excluding the representatives of Arab Jerusalem. We must not, however, make light of the fact that 34 percent support sustaining those talks, which proves the solidarity of Palestinian people within Palestine with the leadership. Statements on the composition of the delegation and the dates of meetings with Baker at the American consulate in Jerusalem have always been released by an official spokesman of the leadership. Successive reports on those discussions and lengthy London meetings attended by PLO representatives and Palestinian legal and international experts all prove that attempts to isolate the heartland have failed, and that glowing promises can not replace official pledges that participation in the peace conference would impose a new status, which our people has rejected and will continue to reject.

Question 5 dealt with holding free elections in the occupied territories. 63.7 percent of respondents favored such elections, which is yet further proof that our people is democratic. Recent Chamber of Commerce elections in al-Khalil, Jericho, and Tulkarm, and elections at several professional and labor unions and student organizations are proof that we believe in democracy, respect dissenting opinions and that, contrary to the image they paint of us, we are not a disorderly mob of people whose factions and movements resort to force and violence to impose their viewpoints.

Majority support for free political elections pulled the rug out from under those who would claim—albeit no longer as frequently—that the PLO fears that such elections might undermine its domination. Elections that have taken place, and majority willingness to hold elections, are proof to the contrary, because renewed allegiance and support for the leadership are evident in all directions and in all areas.

In summary, the AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI public opinion survey, supervised by an impartial scholarly organization, proved that our people is resolute on Palestinian fundamentals and that it expresses itself freely, believing that the leadership has never stopped feeling the pulse of its people in the occupied territories.

Journalist Offers Inside Look at Conference

TA0511100491 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 5 Nov 91 p 6

[Report by Smadar Peri]

[Text] At 0900 Madrid time, Dr. Nabil Sha'th—the head of the PLO political desk—quickly passed through the lobby of the Victoria Hotel and was swallowed up by one of the elevators. Only one hour remained before the first face-to-face meeting between Israelis and Palestinians/Jordanians, and 'Arafat's adviser came to the hotel

where the Palestinians were staying in order to relay orders from Tunis. The Palestinian delegation tried to deny that Arafat's man, who has already been in Madrid for a week, was indeed in the hotel.

"It is not him," Khaled—a Palestinian journalist recruited in order to present an assessment of the situation to the Israeli press—wrinkles his brow.

"It is him," I insist.

And, then, another one of the scores of Palestinian information [officers] here in Madrid joins the conversation: "Today, we are making history," he says, "and we will see if your authorities will dare to embitter the lives of the members of our delegation, who are meeting with you and also with the messengers of Arafat."

In the Palestinian "situation room" on the second floor of the Victoria Hotel, Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi receives a list of conduct rules in anticipation of the working meeting with the Israelis. Tunis wants the Palestinians to demonstrate "positive behavior." The head of the Palestinian delegation, the elderly doctor from Gaza, seems to be in high spirits. Faysal al-Husayni also seems more invigorated. The secret night flight, between Friday and Saturday, to Morocco via private plane—for a meeting with Arafat—managed to allay the fears of al-Husayni that something bad would happen to him or his family upon his return home.

"The flight to Morocco, if there was such a flight"—in the double language of Anis al-Kasem, legal adviser to the Palestinian delegation—was intended as a life insurance policy for Husayni, and the nighttime Husayni conversation with Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara, in advance of the meeting yesterday, was to serve as such a policy as well.

Husayni yesterday again clarified to the Syrians that: "We are going to negotiate with the Israelis."

The Syrians responded in anger: "We demand to know the results in advance. You should not agree to deviate from the Arab consensus."

At 0945, at the entrance to the Mindanao Hotel, scores of television photographers wait to see whether the Syrians will go to their meeting with the Israelis, but all the members of the Syrian delegation are cloistered in their rooms.

"President Asad is sleeping, and we must wait until he awakes and relays instructions," a Syrian officer and member of the delegation, tries to gain borrowed time.

As on every morning of his visit, Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara' sends his security people to check whether Israeli journalists have again posted an ambush for him in the lobby of the hotel. And—if so—to evict them immediately.

With the Lebanese delegation, the situation is clearer. They are doing exactly what the Syrians say. And, for the

moment, the Syrians are saying: Do not go to the meeting with the Israelis at the assigned time. One of the members of the delegation explains to me over the telephone: "Israel gave us the excuse and the Syrians are dictating our conduct." And, meanwhile, they are taking advantage of the time to go over the list of members of the Israeli delegation to the Lebanese negotiations.

At 1030, Zuhayr Janan—the spokesman of the Syrian delegation—suddenly appears in front of the luxurious Ritz Hotel. The time is 1030 in the morning. The Syrian delegation is closed up in the hotel and President Asad has already awakened, thank God. He has ordered the members of his delegation to demonstrate "a more rigid line."

The Syrian spokesman reads a written statement: "We came to Spain to conduct pertinent negotiations on a withdrawal from the Golan Heights. However, the Israelis insist on discussing only procedural matters. The situation which has been created is unacceptable to us." Janan appears drained from the nighttime discussions that Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara' conducted with the heads of the Arab delegations, and from the reports home to Damascus.

The sympathetic face of the tense morning, on the Arab side, is the face of Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa. He himself already sat around the discussion table with an Israeli delegation in negotiations on autonomy, and he is forgiving of the incidents between the Israelis and the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Jordan.

"We will be in the vicinity. At any time that a meeting is held, you will find us near the discussion rooms," he says.

One of the members of the Egyptian delegation discloses that Israel proposed that Egypt be a full partner to negotiations on the Gaza Strip. But Cairo decided to respond: "No, thanks." This, out of a concern that a separate solution will be found in Gaza, and the West Bank will continue to be an open wound.

And, meanwhile, in the Syrian situation room in the Mindanao Hotel, they are maintaining an open line to the Presidential palace in Damascus. Hafiz al-Asad, fond of small details, receives reports every minute about every contact and he fires off a new instruction: "Only one man will conduct the discussion with the Israeli delegation."

Who will be the head of the Syrian delegation? "No comment," they announce. It is forbidden to envy the man upon whom this mission was placed. He will have to prepare every word that he says to the Israelis, while the members of the Syrian delegation gasping behind him, rush to send detailed reports home.

The real drama started close to midnight in the first direct meeting between a Syrian delegation and an Israeli delegation, when the doors to one of the halls of the "Palacio de Parliant" were closed.

"And believe me, the two parties are dismayed by the circumstances which have been created," testifies the Egyptian Foreign Minister—from experience.

Yesterday, the Egyptians were the first ones to leave Madrid. "We, who helped throw everyone into the cold water, can allow ourselves to become free for other matters," the Egyptian Foreign Minister smiled with satisfaction.

Impact of Closure of Ramallah Agricultural Land

92AE0017A Jerusalem AL-MANAR in Arabic
23 Sep 91 p 4

[Report by 'Ali al-Jariri]

[Text] The commander of the Central District has issued a military order requiring the closure of 120,000 dunams of land of Dayr Dibwan, al-Tayyibah, Dayr Jarir, and Kafr Malik. The closure order was based on military government regulations pursuant to Article 378/90 of 1970, which authorizes the military government to close any area for numerous purposes, including housing, security, and others.

This land is owned by people living in the above-mentioned villages. About 109,000 persons use this land, which is considered the sole source of income for about 70 percent of the peasants and farmers living in these areas. The confiscated and closed agricultural land constitutes about 75 percent of the agricultural lands known as "cultivated"

The Village of Dayr Jarir

This village has a population of 2,500, of whom 80 percent work in agriculture. The authorities confiscated 40,000 dunams of the village's land, on which they established the settlement of Kawkab al-Sabah in 1975. The authorities subsequently closed 25,000 dunams, bringing the total of the village's land that has been closed and confiscated for various purposes to about 65,000 dunams of agricultural land, which is two-thirds of its agricultural land. Thus, the land remaining to villagers to cultivate is known as [Fatm] al-Sharqiyah, which is land surrounded by Jabal [Laqiyah] and the settlement of Kawkab al-Sabah, which is built on the land of al-Najmah.

The Village of Kafr Malik

The population of this village totals about 2,500, of whom about 80 percent work in agriculture, especially in the plain of 'Ayn Sati', known for its fertile land and abundant ground water. The following is an inventory of the confiscated and closed lands:

The city of Dayr Dibwan (population about 9,000): The Israeli authorities closed about 40,000 to 45,000 dunams, according to the map obtained by the municipal

council from the Administrator of the Property of Absent Persons, including:

Name of Basin	Number
Mughayyir al-Dayr	38
Wadi Shammut	37
Hawd al-[Shaghghab]	44
Hawd al-[Muqatalah]	45
Hawd al-[Mushayyinah]	41
Wadi al-'Ara'is	39
Qubur al-[Walim]	42
Hawd al-[Madmar]	40
Hawd [Sahm]	43
Hawd al-[Qalat]	46

In addition, Basin 47 does not appear on the map. This land lies east of the Alon Line. It is surrounded by the settlement of Ma'al' Mikhmas, which was built on land subordinate to the State Land Treasury [Authority], and which last April threatened the land adjacent to the boundaries of 'Ayn [Bayrud], with the construction of a road or the purchase [of land] to connect Ma'aleh Mukhmas to the settlement of ['Uvzat], which is built on the ruins of 'Ayn Bayrud and [Salwad] on the Alon Line.

The Village of Rammun

The population of the village totals about 2,500, 90 percent of whom work in agriculture. The authorities confiscated and closed about 18,000 dunams, comprising basins running parallel to the settlement of Ma'al' Mikhmas and the settlement of [Shi'ib]. The closed land lies east of the Alon Line. It is the only land owned by the residents of the village in "the eastern division". The people of the village were notified of the closure of 18 plots of land in May 1991. Thus, they have no land to cultivate in what is known as "the eastern division" this year.

The Village of al-Tayyibah

The population of the village is 25,000, of whom 50 percent work in agriculture. The authorities closed about 1,900 dunams, which is about two-thirds of the land owned by villagers east of the Alon Line. The authorities closed three basins surrounding the settlement of [Tshiliya] last April, including: the al-Mu'akkarah 17 Basin, which include 143 plots of land; the Tshiliya 18 Basin, which includes 45 plots of land; and the [Qullah al-Mazdiyah] Basin, which includes 136 plots of land, as if they were located east of the Alon Line, having already confiscated 600 dunams of the land of Tshiliya, on which the settlement of Tshiliya was established. They then confiscated 3,000 dunams in the area surrounding the settlement. The authorities confiscated 20,000 dunams in 1975 to expand the settlement of Kawkab al-Sabah in the direction of Miyah 'Ayn Jamal and the settlement of [Fasayil]. The authorities returned to close about 25,000 dunams, bringing the total of confiscated and closed land to about 45,000 dunams, which constitute 60 percent of

the village's agricultural (cultivated) land. Also, closed lands constitute more than two-thirds of the land of 'Ayn [Samiya].

Collective Protest Memorandum

The residents of the villages submitted a collective protest memorandum to the military government. The memorandum was signed by notables, [council] members, chiefs, and mayors in the area. In the memorandum, they request that the pertinent authorities cancel the order issued by the commander of the Central District, which is designated No. S/2/91/5751 of 1991, especially since all the lands that were closed, and into which entry was prohibited, are recorded in the land registers (of the Land Registry [Authority]) under the Settlement Law, and there are certificates of registration for them bearing the names of the owners and holders of the land, who have no other source of income, be it industrial or commercial.

In addition, the signers of the memorandum intend to forward it to local and international legal organizations, including the UN Security Council.

Text of Memorandum

His Excellency the Honorable Defense Minister
Through His Grace the Honorable Commander of the Central District
Through His Grace the Honorable Military Governor of the District of Ramallah
Salutations,

We the signatories to this document, which is directed to your excellencies by the municipal chairmen, council chairmen, mayors, and notables of Dayr Dibwan, al-Tayyibah, Rammun, Dayr Jarir, and Kafr Malik, hope that you will give our due to all of us who have been damaged by the unjust decision issued by the commander of the Central District, No. S/2/91/5751 of 1991, dated 30 June 1991, which orders the closure of most of the agricultural and pasture lands of the above-mentioned villages to their owners and holders pursuant to Article 378/90 of 1970. We hope that your excellencies will re-examine this unfair decision and take action to cancel it for the following reasons:

a. All of the lands which were closed, and into which entry is prohibited, have been registered in the land registers of the Land Registry [Authority] pursuant to the Settlement Law, and there are certificates of registration in the names of the owners or holders of the land in question, who are now prohibited from entering it.

b. The unparalleled, difficult living condition being experienced by Arab citizens and the growing rate of unemployment are compelling these citizens to return to these lands to exploit them to provide income for their families.

c. Given the absence of industrial or commercial sources of income for these thousands of farmers in the areas

where land has been closed, and given that they are under the umbrella of the state, even if not in name, the state has a primary duty to provide citizens with an honorable means of subsistence and not to close lands which are their source of livelihood, regardless of the circumstances and reasons.

d. In addition, livestock herds are no less a source of income in these lean years. No authority is permitted to deny citizens their legitimate right by prohibiting them from pasturing their herds, instead of leading them by the hand toward enlightenment and development.

Based on the preceding, the assembled deem it appropriate to adjure your excellencies to grant the following demands:

1. Action to cancel the order issued by the commander of the Central District, the return to the status quo that existed before the issuance of the order, and the encouragement of citizens to exploit their lands instead of closing the lands to them.

2. The assembled also believe that in all civilized, democratic countries, democracy is not a monopoly of one people to the exclusion of another, or of one group to the exclusion of another. The assembled also believe that in this advanced age, the return of a right to its legitimate owners is an important foundation of democracy, which our people is demanding, and which all peoples of the world seek.

Respectfully,

Composed on 7 September 1991.

Copy to His Grace, the Honorable Commander of the Central Region

Copy to His Grace, the Honorable Military Governor of the District of Ramallah.

Copy to the Honorable Legal Adviser

Copy to the Honorable Administrator of the Property of Absent Persons

[illegible signatures]

EGYPT

Murad Disparages Islamic Alliance, Praises Mubarak

92AF0024A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
5 Oct 91 p 8

[Article by Muhammad Yusuf al-Masri: "Liberal Party Leader: Mubarak Succeeded in Normalizing Arab Relations; Opposition Party Alliance Only Way To Defeat National Party"]

[Text] Liberal Party leader Mr. Mustafa Kamil Murad asked that Egyptian newspapers, both national and party organs, be encouraged to enter the Arab market, which represents a significant source of revenue for them.

In an interview with AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI, the Liberal Party leader said that he had statistics pointing to

the presence of 2.5 million Egyptian nationals in these brotherly countries, ten percent of whom read newspapers. This translates into a 250,000 copies among Egyptians working and residing in these countries. Add to that the ads newspapers can carry, which represent a reasonable income. He added that he had no objection to, and saw nothing wrong with, the attention some of these party newspapers accord certain media figures, so long as it is within proper journalistic mores.

On another level, he said that the parties have not, and will not, go back on their demand to amend the existing constitution, speaking at great length about the totalitarian aspects and features of this constitution. He also dwelled on reform that had now evolved into a necessary and substantive issue. "It is an issue that a totalitarian constitution such as ours is unable to secure, given the economic, political, and social situation in our Egyptian homeland, which is now tending toward a free economy based on a multi-party system and democratic competition among the parties."

About the vascillating relations among opposition political parties, the Liberal Party leader said he was the one who came up with the idea of forming an alliance among all opposition parties, and that he has been raising this strongly-held idea since 1984. The parties, however, have embraced it only partially, through the Islamic alliance that was formed in the 1987 parliamentary elections, when the alliance parties won 30.7 percent of the total vote. While the opposition parties could have received the majority of the vote if they had all been able to enter into one alliance to face the ruling party.

With regard to the Islamic alliance itself, the Liberal Party leader, who is one of its three pillars, emphasized that the alliance was here to stay, ruling out the possibility of it disbanding because of the rapprochement [Labor Party leader] Ibrahim Shukri is seeking with the Nasirist groups. He said that the Nasirists have always been part of the [National Progressive Unionist] Grouping Party, that they identify best with it, and therefore, they do not heed the Labor Party.

The discussion also touched on Egyptian-Arab party relations. Although Mr. Mustafa Kamil Murad said that he would rather not talk about his participation with late president Anwar al-Sadat in his famous trip to Jerusalem, he could nonetheless say that every period in history has its own special circumstances; every decision has its own givens; and every president has his own way of thinking. He went on to say that President Mubarak is keen on maintaining good Egyptian-Arab relations, pointing out that he has been highly successful in this area, and has been able to get these relations back to normal.

On a personal level, the Liberal Party leader said that he was delighted that Arab presidents have received and honored him. The last president to receive and honor the Liberal Party leader was Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, leader of the Libyan revolution.

Elections May Reform Party Politics

91AA0540B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 Sep 91 p 5

[Editorial by Wahid 'Abd-al-Majid, AL-AHRAM Center for Political and Strategic Studies]

[Text] The announcement about the reshuffle of all levels of the ruling National Democratic Party [NDP] in Egypt by direct election was no routine party event. For the first time since this party's founding thirteen years ago, the wing calling for "democratization" has triumphed, thus spreading vitality in its ranks and supporting its competence after its chief adopted and insisted upon it. The importance of this development is the fact that its effects reach beyond NDP structure, which is still based on selection from above, to be reflected in the whole of the party system and domestic conditions in Egypt. It represents the chief significance of rebuilding the party via election, as it is definitely possible to move from a phase in which it has been an extension of the single-party system. Although the move is belated, it would have been truly difficult to accomplish that move in a short time because of the tremendous political, social, and psychological legacy of the single-party system. So its realization was open to doubt until the last minute, as a result of the national position still enjoyed by supporters of the selection-from-above theory and the number of [special] interests lined up to embrace it. At this point, President Mubarak would necessarily step in to conclude the debate over the party's future.

The conflict between promoters of the selection camp and of the election camp is not a new one. It began with the formation of the party, tied to the explanation given in the party's basic statutes regarding the election of various organizational levels, beginning with the base-level Unity Committee elected by a conference of this unity [as published], and even the Political [Affairs] Office elected by the General Conference. But at the same time, these statutes contain the possibility of resorting to appointment as a temporary measure provided for in the transitional by-laws. This point has been belabored constantly from the founding of the party until the present, despite continued calls for party elections. The head of the party still chose members of the Political Office, which in turn appointed the General Secretariat to take charge of forming committees and commissions in the governorate offices, among others, with the cooperation of this office.

The Debate Continues

The debate continued in different forms and at different levels, while the building of the party went on with selection from above; despite that, it was clear that the second party chief, Husni Mubarak, who had aligned himself with the evolution of democracy in Egypt from the beginning, was convinced of the need to build a party by election, but was waiting for the right time. He said in

1984, for example, that "the ideal and imperative solution in political parties is the selection of all leaders by election from the base, because the legitimacy of the party leadership is derived from the consent of the party masses and their confidence in it. There can be no recourse to selection except in the most dire circumstances and only in transitional phases. The National Democratic Party will see widespread action of this kind at the appropriate time."

This view clearly differed from what was adopted by some of the party elite, for whom the whole business of elections held no appeal anyway. In their view, the principle of selection in political parties was sound, as they were "unofficial institutions, not elected public powers."

It is remarkable that this debate escalated following the parliamentary elections of May 1984, when the subject of party elections was much pondered in the party ranks. This surfaced in some of the conferences and meetings. The party secretary general at the time persevered in explaining the postponement of elections as the need for time to organize the membership and realistically complete the records to properly prepare for the election process. And in fact, Dr. Subhi Abd-al-Hakim exerted a tremendous effort in this regard at the behest of the party's General Secretariat; he linked the debate of the election/selection question with the final completion of the building of the party structure.

The party is still striving for this completion, which it desires unreservedly, at a time when the prevailing political culture among the citizens of Egypt does nothing to help. It is a culture that is not inclined toward participation and is largely marked by apathy, disregard for political activity, and wariness of its claims. The first party chief raised this issue in May 1981, when he admitted that "The organizational levels are not completed, as I had wanted, as they should have been, in a party as huge as this. But we must be fair. It would be unreasonable for everything to be complete in a party with this overwhelming majority in a year or two, or even five years."

It was clear in an article by Muhammad Rashwan, the Cairo Governorate's party secretary in 1984, that the organizational structure had not been finalized as of that time. He said, "Of course, there have been reforms in the party after Mubarak's tenure, aimed at completing the organizational structures at all levels, supporting the youth, and coordinating the membership. However, some of these reforms overlook the continuity or seriousness of the confrontation because running the big parties is extraordinarily difficult." He cited a very important issue in this regard, saying, "The political balance between individuals at times came before reform."

The significance of this remark lies in what it says about the problem not being one of providing concern and effort in finalizing the organizational structure, or of

clarity of vision. It is clear that the organization official in the party strove constantly for it, including the clarity of vision reflected in an integrated concept from the beginning.

In September 1981, for example, it became clear that organizational action included expanding and stimulating the membership base and realizing the wide diffusion and support of a communications network among all party levels. It mandated integrated measures in this regard, including routine meetings and reports, to progress toward finalizing party organizations in about 450 units in February 1983. The party leadership still affirmed its interest in forming base units, as they were the true indication of the completion of the structure when this was considered one of the most difficult issues for a number of parties. The objects of these units were villages, small towns, and municipal districts.

In this context, the completion of the organizational structure this way was the topic of debate in several party meetings. For example, a meeting held at the end of 1984 saw a debate about it, when Sa'd-al-Din Wahba brought up what he called "the delay of the party's organizations," and asked that their formation be expedited. The secretary general at the time, Dr. Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, explained that "the job requires more time and effort than we had ever calculated, and this delay in completing the organizations was due to the need to complete studies to reassure us that we will form organizations that will please the great majority of our party members." But the secretary general said, in another party meeting, that reshuffling some of the middle levels, such as the governorate leaderships, could negatively affect the finalizing of the base-level structure. He called upon what he called "our party organizations in the governorates" to "carry out their activities, and not to be permanent spectators, or merely to wait, because that would stop our party's movement in the governorates, as party activity is not tied to the completion of new organizations." In this context, progress has centered more upon completing the mid-level than the base-level party structure, in accordance with what the organization secretary said in April 1987: "The party has finalized all its organizations, at both the central and provincial levels, main and branch offices, and finalization of these organizations will go forward in the villages." That does not mean that progress was not made in organizing the base level; but it had not yet covered all units.

Also, the practical experience of organizational structure of the NDP in Egypt has shown the important relationship between finalizing this structure, adoption of the electoral method, and the spread of democracy through the party ranks. It has proven that in the absence of party elections and competition for the power centers could be directed into unhealthy channels, negatively affecting the base-level finalization of the structure. When in 1985, for example, the former secretary general warned of the likely or actual negative effect of reshuffling the middle levels upon party activity, his warning sparked a remarkable fuss, especially in the NDP, which the other

Egyptian parties did not face. That party suffered from fierce competition for positions at the middle and base levels.

When there are no clear and orderly signs to change leadership or keep it in these positions, it becomes difficult to control these effects on party activity, including efforts aimed at completing its organizational structure. In this case also, change in party leadership can hamper its activity, given that the coming of new leadership usually comes with the ability to make changes in the middle levels. It is natural that the absence of elections leads to a loss of objective bases when it comes to recruiting for the middle and base levels, and the prevalence of methods inherited from the single-party days. These problems were not unknown or ignored by party leaders. In 1984, for example, the Cairo party chief took up the issue with total candor and got to its roots when he said that "the growth of the party was not accompanied by popular dialogue or founding committees," to specify that "the party existed from above, relying upon the political standing of the late President Anwar al-Sadat. At that time, the party was unable to bring in new members, which led the political leadership to have a program of change ten months after the birth of the party. This experiment made it clear that forsaking the electoral method deprived the party of the chance to renew itself with new blood, especially intellectuals unable to keep up with prevailing methods of party activity in the absence of elections. So, most of them refrained from joining the party, believing that it would not give them the proper chance to select the members best qualified and capable of work.

A Better Future

For all of this, the announcement on forming NDP organizations through election has, for the first time, raised widespread hopes of development and new blood to lead to its revitalization. It was certain that the party would become able, in the true sense, to invest what majority it gains toward revitalizing the political scene in Egypt and ending the stagnation it has endured as a result of different parties' inability to engage in effective action. It is expected that this development will result in broader popular participation, as the NDP has more members than any other party. This will be linked to other parties' incentive to act, also, thus increasing serious competition, which has been dormant in the Egyptian party system. A majority party that is strong, active, and less dependent upon administrative procedures will inevitably, as a result, see opposition parties increase activity. Opposition parties' activities have suffered from the shortcomings of these administrative procedures due to grave internal problems which blunted their effectiveness, making them virtual political "shops" whose existence was confined to their offices and the newspapers they published.

'Big Changes' Expected in Labor Party Elections

92AF0024B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
5 Oct 91 p 8

[Article by Ahmad al-Batrik: "Egyptian Party Activities: Tal'at Muslim Affirms Split Is in Nobody's Interest, Must Be Stopped"]

[Text] Labor Party leaders have cautioned against attempts to propel public figures newly affiliated with the party to high leadership positions through the Third General Conference that is scheduled to convene soon.

These sources said that such reservations are backed by certain considerations, especially since the two episodes of Mr. Ahmad al-Mujahid and Justice al-Damardash al-'Uqali are still fresh in peoples' minds. Meanwhile, Dr. 'Abd-al-Hamid Barakat, Labor Party assistant secretary general and organization secretary, said there are generally-accepted organizational rules, regulations, and actions by which the party can judge those leaders.

He also said there is a provision barring members with less than a two-year tenure in the party from assuming leading positions, excluding those who join the party's Higher Committee by decree. The Labor Party's organization secretary made it clear that Maj. Gen. Kamal Hafiz, Dr. Majid Fakhir, and Maj. Gen. Tal'at Muslim have in fact joined the Higher Committee and, therefore, have the right to run for leading party positions.

He added that the rise of some public figures to leading positions is contingent upon their activities and popularity, especially since the party had sought long ago to admit some of them to its membership.

Mr. 'Abd-al-Hamid Barakat, the party's organization secretary, stated that he expected the party's Higher and Executive Committees to undergo major changes during the upcoming elections, indicating that the party's recent experiences and stated political orientations have introduced new elements who have stepped up their activities to affirm these orientations. Meanwhile, some leaders have quit the party in accordance with their dissenting views.

'Abd-al-Hamid Barakat also said that the party's boycott of the recent People's Assembly elections prompted disparate reactions within its ranks, reactions that will have a definite impact on the outcome of its elections for leading positions.

The party's organization secretary explained that the party formation process in 26 governorates has been launched in al-Sharqiyah, al-Gharbiyah, al-Daqahliyah, Kafr al-Shaykh, and Alexandria, which, in particular, represent over 40 percent of the party's strength. Meanwhile, the conference's Executive Committee is in the process of setting a date for elections and reforming the party in several other governorates in accordance with an agreed-upon timetable. It has been decided that the party would wind up its reformation before October to pave the way for convening the General Conference,

which is likely to be delayed briefly until the current labor union elections—in which many of the party's workers are taking part—are over.

The party's assistant secretary general indicated that a decision had been made to endorse party candidates at all electoral sites, and to ask party members at all the sites to support them so they may achieve the desired outcome, especially since the party had designated space for them in its newspapers to publish their platforms and to explain their points of view on various problems raised in the political and economic arenas.

On another level, a new party member who occupies a key party position and is a candidate for major posts in the coming stage, Maj. Gen. Tal'at Muslim, told AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI that he joined the Labor Party because it is the one closest to his views, and that he felt the need to make a contribution when the Gulf war broke out and the magnitude of the perils facing the region, and the futility of the individual views and stances, whatever the source, became clear.

He expressed his appreciation for the stance AL-SHA'B newspaper embraced during the Gulf war which, as he said, was different from the positions the other parties and newspapers assumed.

However, the party experiment itself does not seem encouraging, as indicated by Maj. Gen. Tal'at Muslim, who directed a torrent of criticism at party practices that are governed by the emergency law and are marked by stagnation. The fact that existing Egyptian parties, for the most part, express Salafi tendencies is no reason to underestimate them. They do lack, however, a full vision with which to face the future and its challenges, thus rendering them candidates for future extinction.

Maj. Gen. Tal'at Muslim pointed to the problems of mass communications and funding, saying that they are two of the biggest problems impeding party action. For, by requiring police permission in advance, the police block any attempts to reach the masses, not to mention their various meddling tactics. At the same time, membership fees do not bring in enough revenues to finance party activities.

Maj. Gen. Tal'at Muslim then talked about the alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, saying that none of the parties to the alliance have lost their independence. However, he advanced the notion that the slogan "Islam is the solution" will be incapable of bringing about practical solutions to the problems at hand.

In conclusion, he said that he would rather see the party adopt the democratic method in building itself in the next General Conference. He also said that he is greatly interested in mending the schism within the Labor Party, which he is seeking to contain, a schism that definitely is not in the interest of the party or the dissidents, or even the advocates of the schism.

Article Reviews Nuclear Program's Frustrations

92AF0030A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 17 Sep 91 p 2

[Report by 'Adil al-(Bahansawi)]

[Text] We will once again open the dossier on Egypt's nuclear program to disclose the American-Zionist plot to curb Egypt's aspirations by thwarting three Egyptian attempts to enter the age of nuclear energy.

In this report we will show, based on previous reports published in AL-SHA'B, how the current electricity and energy minister changed his position, inasmuch as he began to speak of the cost and dangers of nuclear power stations after he had appeared before the Consultative Council in 1987 to defend the nuclear program and reject any lagging on the part of Egypt in the nuclear energy field. We will also show how the political leadership has rejected attempts to keep Egypt away from modern technology and the age of nuclear energy. These leaders declared their rejection of any American or Western mandate over us. AL-SHA'B has advocated this same rejection for years. For more than seven years, we have written that Egypt's future depends on the availability of energy, the best source of which is nuclear energy, given that thermal and renewable energies will not be sufficient. Egypt has made three attempts to enter the nuclear energy field. However, each attempt was thwarted as soon as progress began.

The first attempt was in 1963, when Egypt solicited proposals for the construction of an electricity generating station and a desalinization unit in the Sidi Kurayr area. However, the Western states, especially America, refused to finance the project because of Egypt's special relation with the Soviet Union at the time. The 1967 War thwarted this attempt.

The Plot

Regarding the second plot uncovered by AL-SHA'B, in 1973, American President Richard Nixon announced, during a visit to Egypt, that the United States had agreed to supply Egypt with nuclear power stations with a total capacity of 1,800 megawatts [MW]. In 1974, Egypt signed an agreement with the American Atomic Energy Commission, which stipulated that the United States was to be responsible for the uranium enrichment process. This stipulation was to be intended to ensure that the United States would have easy control over Egypt's nuclear program. In late 1974, a limited invitation to submit bids to build nuclear power stations with a capacity of 600 MW was made to American companies. The contract was awarded to the Westinghouse Company in March 1976. However, strong Zionist pressures caused the U.S. administration to retreat and attempt to amend the contract with Egypt to allow the United States to inspect Egyptian installations periodically. The U.S. administration also cancelled funding assistance, effectively killing the second Egyptian attempt.

The Third Stage

In the early eighties, Egypt became active in the nuclear field after it joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in February 1981. Specifically, Egypt's third attempt to develop nuclear energy began after the Energy and Electricity Committee formed by the president in 1975 concluded in a report that it was necessary to build eight nuclear reactors to cover an approaching energy deficit. Based on this report, AL-SHA'B reported in December 1985 that "the Egyptian Government began holding contacts with countries in which there are companies involved in the construction of nuclear reactors. Initially, negotiations were begun with the French Government to purchase a 2,000-MW double nuclear reactor for the al-Dab'ah nuclear project. The negotiations failed because the Zionist lobby in France found out about the deal. Pressure was exerted on the French Government and the Zionists achieved what they wanted.

The Zionist Octopus

The Egyptian Electricity Ministry subsequently issued a limited invitation to French, German, and U.S. companies to build a 1,000-MW nuclear reactor. The German Kraftwerk Union Company, the French Framatome Company, and [Combache] Engineering G.F., submitted proposals in January 1984. Egypt asked these companies to submit their financial proposals, which were studied with the help of an international consulting office, Motor Columbus. The study indicated that the German proposal was the best from a financial and technical standpoint.

However, this serious attempt did not see the light of day. The Zionist octopus exerted strong pressure on America to prevent Egypt from purchasing German reactors. As a matter of fact, the United States, in violation of all international laws regulating international tenders, submitted a new offer involving old equipment for a 900-MW reactor, which America had adopted previously for the Wadi [Tinas] project, but which the board of directors rejected due to major errors in fabrication. The Egyptian Electricity Ministry, under American pressure, studied the American proposal. It emerged that the equipment being offered was unsuitable.

America was not satisfied with this. It urged the World Bank, 70 percent of whose capital it controls, to fabricate erroneous reports.

Confronting Policy of Appeasement

Subsequently, in 1986, AL-SHA'B was compelled to criticize the political leadership because that leadership "followed a policy of appeasement in confronting this conspiracy against, and threat to, our political and economic independence and will, which we had liberated from foreign pressures through great sacrifices."

This happened two months after the publication of a book by an American author entitled "Dangerous Relations," which discloses how five consecutive American administrations helped support and conceal Israel's nuclear plans. The conspiracy did not stop at thwarting any Egyptian attempt to acquire nuclear power stations. It also inundated Egypt with offers of funding in the form of grants and soft loans to induce Egypt to expand its construction of thermal stations, so that it would miss the opportunity to implement a nuclear program. A report issued by the American aid organization [AID] last December states that the organization provided about \$16,077 million in aid to Egypt between 1975 and the end of 1990, including \$1.4 billion for the electricity sector alone, in addition to \$100 million provided by AID for the al-[Kuraymat] electricity station last week, and other grants and loans provided to the electricity sector by international funding organizations, such as the World Bank and the German Development Bank, as well as Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and other countries that support the plan to exhaust Egypt's oil and eliminate its nuclear program.

Official Reports Support Our Position

AL-SHA'B has called for, and is calling for, Egypt's entry into the nuclear age to ward off the danger of darkness for future generations, given that nuclear technology is more than just the "nuclear bomb." This call was also made by Egyptian officials—led by the president, who chairs the High Council for Atomic Energy Uses—in Decree No. 784 of 1975. The minutes of the council's 5 December and 8 December 1986 meetings, which were attended by the president, several experts, and members of the cabinet, record "collective agreement on the benefit of establishing nuclear power stations and belief in the importance of entering this field and continuing with the al-Dab'ah project." AL-SHA'B's position is also supported by a report prepared by a special committee in the Consultative Council that convened to study the "Egyptian nuclear program" on 2 July 1987. The report calls for the construction of nuclear stations for Egypt and the exploitation of the al-Dab'ah site, whose preparation had already cost millions.

This is in addition to reports prepared by the Industry and Energy Committee in the People's Assembly in late 1990. Last week, the committee strongly criticized the government's slowness in building nuclear power stations and expanding the construction of thermal stations.

Electricity Minister Changes His Opinion

The development of nuclear energy was also advocated by Electricity and Energy Minister Mahir Abazah in an appearance before the Consultative Council on 29 June 1987. He told council members that "all reports indicate that the cost of a kilowatt-hour produced by a nuclear station is cheaper than that produced by coal.

He added: "It is most painful to see Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and Morocco racing to acquire nuclear reactors, while Egypt has been the winner in every development and innovation. Therefore, Egypt must not be permitted to lag in this field. However, the import of the energy minister's statements differed on 13 September, when the minister said in remarks to AL-SHA'B that Egypt's decision to delay its entry into the age of nuclear power stations will not at all affect its ability to achieve its goal of increasing energy production. That decision was made to protect electricity consumers from a steep price increase, which would be needed to finance the high cost of building a nuclear power station, aside from the dangers that would be posed by such a station.

In 1984, AL-SHA'B organized a scientific roundtable attended by most of the energy experts in Egypt and moderated by Dr. 'Abdallah Hilal. The nuclear energy experts, including Dr. Fawzi Hammad, defended the project strongly, emphasizing that nuclear energy is crucial for Egypt and that we must enter this field. While AL-SHA'B was publishing the details of this roundtable, the national newspapers were applauding it in their headlines, stressing that "Egypt is entering the age of nuclear energy" and publishing enthusiastic statements made by Mahir Abazah, in which he strongly defends the project. The Labor Party realized the danger of plot against this project, and in 1989, AL-SHA'B published remarks made by Professor Ibrahim Shukri in the People's Assembly, in which he called for the construction of nuclear power stations and emphasized that "it is our natural right under international agreements, and Egypt is a signatory to the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation treaty." He also called on the Arab states to help Egypt in this regard.

Back to Our Scientists

Back to a new elite of energy scientists in Egypt.

With intense anger and bitterness, Dr. 'Ali Fahmi al-Sa'idi, the chief of the Nuclear Power Stations Authority, states: "I have learned much regarding this subject. We declared in the People's assembly and in the Consultative Council that Egypt's use of nuclear energy is necessary and inevitable. However, no one in Egypt is listening to what we are saying. It suffices for us to be aware of the extent of the disaster that encircles us now because of the nuclear reactors that Israel is building on Egypt's borders. Is that not a disaster?!"

Atomic Energy Authority's Deputy Chief

Dr. Hisham Fu'ad, the deputy chief of the Atomic Energy Authority and the head of the al-Har laboratory and the Nuclear Waste Treatment Center, states: "We are willing to hold discussions with any officials who desire them, whether from a technical or a safety standpoint. We have frequently tried to clarify the true picture. However, unfortunately, many officials were already predisposed to remaining unconvinced."

Dr. Hisham added: "The delay of the national nuclear program reminds us of the subway project, which Egypt needed for a long time before we were finally compelled to build it after it was already too late. We spent much, and much could have been saved."

Dr. Fawzi Hammad, the head of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority expresses appreciation for the good efforts being undertaken by AL-SHA'B to help the national nuclear project succeed. He states: "However, in addition to speaking in the press, I have my special way of defending this national project, which is a natural right of the Egyptian people."

Atomic Energy Authority's Former Chief

Dr. 'Izzat 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the former chief of the Atomic Energy Authority, speaks of the dangers of Egypt lagging behind in the use of nuclear power stations. He states: "First, we should remember that Egypt was among the first countries to break into this field in the early fifties. Egypt has 35 years of experience. The result is three nuclear authorities: the Energy Authority, the Nuclear Power Stations Authority, and the Nuclear Materials Authority."

Dr. 'Izzat asks: "When the nuclear program is given the death sentence, what will be the fate of these abilities and capabilities—the tens of millions we have spent on these nuclear installations, this large amount of scientific manpower, which cannot be measured in material terms?!"

"The answer is a good deal of frustration and a high rate of emigration to the countries of the advanced world!"

Finally, Dr. 'Izzat states: "One of the arguments used by Egyptian decisionmakers is their fear of the dangers posed by nuclear power stations, be it the possibility of contamination or the possibility of a nuclear accident like the one that happened at Chernobyl. This argument is refuted by the fact that nuclear reactor designs provide for the utmost degree of safety, a high rate of support and quality control, the substantial presence of backup safety equipment, and the existence of numerous agencies that use the most modern computers."

IRAQ

Demise of Hammadi Analyzed

92AE0019A *London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic*
2 Oct 91 pp 18-19

[Article: "After Expulsion From All Government, Party Posts: Sa'dun Hammadi's Execution Dossier Ready"]

[Text] With the downfall of former Iraqi Prime Minister Sa'dun Hammadi and his removal from all posts, and perhaps sending him to join his predecessors, the last bead in the old Ba'th Party leadership rosary has fallen. He has been preceded by a long line of leaders who were executed with a silent gun, run over by a car, or killed by

an unknown assailant. They include Hardan al-Tikriti, 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samara'i, 'Adnan Husayn, Muhammad al-Fadil, Muhammad 'Ayish, 'Abd-al-Karim Mustafa Nasrat, Nazim Kazzar, and others.

While Sa'dun Hammadi's removal in this all-too-familiar fashion happened some time ago and has been relegated to the back pages of Arab and Western newspapers, this matter is still playing in Iraq, and people are still talking about it, raising questions softly or, sometimes at gatherings, loudly, about the reasons and causes of his ouster and whether this was the final step or whether the gallows is awaiting the former prime minister.

Story With a Moral

Before tackling these questions and going into the probabilities and real reason behind the ouster of this man, a member of the Ba'th Party's first generation and one of its founders, it must be explained here that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn who, in the early days of his regime, was accustomed to making unexpected inspection tours of ministries and establishments, visited the Foreign Ministry when Sa'dun Hammadi was its minister, and it so happened that Hammadi was meeting with a foreign ambassador.

A senior Foreign Ministry official entered and informed the foreign minister that "Mr. President" was at the ministry awaiting him. Hammadi's reply was that Mr. President was at his ministry and to please wait until the meeting was over, because protocol made it impossible for him to cut short the meeting for any reason whatsoever.

The official returned to inform Hammadi that the president wanted to see him, but he received the same answer and was told to stay away. Indeed, Saddam Husayn left the ministry without seeing his foreign minister, who had insisted on going on with his meeting with the foreign emissary and not violating protocol.

Although this odd story is hard to believe because no one dares to rebel against Saddam Husayn, it is making the rounds in Baghdad and, if it is true, it is because it happened in the early days of the president's rule.

Days passed and Saddam Husayn did not raise the matter with his foreign minister. However, in the first joint meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Regional Command, the Iraqi president delivered a lengthy speech, as was his wont, about duty and the importance of duty, citing, as an example, the Foreign Ministry incident and praising Sa'dun Hammadi, "the loyal and dedicated comrade." He concluded, saying: "And, as a tribute to him, I believe that we should appoint him chairman of the National Council to take advantage of his expertise and abilities."

The hall broke out in applause, and some conferees laughed while the friends of this seasoned man gazed in amazement and disbelief at each other. This is how

Sa'dun Hammadi left the foreign ministry to move to that "grand" building in [Karradah Maryam] to go into oblivion, and to remain in the shadows until he was dusted off and returned to the forefront later in the Gulf war, under the pressing need to appease Iran and to solicit [the support of] the south, which is his home.

Since that incident at the Foreign Ministry, Saddam Husayn began repeating over and over, within earshot of some leaders, that "comrade" Sa'dun was a good and very capable man, but he lacked courage and leadership qualities. The Iraqi president does not miss any opportunity to recount that, during the 'Abd-al-Salam coup, when Hammadi was a minister, he had a nervous breakdown and the party leadership punished him by freezing his party membership. But when he was reinstated right after the 1968 coup, he only reached the position of member of a Group Command, the lowest rank in the Ba'th Party.

It is said that this issue was raised in a leadership meeting during former Iraqi President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr's regime, and that some of Saddam's supporters blamed him for opposing the timing of the 1968 coup, saying that he advocated patience and opposed the view that an agreement ought to be reached with 'Arif 'Abd-al-Razzaq and 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Nayif, and later turn against them, and this is what exactly happened. Sa'dun Hammadi stood up to defend himself, directing his words at Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr:

"Yes, that was my opinion, and I was against participation in the said coup because we had a painful experience with 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif when we took part in his coup against 'Abd-al-Karim 'Arif, and he turned against us, for which we had to pay a heavy price." He went on to say: "But when the decision was made by the majority, I was in the forefront. Isn't that right, Abu-Haytham (meaning al-Bakr)? Al-Bakr replied: "Yes, that's right."

The Gulf Crisis

Going back to the Gulf crisis, we find that Saddam Husayn selected Sa'dun Hammadi to make the well-known deal with Iran out of his belief that Hammadi might be acceptable to Tehran because he was a Shi'iah and was not a symbol of the Iran-Iraq war. Some say that the Iraqi president did not believe that the war would end the way it did, so he wanted to push him into this to get rid of him later on the charge of negligence and collusion with the Iranian Government. Since attempts to neutralize Iran fully, if unable to draw it to the Iraqi side, were a dismal failure, Saddam Husayn kept saying that "comrade" Sa'dun was not up to the task and not decisive with regard to the deal he made with the Iranian leadership. He accused Hammadi indirectly of collusion with Iran, and when the situation in the south flared up, Saddam stepped up his accusation of his party and government colleague, but [he kept him on] because he needed him, thinking that the United States and the West might accept a liberal that they could communicate with and bet on.

But despite Hammadi's appointment as prime minister, Saddam continued to malign him, accusing him of failing to do what others had done in those difficult days, in an effort to laud 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, whom he described as the "hero" who led the campaign against the "riffraff," and to heap praise on his other vice president, Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jazrawi, Interior Minister Hasan 'Ali al-Majid, who became a household name during the Basrah events and the Kurdish movement.

Some accounts say, with reasonable certainty, that Saddam was, and still is, convinced that Sa'dun Hammadi, during his frequent visits to Tehran, made a deal with the Iranians to take power, and that is why he adopted a different position when events in the south flared up and he did not leave Baghdad for his hometown of Karbala' until after he learned that government forces had decisively taken control there.

Some circles close to the Iraqi president's supporters say that, during the final days of the war, when the Iraqi leadership used Imam Musa al-Kazim's residence in Baghdad as its headquarters, Sa'dun Hammadi seemed disconcerted, shaken, and dejected. Some impartial people deny this allegation, saying that the leadership did not set up its headquarters at Imam al-Kazim's residence, but rather at some villas in the Baghdad suburbs, and that Hammadi was neither shaken nor dejected, adding that he went to Karbala' at the worst possible time to lead the confrontation with the "riffraff," even though he came from a small family, spent most of his years in the Iraqi capital, and is not popular in his hometown.

Decisive Moments

People in the know say that Hammadi spent his time as prime minister touching his neck all the time [worrying], but kept asking that a full investigation be conducted to fix the blame for the disaster that Iraq, the region, and the Arab nation suffered, and insisting on the abolition of the single-party formula and the adoption of a multi-party system and Western-style democracy.

On the other hand, accusations against him kept multiplying, and party circles everywhere began receiving directives about Sa'dun's plotting and collusion with Iran, saying that he was preparing himself to take power if the movement in the south succeeded, and that his raising the multi-party slogan was aimed at crushing the Ba'th Party in Iraq, just as Yeltsin had crushed Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union under the same slogan.

The fact is that Saddam Husayn, who employs well-known techniques to liquidate his opponents, followed the same technique with Sa'dun Hammadi, and sentenced him to death, using the party instead of a silencer or hangman's rope, because this was not the proper time to liquidate him in the old way, and because the regime and the party in this situation could not withstand violent shocks as before.

Therefore, the campaign focused on Sa'dun Hammadi throughout the two months of party elections, which included all leadership posts, from a [discussion] circle to the regional conference with groups, sections, and chapters in between. So when the regional conference was held, Hammadi's downfall was assured, and plans to remove him and strip him of all duties and party and official responsibilities were ready.

In the regional conference, which was cooked on a low fire and preceded by a winnowing process that eliminated all the neutrals and those of questionable loyalty to "Mr. President," several altercations and confrontations between Saddam Husayn and his prime minister broke out.

Sa'dun Hammadi was focusing on the need and importance of admitting defeat, changing old ways, opening up liberties, and adopting the multi-party system and democracy, while Saddam Husayn insisted that he did not feel that his country had lost in the "great show-down," accusing those who were advocating Western-style democracy of being collaborators dreaming of playing the same role Boris Yeltsin played in the Soviet Union.

In his keynote address to the regional conference, which lasted over three hours, Saddam said that "he could not allow the application of Western-style democracy, and that he would not keep any official who admires the Western experience." He was actually addressing Sa'dun Hammadi, who was aware that he was finished, and that things would stop at his removal from his party and government posts.

Although many people say that party elections in the last conference were extremely honest, since Saddam Husayn's most intimate associates; his son 'Uday; and his former information minister, Latif Nusayyif Jasim; and others say that these elections were elaborately planned, and thus, Sa'dun was tragically dropped, and that the percentage of votes among the first-echelon figures was in keeping with their closeness to or alienation from the president. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the difference between the votes 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and interior minister Hasan 'Ali al-Majid received was one—in favor of the former.

Last Accusation

In the aftermath of these events, wide-ranging reports circulating in Baghdad indicate that Sa'dun Hammadi's indictment dossier for "high crimes" is ready, and he has only two options left: either follow the example of his former colleague, Na'im Haddan, and open a store, keep his mouth shut, and give up public life; or be driven, when the right time comes, to the execution square on the charge of collaboration with the West and "American imperialism" and making a deal with the Iranian Government behind the regime's back.

ISRAEL

Bi'r Zayt Lecturer on PLO, Leadership

92AE0032A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
4 Oct 91 p 5B

[Article by Yosi Torfstein]

[Text] On 4 December 1986, about one year before the intifadah broke out, a lecturer at Bi'r Zayt University sat down on the ground across from the startled faces of IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers at a roadblock near the village of Abu Qash not far from Bi'r Zayt.

He called to students on the verge of a confrontation with the soldiers to follow his example. Most of them joined in the sit-down strike. Tempers among the students, whose numbers grew into the hundreds, were running hot because of a series of preventive closures over the course of some weeks that had utterly disrupted their studies. The lecturer even convinced the furious students to permit the passage of a military vehicle carrying a pair of frightened Israeli soldiers who had been caught in their midst. He tried, without success, to restrain the students and speak with the officer at the roadblock. The officer gave orders for his immediate arrest and for dispersal of the mob of students by use of tear gas grenades. Two stones were thrown from the direction of the students, who had become unruly. The incident ended with two students killed by shots fired by the IDF. The slain pair belonged to the campus branch of the "Islamic Bloc."

The arrested lecturer believes today that the incident began as a limited and spontaneous protest that flared into something much bigger because of the Israeli reaction. He sees other key elements in the incident, of which recourse to nonviolent protest was one. The crucial point is that, during the course of it, he became an independent man, someone unidentified with any organization, and a symbol of the Palestinian masses of the intifadah. Two senior leaders of the "Shabibah" who were present hesitated and did not get involved. In his opinion, that was the first event to highlight the new stage of the Islamic movement: direct, violent confrontation on the street. Those, he says, are the central features of what happened about a year before the intifadah. Today, many agree with him that that was one of the signs heralding the intifadah and the civil revolt.

The lecturer is Salah Jawad 'Ata Hammil, 39 years old, born into one of the original clans of the town of al-Birah, married to an Egyptian woman, father to three children, and the son of the mayor of al-Birah who was deported in 1973. He was an independent representative on the PLO's working committee and now serves on its Central Council. His daughters have led a number of women's demonstrations in al-Birah. His wife has been wounded twice by rubber bullets. Soldiers have beaten his nine-year-old son. Six times he has been sent to prison, three times in Egypt and three times in Israel. During an investigation in 1980, the General Security

Service failed in an attempt to coerce him into becoming a collaborator. He was left with deeply negative impressions. To this day, he is very careful about unduly close contacts with government officials.

He is active in various ways in the civil revolt of the intifadah. For example, he took part in 1990 in a hunger strike of Palestinian activists and leaders in Jerusalem as a protest against the murder of [Arab] laborers in Rishon Letzion. He was hospitalized during the strike. He often acts as a mediator between quarrelling factions in the Palestinian camp. Like many of his intellectual colleagues, he also serves as a liaison to the foreign media, particularly in France. He wrote his doctoral thesis in French, while in France, on the Fatah organization.

All this, besides the incident at Abu Qash that added to his not insignificant fame, provides Jawad enough "national credit" to dare to level biting criticism against the intifadah, the leadership and the PLO—but from the viewpoint of someone personally involved who mourns its debasement. In that, he reflects the opinion of many activists of the middle generation who, some months ago, publicly issued a demand for reform and democracy.

It is his opinion that the intifadah has failed to change the balance of power vis-a-vis Israel and to bring about a concrete transformation in internal social relations, which were characterized at the start by a high degree of unity. In his view, what remains of the intifadah today are local actions that no longer meet the needs of circumstances and over which it is difficult to exercise control. "The strikes, for instance, are superfluous now. They do not produce effective results. Indeed, they succeed only in inflicting severe economic hardship on our people.

"The intifadah exhausted its usefulness more than a year and a half ago when it made the world conscious of the occupation and presented the inhabitants of the territories as the central cadre in the national struggle," Jawad declares in forceful terms. "The time has come to pause for thought, to analyze the preceding events and learn their lessons, and then to map out a new plan for the rest of the journey. That is the only way to advance and develop the intifadah. But there is no one to do that in a systematic and analytical way, not inside (that is, in the territories) or outside (in the PLO)."

In his opinion, the territories today show a tendency for "military" action by the various groups of shock troops, but that is not "armed struggle" in the conventional sense, which is measured by the ability to make a significant change in the situation. Jawad stresses that, had it been up to him, the Palestinian struggle would never have been truly an armed one. Such a struggle must be a popular war encompassing most of the strata of society. It is a vision something like Mao's original ideas. What has occurred in practice thus far has actually been restricted to isolated groups of members of the

organizations without a national basis. Most of them have been captured or killed.

The conclusion one draws from his comments is that even the current "military" activity of stabbings and shootings, although it may cause Israel more harm than it suffered in the past, is ineffective because it is not leading to anything.

Liquidation of Palestinian collaborators, according to him, is an unfortunate aspect of the intifadah. It is possible, however, to understand it in light of the persistent pressure brought to bear against the Palestinians and the tremendous harm done by collaborators. Apart from that, most of those who are eliminating collaborators are young and uneducated, people who have found in the intifadah an opportune stage on which to show off. When the army comes looking for them, they feel like caged animals snared with the aid of collaborators.

Jawad sees himself first and foremost as a historian despite the opportunities he has enjoyed to vault into the local leadership. "I am not built for routine political activity," he says of himself. "It is easier for me as a historian to make a rational analysis of the situation. That is an asset lacking in our emotional society." Nonetheless, he commands great respect from those around him, both by his own right and by virtue of his father.

Jawad recognizes the right of Israel to exist. As a historian who took a three-month course in Hebrew and Jewish history while he was in France, and as an archeology buff, he finds it impossible to close his eyes to the vast Jewish presence in the history of the land. "It may even be that the Jews have cultural and historical ties to the land stronger than those of the Palestinians," he says. This outlook contradicts much of the Palestinian trend to prove the historical dominance of Palestine by advancing a continuous connection from the peoples of Canaan to the Palestinians of today.

He does not regard that, however, as the crux of the matter. The freedom of man, equal rights for all, and justice are his criteria, a sort of "Archimedes point" by which he weighs the situation. "From that point of view, Israel is still a racist state, just as the Moslem extremists charge. It discriminates against Palestinians, deprives them of their rights and wrongs them every day. I am willing to live under Israeli, Jordanian or Palestinian rule, but I prefer, of course, to be governed by Palestinians, because such a regime will be democratic and guided by justice."

He argues that the average Israeli never considers how heavily the daily repression weighs on the territories. This, he says, is a slogan inspired not by the national struggle but by personal reality, extending to the little details of life even if they seem to be trivialities.

In a world of permits for every action, which means waiting lines and applications to Israeli government officials, every trip to Jerusalem, for example, becomes a

small nightmare if one travels without permission. And that happens many times each day. A drive that he once made to Eilat with his wife and an Israeli couple became an even bigger nightmare because no hotel would agree to lodge Jawad and his wife.

He believes that the discriminatory and humiliating way many Israelis, soldiers and employers, behave towards Palestinians even today, after the outbreak of the intifadah as a result of that, continues to instill a growing anger in every resident of the territories, stamping a deep and destructive mark on relations between the two peoples and subverting settlement of their dispute.

Most Palestinians, he contends, meet only the Israeli oppressor—the soldier, the settler, the employer. This fact distorts the Israeli image. Many do not understand that it is possible to talk even with the soldier who hits them. Indeed, despite everything, there are Israeli cultural norms. For their part, Israelis have a distorted image of Palestinians: for example, the Palestinian mother as a demographic machine who feels no grief for the death of her son. Jawad is certain that peace will banish these false images.

He takes little comfort in the regional conference, in which he feels the Palestinians must take part although it augurs ill for them. "Perhaps such a conference can at least prevent the slide towards a quiet transfer [of Arabs from the territories], which a majority of the government's ministers are plotting with the support of 60 percent of the Israeli public."

On the other hand, the censure he heaps on the Palestinian leadership is so sharp as almost to place him at risk. "The Israelis," he smiles, "tend to exaggerate the value of the PLO as an institution. They do not appreciate how corrupt it is and hobbled by inefficient bureaucracy. If it had depended on the PLO, the intifadah would never have erupted. Even deported Palestinians who did not believe me while they were still here had changed their minds when I met them after they became involved in the PLO."

"The current leadership must be replaced," Jawad proclaims. "It has lied to the people for 20 years and failed to lead it as a true, enlightened leadership." The final example is the gulf war and the Palestinian support for Iraq, a critical mistake against which Jawad warned from the first days of the crisis. The local leadership in the territories, which was swept along with the line adopted by the PLO and the masses, suffered an erosion of its ability to lead as a result. None of them has been required to justify these mistakes.

He concludes, therefore, that the PLO must undergo a serious shake-up. "Who knows how delegates to the PLO institutions are selected? The 'resistance organizations' have grabbed the biggest slice of the pie of representation and pushed aside the 'independents' and the 'interior.' All this has to be changed in elections in the PLO and in free political elections in the territories so that authentic representatives can be picked."

The need for free elections in the territories has become a matter of consensus. In a public opinion poll published by the weekly AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI on September 14 this year, 63.7 percent of those questioned favored the proposal.

Jawad, however, foresees no genuine reform of the PLO so long as the current leadership sits at the helm. His criticism of the PLO rests not only on his objective analysis but also on personal experience. Throughout most of 1947, he lived with his father in Beirut, where he had such a close view that he could observe even the table manners of [Yasir] 'Arafat, or "the sergeant," as he is called in the territories. His father, who frequently argued with 'Arafat, split with him even at that time because of the corruption rampant in the PLO and over the issue of the proper importance of the "interior" in the organization's decisions. Maher, Jawad's brother, then died under suspicious circumstances while he was in the company of Fatah personnel in Beirut.

In his own way, Jawad expresses the mood of many in the territories on a range of issues. But unlike others, the words of this Francophile echo against the background of the French revolution, or the Palestinian version of it. It is not necessarily Marxism or even exactly nationalism in the Fatah mold. Perhaps for that reason, he is dubbed "independent"—the definition he has chosen and on which he insists.

Analysis on Wording of Resolution 242

TA0511101191 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 5 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by Eliyahu Zehavi]

[Text] Danish Ambassador Hans Tabor, rotating chairman of the Security Council in June 1967 and a participant in the "behind-the-scenes" negotiations to formulate resolution 242, that was passed in November 1967, yesterday said to the newspaper, POLITICIAN, that the phrasing accepted after a compromise was the English version, which spoke of "withdrawal from occupied territories," and therefore does not obligate Israel to withdraw from all of the occupied territories. The ambassador noted that the formulation allows Israel to withdraw from territories while taking security concerns into consideration.

"The controversial resolution 242 does not demand Israeli withdrawal from all of the territories that it captured in 1967. On the contrary, the resolution permits Israel, due to security considerations, to hold on to some of the territories," said the ambassador. "The English version was the result of a compromise between opposing positions, and it was not possible to attain agreement for another version given the power relations then prevailing in the Security Council. The English version resolution 242 is the original one. The French translation of the resolution, wherein the article 'the' was

added to the phrase 'occupied territories,' thereby essentially changing the resolution's content, came later and is based on the English version," added Tabor.

He concluded by saying: "Sometimes one must prefer an obscure text over a clear one out of political considerations. In my opinion, today also, the political situation is the cause which prevents a different and flexible version of the resolution."

Commentary Warns Against Signing Nuclear Treaty

TA1510102291 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 Oct 91 p B1

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Against a Nuclear Strip-tease"]

[Excerpt] Anyone who believes that Israel will now sign the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, after the treaty's impotence was manifestly proven in the Iraqi debacle, is simply deluding himself. Israel does not even have second thoughts about its position against joining the treaty. Israel is digging its heels into the ground out of a feeling that all its complaints about the treaty have been proven right. Anyone now proposing to sign the treaty is simply naive if he believes that one can be a smart aleck and only have part of the supervision enforced, as if one was only a little bit pregnant. Israel is the last country that would be permitted to get away with this.

Israel had many reasons for rejecting the proposals to sign the treaty, which included among other arguments: The treaty's supervisory means are not tough enough, and occasionally, as in the case of Iraq, it can even serve as a convenient front for clandestine activity. Even International Atomic Energy Agency officials admit that the supervisory measures have failed, while the members of the committee appointed by the Security Council to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have been considerably more blunt in their criticism.

Therefore, the current demand that Israel join the treaty has been softened. There has been talk mainly about the danger posed by the weapons of mass destruction and about general proposals for arms control, such as the plan proposed by President Bush, while at the same time preparations are under way for a rewording of the treaty in 1995. The intention is to update the treaty and to make it more comprehensive and effective. The Americans have set up a committee of experts for this purpose and everybody is getting ready for a big argument, because the disagreements revolve not only around the issue of supervisory measures but also around the experiments carried out by the nuclear powers.

That is why, when the United States and Israel today hold discussions about the latter joining the treaty, they are really referring to the more distant future after 1995, following the treaty's rewording. President Bush's arms

control proposal notes that all the countries in the region will eventually join the nonproliferation treaty.

As far as is known, there still has not been any presidential decision to constrict Israel's activities on this issue. This may happen one day, after everyone is certain that Iraq cannot repeat its nuclear adventure; however, there is no proof that this is the situation today. This is the last thing Washington will do while it is asking Israel to attend a regional peace conference in which it will be asked to make concessions. Washington can barely handle major weapons suppliers like the PRC, so why should it open another Pandora's box?

Bush's arms control proposal contains an implicit demand to stop the production of nuclear weapons. In other words, as far as Israel is concerned, U.S. experts explain, the intention is to place the Dimona nuclear reactor under supervision (the other reactor, in Nahal Soreq, has been under supervision for a long time), but not to touch Israel's nuclear capability, at least not for the foreseeable future. And, since the supervision will not only affect weapons production but apply to fissionable materials in general, this constitutes a more comprehensive supervision of the Arab countries.

Bush's plan mentions Israel's joining the nonproliferation treaty, but, as noted earlier, only in the future. Therefore, it should cause no wonder that there are those proposing that Israel not categorically reject Bush's proposal. Israel is indeed proceeding cautiously on this matter, even though it has many reservations about the U.S. President's proposal. Israel, in any event, is not withdrawing back from its long-stated readiness to declare the Middle East a region free from nuclear weapons within the framework of the peace process. [passage omitted]

IDF Establishing New Companies To Serve in Territories

TA0810134291 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew
8 Oct 91 p 1

[Report by On Levi]

[Text] As part of its multiyear work plan, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] intend to set up a number of new companies over the next five years. Some of these companies will serve in the territories. Senior military sources reported this fact yesterday, asserting that several of these units will be armored infantry units, one of which will be set up soon.

Senior army sources said that they were encouraged by the fact that many new draftees arriving at the recruitment centers ask to join the units in the territories. The sources claimed that these units currently serve approximately eight and a half months in the territories per year, while the remaining three and a half months are used for training.

The commanders of the forces to which the companies were attached took good care of their soldiers and this resulted in the troops displaying a high level of motivation and soldiery.

Sharon's Housing Administrator on Ongoing Projects

91AE0015A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
(Financial Supplement) 24 Sep 91 p 46

[Article by Hagar 'Enosh: "In the Territories the Ministry of Housing Only Carries Out Government Policy"; boldface words as published]

[Text] **"In the territories the Ministry of Housing only carries out government policy,"** says the General Director of the Housing Ministry, 'Arye Ber, and thus refutes allegations that it is a question of the private projects of his boss, 'Ari'el Sharon.

'Arye Ber, 47, has now been serving for half a year as General Director of the Housing Ministry—a stormy and interesting half year, beyond compare with any that came before. He came to the Ministry as a youth after being sent there by the Youth Employment Office. 'Ariq Sharon is the ninth Housing Minister that Ber has known since he started work there.

I conducted my conversation with him at noon on Friday in Ber's old office in the depressing concrete structure of the "Negev Center" in Be'er Sheva'. In a somewhat surprising manner, and certainly one without precedent, Ber continues to hold, together with the General Directorship, his previous position, as well as manager of the Negev district. He has, of course, a replacement, even two of them, but they only deal with the regular work. The General Director of the Ministry, who appears in the district office on the government workers' free Friday, continues to make the fundamental decisions in the district that provided him his life's opportunities. Ber has a ready and logical explanation for his inability to sever his ties to the district: 30 percent of the construction planned by the Housing Ministry is focused on the Negev. The solutions that he is formulating for the district will, in general, be good and applicable for the Galilee and the Jerusalem area, as well. In any case, he is doing two jobs on one salary.

'Arye Ber summarizes half a year as General Director of the Ministry, which is one of the most screwed up in the country's history—a direct consequence of grand programs and take-charge leadership—as well as a cesspool of public administration rules, which it openly scorns. Ber formulates this initial summary very carefully, trying not to insult and also not to be too modest about his share and contribution in fixing snafus. In the end he compromises on the definition of establishing rules and getting things in order. Order, above all, in the Housing Ministry's budget, which this summer revealed a deviation of a billion and a half shekels.

[Ber] No, it is incorrect to speak of a budget deviation. Deviation means that they were obligated to pay but there is no money, and that is not what happened. Rather it is a question of a budget deficit of a billion and half. That is the amount that is lacking for implementing programs, and that is the order of magnitude of the mistake that was made in the calculations.

They thought, for example, that the infrastructure per housing unit would cost 15,000 shekels. You know how much it really costs? 35,000. When I came and saw that, I said that we cannot swallow this joke. For two months I did nothing, I did not open my mouth at all, I only pored over the calculations. Now we have to make sure that it will not happen again. It should not happen in a professional ministry, and I am responsible for that.

After he calculated the size of the disgrace in the cost forecast, Ber took up what he calls "setting up work procedures in all areas of the Ministry's involvement"—from the allocation of land to entrepreneurs and companies to the contributions for building ritual baths and neighborhood playgrounds. In the construction sector they cast doubt on the ability of the General Director—of the General Directorship, actually—to deal with the legions of wheelers and dealers, advisors and confidants, the friends of 'Ariq and the representatives of the political power brokers.

It is a fact, says Ber, that there is now order in the decision-making process, there are procedures, and there are no more signed and scribbled notes.

Baloney, say the real estate sharks in derision, the veterans of the mass loosening of the rules that increase a man's wealth eleven hundred times in a minute. Sharon has stopped distributing "notes" and now works with a small account book, like he saw Pinhas Sapir using. "If the account book is not actually in his hand, then it is with his personal advisor. And what is written in it, no 'Arye Ber is going to contradict."

Of course it is not necessary to have exaggerated hopes. If Ber should manage to rein in somewhat the members of the Center, who wander the corridors, and wean his Minister of his inclination to run all over the hills and listen to everyone who comes up with some fantastic program, this appointment could go down as one of the wisest steps the Housing Minister has taken in a long time. For Ber really knows his stuff, he is really capable of finding common language with the mayors, he owes no political debts to anyone and he is fully and avowedly prepared to make do with a job that the law assigns to a civil servant: the exemplary execution of government policy.

Since he sees his position as the execution of government policy, he can justify in a logical, almost persuasive manner, two of the most problematic points in the Housing Ministry's construction program: the accelerated construction in the territories and the overly massive construction in the Negev, where there are no

reserves of inhabitants and also no demand for apartments, except in Be'er Sheva.

[Ber] These two things are the implementation of government decisions. The government decided to increase the settlements in Judea and Samaria and to settle another 400,000 people in the Negev. That kind of program cannot be carried out without construction.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] But in 'Ofaqim it is impossible to sell apartments.

[Ber] How do you think they dispersed the population in the past? In the '70's the Housing Ministry built 50,000 apartments. Not in a program like today, but in direct budget construction. How did we get people to those apartments? How did they settle Karmi'el? In the beginning they sold no apartments. They let the people rent them. They came, saw the place, got used to it, found work. Only afterward did they buy the apartments.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] But it is impossible to find work today in the Negev.

[Ber] If everyone would do their duty instead of giving speeches and cutting ribbons, things would be different today.

Ber, who has no publicly known political identification, can identify professionally with the policy of building in the territories without anyone being able to accuse him of advancing goals close to his personal preference. Therefore he is more useful to Gush 'Emunim than a certified representative of the "Whole Land of Israel."

Construction in the territories today constitutes about 16 percent of the Housing Ministry's program for the years 1990-1991 (16 thousand apartment units out of 98 thousand, not including "caravans"), but the fact is that the program is being carried out faster in the territories than anywhere else.

[Ber] The government decided to build; therefore, the job of the Housing Ministry is to build. Construction in the territories is rapid, despite the topographical conditions, because it is easy for the contractors to sell the apartments, because the local councils facilitate rather than impede and because there are no problems with the land. In the final analysis, construction in places like 'Ari'el also provides a solution to the lack of apartments in the center of the country, which concerns all the Treasury officials.

This argumentation helps Ber so strongly oppose the Ministry's budget for 1992, as it was certified by the government under pressure from Treasury. Limiting the Ministry to 15,000 new apartment units (in addition to a surplus of about 35,000 to be built next year under funding from the program for 1990-1991) and the drastic reduction of incentives and of purchase obligations—all of these things were, in his opinion, done deliberately, with malice aforethought, and were intended to push the contractors to build on the coastal plain.

[Ber] Treasury says this: you can build with purchase guarantees using foreign companies and industrially produced prefabricated construction. If I come and say that this deprives Israeli contractors, they say: Go right ahead; you can build 15 thousand apartment units with local companies, but only under the new conditions, without a purchase guarantee. Where will the contractors build them? In Rishon-le-Tzion or in the Galilee? Thus, by economic means, Treasury officials decide to change policy set by the government.

Even after the heads of the budget branch and chairman of the finance committee were pacified and the Housing Ministry got a supplement of 870 million shekels for its budget this year, there is still not enough money to prepare the infrastructure for all the new neighborhoods in the program.

[Ber] Everyone refuses to understand the real significance of the fact that I can build a neighborhood, but am not to concern myself with the public structures in it. How can I build new houses alongside an old neighborhood without sidewalks and street lights? Now we are not allowed to pave a sidewalk even for the old ones because that is the job of the local council or Interior Ministry. Is anyone not thinking about the social significance of this? I do not know how these mayors run around like on drugs every 15th of the month to get money for salaries. How can you task the mayors of these poor towns with worrying about public buildings, a modern sewer network or gardening? If a mayor has 12 thousand inhabitants and absorbs another 6,000 immigrants, can he build them anything? I do not know, does a caravan neighborhood also need a tree and a bench to sit on? Is it impossible to build neighborhoods without a supermarket and a drop of milk? The country decided on regional development. The immigration from the USSR provides a historic opportunity to carry this out without pushing only weak populations into those areas. But we continue to take advantage of the weak. The country is responsible for the construction and development of cities. To throw all that on the council heads is a mistake, and the day will come when we will all be sorry about it, just as we are sorry about missing the opportunity of developing the Negev after the retreat from Sinai.

I am afraid of the problems that will arise if we do not learn from the past, because tomorrow we will all pay the price. When they waved the bloody flag in Wadi Salib, in Qeren Qayemet Leyisra'el Street in Be'er Sheva they threw stones and broke into stores. I saw all that as a child. I cannot forget it and we must not forget it.

Ge'ula Kohen on Silwan Settlers

92AE0021A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew (Weekend Supplement) 11 Oct 91 p 16

[Article by MK (Knesset Member) Ge'ula Kohen: "Why Now? Why Here?"]

[Text] Why, at all? Why was it at all necessary to purchase these homes in Kfar Shiloah [Silwan], thus

creating an issue and noise over Jews residing in Jerusalem? Is Jerusalem not ours? For it is in our interest not to place Jerusalem into the controversy at all—says the Minister of Justice—while this "settlement" in Kfar Shiloah will put it into the controversy and, from our perspective, prejudice its status....

What ostrich-like policy—Mr. Minister of Justice! Does this Jerusalem of ours currently not stand at the height of the controversy and the political struggle? Did you, yourself, Minister of Justice, and the entire government not say, and more than once, that while not at the first stage of the negotiations, but at the second stage, Jerusalem will, indeed, come up for discussion?

Indeed, ostrich-like policy...are we those who are challenging the status of Jerusalem, or is it government policy and particularly your policy, Honorable Minister of Justice, which is enabling the Jerusalem PLO, i.e., Faysal Husayni and Hanan 'Ashrawi, to meet freely with 'Arafat, who has recently said: "Long live the State of Palestine, the capital of which is Jerusalem, the capital of which is Jerusalem, the capital of which is Jerusalem."

What ostrich-like policy...while our enemies, as well as our friend, the United States, openly, daily, and loudly demand the cessation of Jewish construction even in united Jerusalem, this government continues to say: "ssssh, quiet! It is forbidden to disturb the quiet in Jerusalem...let us continue to stand at attention and to sing "Hatikvah" (our hope still has not been lost...land of Zion and Jerusalem), even if at that same moment our enemy exploits that foolish standing at attention of ours and tries to pickpocket us out of Jerusalem.

Why now? Why particularly now, at this time, did Jews, even possessing a lawful writ of ownership, have to enter and settle in these homes in Kfar Shiloah? Why particularly now, when political negotiations are being conducted? Why now, sabotaging Baker's upcoming visit to the region?

What hypocritical thinking...and if we assume that the Jewish residents had entered their lawfully purchased homes prior to the commencement of the political negotiations, would not these loudmouths have asked: "why particularly now?" And three years ago, when Jews moved into a house that they had lawfully purchased in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem, before Baker and the regional conference even existed, did they not use the miserable excuse of timing?

The timing of the settlers of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and the City of David is not political, but timing that is always related solely to the Zionist process, a process in which any time is fit and vital to settlement. In contrast, it is those who attempted in the past and are also currently attempting to appeal to the settlers who are acting out of political timing, out of fear of political pressure—yesterday Rogers, today Baker.

Why at night? Why like "thieves in the night," both people from the right and demagogues from the left ask

innocently. We shall rid ourselves of the demagogues from the left with the question: and if the houses in the City of David had been entered at noon rather than at night, would you have blessed it then? If the "settlement" had been undertaken under the auspices of the government and the police would you not have cursed it, as well? And hand on your heart—had you known ahead of time of the intention to reside in these houses, would you not have hurried to pressure the American administration to pressure the government of Israel not to realize this intention?

But we shall say to the innocent (and those who purport to be innocent, like MK [Knesset Member] 'Ovadia 'Ali): It is pitiful and painful that the purchase of houses in the heart of the Old City and the City of David and the settling of Jews within them not only is not done by the government itself, but not even with its blessing. Now, like many times in the past, it is even done behind its back.... It is painful and pitiful, but it is the government itself that has brought us down to this situation. Not only does the government not actively encourage the settlement of Jews in the heart of the Old City and the City of David, but it delays and prevents them [from doing so].

Why here? Why particularly here, in the City of David that borders Kfar Shiloah, now settled entirely by Arabs; moreover, it is the most hostile of the villages in the area. Except that this question, too, is based upon hypocrisy. Several months ago, when a number of Jewish families settled in a settlement called "Revava", a point that is not located near any Arab villages in the area, did those from the left who spoke of intentional provocation not alert the entire world.

Every settlement in Judaea and Samaria and Gaza—and I have had the privilege to accompany many of them—was accompanied by the question: "why particularly here?" "why particularly in the heart of a dense Arab area?" Yet in today's reality, more Jews are being killed in the heart of "kosher" cities within the green line, while the number of Jewish settlers within Hebron—among the most hostile Arab cities in Israel—is increasing.

Upon awakening yesterday morning with sunrise in a structure that was once a Jewish home within Kfar Shiloah (and I hope that it will be so tomorrow, as well), it was the first time in recent months that I awoke with the joy of the City of David in my heart, instead of the distress of James Baker.

Economic Performance, Credit Rating High

TA1310094491 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
11 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Judy Maltz]

[Text] The respected journal EUROMONEY gives Israel a higher 1991 credit rating than the U.S. In a special issue now being published for the annual conference of the International Monetary Fund, the journal raises Israel's credit rating from number 60 in the world in

1990 to number 38 this year—one of the biggest jumps by any country. EUROMONEY, published in London, specializes in international finance. Economic sources in Jerusalem yesterday estimated that the new rating which appears in an issue to be distributed among all the Finance Ministers and Central Bank governors next week at the IMF conference in Bangkok, will lead to an improvement in Israel's economic image. This, in light of the critical articles which appeared in the United States over the past two weeks which questioned Israel's ability to repay loans.

"The publication in a respected journal proves that elements checking the condition of our economy raise our ranking in terms of our credibility and ability to repay debts. I suspect that the reports in the American press reflect a lack of understanding of the reform process and the changes which our economy has undergone since 1985, in all areas including the capital market, finance, supervision of foreign currency, subsidies, and even the privatization and marketing of lands," said the Finance Minister's senior economic adviser, Shlomo Maoz, last night. About a month ago, the American investment bank, Solomon Brothers, published a very positive report on the Israeli economy, calling for the state's credit rating to be raised. On the other hand, in the past two weeks, the Export-Import Bank and the Congressional research department published negative reports questioning Israel's economic credibility.

According to EUROMONEY, Israel is ranked 41 out of 126 countries, with regard to its "overall economic performance". Japan is ranked first, while the United States is ranked 55—below Israel. Iraq is at the bottom of the list. Israel is also ranked ahead of other Western countries including Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Four out of the top five countries on the list are in the Far East—Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. According to EUROMONEY's forecast, Israel's economic performance rating will improve even more in 1993. The journal gives Israel a 4.88 (out of 10) mark in this area for 1991 and predicts that its mark in 1993 will be 5.11. The highest mark, Japan's, was 7.63 in 1991 and the United States received a 4.16 mark.

With regard to credit ratings, Japan was again first and Iraq was again last. Israel was ranked 38. This ranking is based on a number of criteria such as political risks, ability to repay debts, accessibility to international capital markets, and economic indicators such as debt repayments compared to exports and foreign debt compared to domestic product.

In Israel, debt repayments went down from 32 percent of export income in 1986 to 24 percent in 1989, while foreign debt part of domestic production decreased from 62 percent in 1986 to 31 percent in 1990. Israel's credit rating, according to EUROMONEY, is better than that of all South American countries, except Mexico, most of the large Middle East oil exporters, and all of the East European countries, except Czechoslovakia.

Shekel Devalued 6.1 Percent Since Mid-Sep

TA2310130391 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
23 Oct 91 p A1

[Report by Judy Meltz and Guy Rolnik]

[Excerpts] Following extensive demand for foreign currency, the shekel exchange rate set a new record yesterday, reaching 2.445 shekels to the U.S. dollar. This is almost 0.15 shekel higher than the exchange rate in mid-September when the wave of foreign currency purchases first started. [passage omitted]

The Bank of Israel yesterday reported an extra demand of \$41.4 million, of which it supplied \$39.6 million. Due to the rise in the dollar rate on the world markets, the shekel was devalued by 0.34 percent yesterday, and the new rate at the end of yesterday's business day was set at 2.445 to the dollar.

Since mid-September, the Bank of Israel sold the public more than \$700 million to supply the demand for foreign currency. During the same period, the shekel was devalued by 6.1 percent to the dollar, and a similar devaluation was noted when compared with the European Credit Units. [passage omitted]

JORDAN

Source Links Ministers' Dismissal to Support for Iraq

92P40031A Paris AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic
14 Oct 91 p 9

[Text] A prominent Arab ambassador in Beirut has revealed to AL-DUWALIYAH that the real reason that Jordanian Prime Minister Tahir al-Masri dismissed five ministers from his government, among them Foreign Minister 'Abdallah al-Nusur, was not only their rejection of [Jordan's] participation in the peace conference, but also their continuing support for the position of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and the demand that Jordan continue to stick by him.

The aforementioned Arab ambassador said that the dismissal of al-Nusur and the other four ministers came about as the result of existing unspoken differences between Amman and Baghdad that were bound to come out into the open after things came to a head.

The same Arab diplomat stated that the unspoken differences between Baghdad and Amman follow the confusion of the most recent attempt to interfere in Jordanian affairs by the five aforementioned ministers and some Muslim Brotherhood deputies. This convinced King Husayn to ask Tahir al-Masri to make the recent governmental changes, which removed from power all ministers who supported the [Muslim] Brotherhood and Iraq.

LEBANON

Names of Delegation to Bilateral Talks Reported

92P40041A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 2 Nov 91 p 2

[Text] Beirut, AL-HAYAH—AL-HAYAH has learned from high-level Lebanese sources that the government has decided to ask Ambassador Zafir al-Hasan, director of political affairs in the foreign ministry; Mahmud Hammud, ambassador to the UK; Naji Abu-al-'Asi, ambassador to Senegal; and Dr. Ghassan Salamah to represent Lebanon in the bilateral talks.

The sources pointed out that Lebanese officers will join the delegation at a subsequent stage, depending on the atmosphere prevailing at the bilateral talks, in order to learn the extent of Israel's willingness to discuss a way to implement Resolution 425.

They pointed out that the military delegation that will join Lebanon's representatives in the bilateral talks will be limited to two officers whom the army command had charged with preparing a complete dossier on the truce talks and the negotiations that followed them in al-Naqurah.

The sources said that the two Lebanese officers will be bringing along maps containing locations in the South and the Western al-Biqa' that are occupied by Israel.

Fadlallah on Peace Conference, Hostages

92AE0024B Paris AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic
16 Sep 91 p 24

[Interview with 'Allama Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah by 'Imad Jawdiyah; date and place not given]

[Text] The spiritual leader of the fundamentalist Islamic movement in Lebanon, has said in an exclusive interview with AL-DUWALIYAH that the region is on the verge of an Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon. He said that the continuing Israeli occupation of the south will become a security risk and a domestic problem in the future of Israel's political establishment. He opined that Israel was thinking of water strategy as much as of land strategy, so it was putting Lebanese water at the top of its priorities. He pointed out that the Israeli problem would go on until the hostage issue was solved, because Israel wanted to get its price from America before releasing its detainees. He revealed the American green light given to de Cuellar for positive movement on that issue.

[Jawdiyah] The most important topic in Arab and international public opinion today is the international peace conference expected to be held this October. You were one of the first to think this conference unlikely to reach a settlement. Why?

[Fadlallah] Because I think the issue of a settlement in the region is not an auspicious one, insofar as the basic complex issues will certainly collide with the obstinacy of Israel, which wants everything. It offers "peace for

peace" instead of "land for peace," because it wants to keep all the Jews coming to Palestine. So any impending chance of a settlement distances Israel from its plans to encourage this immigration. This is what makes Sharon and other Israeli leaders say that this conference could lead to war, which would fit the Israeli record in its movement towards peace, but for the sake of war.

[Jawdiyah] In that case, do you expect a Syrian-Israeli war in the al-Biqa' region of Lebanon, as Sharon says?

[Fadlallah] We must watch the movement towards the settlement proposed through this conference, and if the talk of war revealed by some of the international media and set in motion by the statements of some Israeli officials is acceptable from a political standpoint, then it is natural that the coming war in the region will be a Syrian-Israeli war in Lebanon.

[Jawdiyah] Is it possible that any Syrian-Israeli war, should it happen, would affect the situation in Lebanon?

[Fadlallah] I don't think a Syrian-Israeli war can turn the situation in Lebanon back to what it was, though it might complicate it.

[Jawdiyah] What is the role of the Islamic resistance in this case?

[Fadlallah] The Islamic resistance considers itself the movement that works with all its energy and with all other elements of the opposition to turn the Israeli occupation of part of Lebanon, in the south and western al-Biqa', into an Israeli security problem in such a way as to cost Israel and its agents dearly; to turn Israeli's presence in Lebanon into an internal problem in Israeli's future political situation.

[Jawdiyah] You recently stated that Israel had begun to take water from the south to its settlements in Upper Galilee. Are there details?

[Fadlallah] Israel is thinking of a water strategy exactly the way it thinks of land strategy, and inevitably is going to put the Lebanese water that flows in one of the weakest parts of the region into the service of its water projects. If holding a conference in Turkey to discuss the regional water question region is needed, perhaps Israel will preempt the conference and impose the status quo by way of negotiations with Lebanon or pressure upon it.

[Jawdiyah] From the subject of the south we move on to the case of the Western hostages held in Lebanon. What has become of the United Nations' efforts through the secretary-general to solve this problem?

[Fadlallah] I think when the United Nations took on the hostage issue, it put it into the domain of quiet diplomacy, far from the medi[Fadlallah] So we do not think, on the basis of current information about the issue, that the process is stalled; in fact it might be moving in a more favorable atmosphere. There are impressions that America gave the green light to the secretary-general of

the United Nations to get active in a positive way in this issue, which makes the issue of benign waiting an issue of impending reality.

[Jawdiyah] But the Israeli problem shows that it is the obstacle to solving the hostage issue. Israel demands the freeing of its seven prisoners before it will release its Lebanese detainees, particularly Shaykh Abd-al-Karim 'Ubayd.

[Fadlallah] It is normal that the Israeli problem should be the basic problem in this issue, because Israel has striven in its history to demand its price for any issue it gets involved in, or works toward solving. We think that Israel is trying to get part of the price of the issue from America before releasing its detainees.

[Jawdiyah] Some people think that the issue of frozen Iranian deposits in American banks is still the chief obstacle to solving the hostage issue. Is it true that Tehran is demanding the unblocking of these deposits as a basic condition for its involvement in the hostage issue?

[Fadlallah] Iran has not brought up and will not bring up the issue of the Iranian accounts in America as a condition for its intervention to pressure those who abducted the hostages. Iran sees no connection between the two issues. This is what moves the problem closer to a real solution, far from the entangled complications of international relations.

Mufti Calls for Christian-Muslim Summit

92AE0024C Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 16 Sep 91 91 pp 14-16

[Interview with acting Mufti of the Republic of Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, by Zayn Hammud and Bassam 'Afifi; date and place not given; "UN Faces Test of South"]

[Text] The acting Mufti of the Republic of Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, presents, in this interview with AL-SHIRA', what is best known and implemented of the al-Ta'if Accord, the remaining article of the accord (UN Resolution 425) [as published] calling for and reaffirming the unity of the Lebanese as it insures the frustration of Israel's plans and resists its designs on Lebanon.

He indicated that Israel wants Lebanon to be the point through which it will reach all the Arabs, and that implementing the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination with Syria makes Lebanon an invulnerable fortress domestically. The text of the interview follows:

[AL-SHIRA'] The question today is what does the Dar al-Fatwa [the mufti's office] think in light of current developments? Where does it stand?

[Qabbani] What developments?

[AL-SHIRA'] The general developments in Lebanon; Today discussions on insuring new defensive power to implement the al-Ta'if Accord ended, and there is talk of measures at the government level in light of these developments. What is the Dar al-Fatwa doing?

[Qabbani] Lebanon, of course, began a phase of stability and well-being after the al-Ta'if Accords, reached under the sponsorship of the supreme tripartite Arab committee, with strong support from our brother Syria. Syria bore the burden of sacrifices in making the effort successful. It had terrible labor pains and many sacrifices at every level to extricate Lebanon from its crisis after fifteen years of tragedy and suffering. This stability was at first represented in the greater Beirut phase, which was followed by the expansion of Lebanese authority over all Lebanese territory. The obstacle of occupied southern Lebanon and the western al-Biq'a' remains, and then there is UN Resolution 425, which provides for unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. The course of solutions, peace, and stability in Lebanon will be complete after the application of this UN resolution; thus the UN today stands before a great test, particularly as Lebanon has stabilized, as I said earlier. Only this step remains to give Lebanon the range of total independence. The efforts of Lebanon, the Arabs, or the international community must be directed at implementing this resolution, that is if the UN is capable of enforcing its serious resolutions for the sake of peoples. On the domestic front, officials must look to the social state of affairs in Lebanon, the social conditions that have come to light so clearly after the phase of stability, and all the past sufferings the Lebanese still endure today: refugees live among ruins and see their land and possessions either damaged or destroyed. They wait to return to live free and honorable lives like the rest of their fellow citizens. Most of them will be unable to do that for one reason or another, so we must stand united in our efforts to solve the problem of the refugees so that we may eliminate the traces of past sufferings. The lingering of their problem keeps before us all the vestiges of war and its ill effects. The life of a refugee is a bitter one that has repercussions on society, and there is yet another very important question in society: that of the standard of living. A man may be content to wear an item of clothing or buy a new one, or to deal with any problem, but there are two things he cannot endure: starvation and illness. At the level of health efforts, a citizen with a fixed income—and most Lebanese have fixed incomes; because either they are workers or employees whose monthly income barely allows for any worker or employee, no matter how high his position, to feed himself or his children. This is self-evident. So where can he get the rest of the money for food, first off, and where can he get the price of medicine if he falls ill, or if he needs surgery? A man is liable to catch any illness, and if he goes into a hospital—a fixed wage earner, or a worker or employee—let alone one of the unemployed—how can he find the money for a hospital cure? The Lebanese know all of these miseries, and on another front, the high cost of living constantly consumes his raises. There were

salary raises in the private sector yesterday, and today there is talk of raises in the public sector. If these come to pass and are not followed by price hikes, it will be a good sign. However, the norm is whenever salaries are raised in the private sector and public sector, there are price hikes. Rises in the cost of living not only consume raises, but they cut into the basic salary upon which the raise had no effect. This is another issue that must be a matter of concern, because the goal is not to give raises, but to make things easier for citizens to see that he has a reasonable income at least sufficient for him to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter himself. If we know the goal, then we are obliged to study ways of reaching it, whether it means raises or not. Might the solution be price controls? Might the solution be a limit on the rise and fall of the value of the Lebanese pound against the dollar? This is something finance and social officials may know of and understand and be able to solve, and efforts to that end must be made together.

[AL-SHIRA'] That means that your eminence considers these questions of living standards to be time bombs that, unless solved, could blow up even the settlement treaty that came from the al-Ta'if Accord. Can we say this?

[Qabbani] I do not want to give that idea, nor do I imagine that that fact will lead to that outcome, but this does not mean that the tragedy of social conditions is easy, or insignificant, or that its effects are minor, but I do not always want to give that impression. I want to reaffirm what I said above—that a person can endure any problem except for starvation or illness. How can the stomach endure hunger when, as the poet said, "A stomach with no food will eat itself." Likewise, illness threatens a person's life. Usually when there is mental and social stability and a citizen can satisfy all his needs in an atmosphere of social peace, food security, and health security; when he can satisfy all these needs of his, then it is easy to solve any national problem, because no matter how big it is, it will find no unrest to drag us into the abyss. Whereas any problem needing a solution when people are uncertain about their health, their income, their hunger and other needs, then this bitter health and social fact will worsen the problem and create a great sensitivity to inflate it, but God willing, things will not reach the point of collapse you mentioned in your question.

Health Card

[AL-SHIRA'] What has the Dar al-Fatwa done in this regard, that is to say, regarding social solidarity, particularly as it is the heart of your mission. What have you done with the charity [zakat] and other funds to lighten the burden of social conditions?

[Qabbani] Naturally any responsible position has a role in easing this suffering and any responsible position has the duty to deal with this fact. In addition, there are citizens' rights before every position and in return. Dar al-Fatwa has taken steps to ease this suffering with what

capabilities it has to treat these problems, and they may not be the steps some had hoped for, because we always hope for the best, hope that our abilities are greater, and our powers more numerous in order to take part in greater mitigation. Despite all that, the charity fund set up six or seven years ago cares for about 7,000 families with monthly grants that may be small, but even a little is better than this deprivation. Whether giving money or health, there are many cases which require paying for medicine or medical care in hospitals, and the charity fund is doing much on these fronts, especially in treating incurable cases such as heart disease and other hard-to-treat diseases. This is true in spending to assist the purchase of medicines, including medicines prescribed for incurable cases obtaining further care, since whenever the malignancy of the condition increases, the grant must be increased to ease the financial pain. Today, the charity fund is setting up a health card for the 7,000 families I mentioned. Apart from the cash grant, there is a health card obtainable by every user of the charity fund from those 7,000 families, whether they are made up of a single person, or of six or seven people. There are several health centers run by the Dar al-Fatwa and the General Directorate of Islamic Trusts. A cardholder can go to any of these health centers and get medicine free and on a regular basis if his illness is severe. We have several health centers with clinics for treating various diseases. These include dental clinics. The Dar al-Fatwa Health Center in the [al-Sina'i] district is open from 0800 until 1900, and has doctors that do rotations in the dental clinics.

I would like to add to what I said about Dar al-Fatwa's role in dealing with social conditions, as far as illness and treatment go, or cash assistance. I would like to add that at the beginning of every school year the Dar al-Fatwa charity fund prepares a budget to help with textbooks. There are thousands of students who benefit, perhaps 20,000, because I mentioned to you that a family might have three children, or two or more. All of them help in about 70 percent or 60 percent of the cost of their books, not at all levels, of course. Students at half-price government and private schools, for example—most of those who have recourse to these schools are in a tough spot because they cannot get into high-fee schools. So students like these schools [as published] also obtain this kind of assistance in obtaining school books. And there is social assistance in addition to what the Dar al-Fatwa's charity fund spends, and also the social assistance the Dar al-Fatwa gives away every year during Ramadan. This is in addition to the food assistance given on occasion by the Dar al-Fatwa's Commission for Aid and Reconstruction. I would like to add that Saudi Arabia sends trucks carrying freezers of meat from religious sacrifices. Slaughtered carcasses are no longer abandoned in the desert as they were before this arrangement. Saudi Arabia has rectified the problem of the hajj season sacrifices. Every year, after they are cleaned, the sacrifices are all put into refrigerators and freezers and sent all over the Arab and Islamic worlds. There are hundreds of thousands of sheep. Only a few days ago, about twenty

trucks arrived in Lebanon, each loaded with refrigerators, which have begun to be distributed throughout Lebanon.

[AL-SHIRA'] Very good. Your eminence mentioned that, in addition to the matter of implementing the al-Ta'if Accord, there is the matter of implementing Resolution 425. What, in your view, is the likelihood that Resolution 425 will be implemented?

[Qabbani] Resolution 425 must be implemented as soon as possible. As to setting a time for its implementation, even if that were possible, it would be tied to the seriousness of the UN and the great powers in the Security Council. If those countries in the Security Council are unable to implement a resolution like 425, we want to ask whether it is possible the UN and the Security Council are able to solve any problem bigger than this? If the UN Security Council is capable of solving a bigger problem, whenever or whatever it may be, then why the distinction between one resolution and another? This is the thing we wonder about, and the UN and the Security Council stand before a test. Perhaps these countries will not be harmed by the matter we are discussing. We want to say that they are not hidden; even ordinary citizens who cannot read or write can think, and they feel bitterness at the weakness or weakening of the UN with regard to implementing its resolutions. If it cannot, what good are its resolutions?

[AL-SHIRA'] Does your eminence expect negative repercussions if Resolution 425 on the situation in Lebanon is not implemented?

[Qabbani] Every delay in the implementation of Resolution 425 should make us better aware of how great is the need for Lebanese unity, cooperation, and combination of their efforts so that the Zionist enemy, which is occupying our land, coveting its water, and even denigrating the citizens, will not be able to divide the Lebanese.

Lebanese Unity

[AL-SHIRA'] You mean that Lebanese unity can thwart Israel's plans and ambitions?

[Qabbani] Yes. Lebanese unity first, their feeling for the need for Arab solidarity and a united Arab stance, for their commitment to a single stance in the face of these Zionist plots, and through unity and accord—this is what will prevent the Zionist enemy from dividing the ranks of the Lebanese and intervening to divide, tear apart, and threaten their homeland again. These sufferings we have endured for the past fifteen years were one of the goals of the Zionist enemy, who wants Lebanon to remain a wound in the side of the Arab nation. Had Lebanon's body been healthy with this unity, cooperation, and accord, it would have frustrated those Zionist plots, especially if all the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon had been implemented, or if the

provisions of the treaty or the recently concluded security and defense accord between Syria and Lebanon had been implemented. If that treaty and this accord are implemented in all their provisions, Lebanon will be a strong fortress, not only domestically, but in the whole region, because the Zionist enemy is trying to infiltrate through the weakest points. If Lebanon were strong, the Zionist enemy would not be able to penetrate that point, nor, by extension, Syria or the Arabs. If there were other spheres for its plots, then the principle that says Lebanon's security is part of Syria's, and Syria's security is part of Lebanon's, is one we can preserve in form, content, practice, and application. That way we will frustrate all the Zionist plots and preserve the security and stability of our country.

[AL-SHIRA'] In the context of affirming the unity of Lebanese ranks, there was an initiative to make a move at the Lebanese spiritual level by holding an enlarged Lebanese spiritual summit, or bilateral meetings with Christian and Islamic spiritual leaders.

[Qabbani] Religious values always appeal for an honorable, superior morality, and this is the biggest problem in societies which, if they are threatened, threaten the values, or the degree of commitment, so the more a society lives by an honorable, superior morality in its thinking and in its relations with one another, the more cohesive the society is. As long as we are speaking of spiritual authorities, the mission of these spiritual authorities is the mission of these religious values. Thus, the role of the spiritual was a significant one in the cooperation of the Lebanese and their unity and all their deeds in the interests of their homeland. This noble ethic should enhance commitment to cooperation, unity, aid to the unfortunate, and clearness of vision on any society or problem. There is always morality and when there is estrangement, strife, or disunion, we are obliged to look into our innermost hearts. We all must be provided with the values these spiritual authorities cherish and call for if there are conflicting views. Why have recourse to negative matters, whatever they may be and, as is said, if there is a will there is a way. So we must all direct our wills to the unity of our Lebanese homeland, its security, safety, and stability, especially—as I mentioned above—its social and health security, to say nothing of justice, which alone can ease the road to solving any problem. Justice is the guarantee for all.

[AL-SHIRA'] Very good. Your eminence then, is calling for a Christian-Muslim spiritual summit to study the difficult issues, from the question of Jazzin to the matter of Resolution 425, since it strengthens Lebanese unity and frustrates Israeli plans.

[Qabbani] Who said that religious authorities do not want the Lebanese to cooperate or solve their problems, or for there to be a solution to the Jazzin question or any other? Truthfully, whether or not these spiritual authorities actually come together in a meeting or not, the announcement of these notions, which put the country on a strong journey to peace, stability, and problem

solving—whether or not these religious authorities meet does not mean does not mean it is they who are delaying a solution to any problem. Even if they had met, and they might meet at any time, since there is nothing to prevent them from meeting, would the problem be solved? There are many complicated problems and one meeting of spiritual leaders is not enough to solve them. How many meetings and spiritual summits have been held! As I have said, they have met, and if they have a meeting held on these notions, values, and goals for Lebanese unity, solidarity, and cooperation, there are the social, health, and political spheres, and the stances of many factions. Can a spiritual summit solve all this? A spiritual summit would be delightful if it could solve or dispel these stances. The stances should not be convulsive and must be calm, and if they truly are for Lebanese unity—and I repeat that justice, equality and equality of opportunity among all Lebanese; sincere devotion to Lebanon, its security, safety and stability; and readiness to make sacrifices for this stability will put an end to these problems. As I said above, where there is a will there is a way to solve any problem. But we Lebanese must realize the danger of the Zionist enemy is greater to us than to any other part of the world, because Lebanon, as I have said, has been a serious wound to its citizenry for fifteen years, and in the Arab nation. Thus, Lebanon has been a weak point, and the Zionist enemy seeks out weak points through which it may enter—not into Lebanon only, but into the Arab world, too. The Zionist enemy wants to make Lebanon not only a problem for Lebanon and the Lebanese, but a problem for the whole Arab world. So we must combine our efforts to solve our problems, to meet and rise above all the conflicts that cause us discord, malice, and disunion. We must look to a healthy, sound Lebanon, building itself and the future of coming generations, in whose hopes the Arab nation shares, because they are its hopes, and which is one with its Arab brothers, especially Syria, to which it is bound by strong, solid ties that the Zionist enemy seeks tirelessly to undo. This way, we can achieve security, peace, and stability. Going back to the beginning of the question—spiritual authorities may meet at any time to call for these ideas and to decide upon them. But the settlement of these conflicts we may have seen or heard of from time to time, in whatever sphere, are the province of politicians who can solve these problems; who can work wisely, patiently and the with the ability to appreciate the scope of the problems in order to solve them.

Finance Minister Reports on 1992 Draft Budget

1992 Budget Deficits

92AE0025A Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 20 Sep 91 p 5

[Article: "Al-Khalil on Budget Bill: Estimate Deficit Below 1991 Level"]

[Text] Minister of Finance Dr. 'Ali al-Khalil said that the estimated deficit in the 1992 budget bill passed by the cabinet is within reasonable limits, compared to the 1991 budget deficit, and amounts to 58.87 percent of the total budget estimated at 1.634635 trillion Lebanese pounds.

The minister outlined the features of the 1992 budget bill, as follows:

The total figure of the 1992 budget bill for the general budget and supplementary budgets amounts to 1.634635 trillion pounds, compared to the 1991 budget figures of 162.61 billion pounds, an increase of 472.025 billion pounds, or 40.6 percent.

These figures are broken down as follows:

A. General Budget:

- 1. Expenditures:
- General budget expenditures amount—1.46955 trillion pounds, allocated as follows:
 - Part 1 Expenditures: 1,183,191,825,000 pounds, amounting to 80.51 percent of the general budget.
 - Part 2 Expenditures: 286.358175 billion pounds, amounting to 19.49 percent of the general budget.
- 2. Revenues:
- Regular revenues amounted to 604.55 billion pounds.
- Expenditures amounted to 1.46955 trillion pounds.

The deficit is 865 billion pounds, covered by extraordinary revenues generated by loans and new returns, hence the ratio of ordinary revenues to total expenditure is 41.14 percent and deficit rate is 58.86 percent.

B. Supplementary Budgets:

The total for the 1991 supplementary budgets was 126.61 billion pounds, and the total for the 1992 supplementary budgets is 165.085 billion pounds. This is an increase of 38.475 billion, or 30.4 percent.

C. Grand total of general budget and supplementary budget:

- For 1992: 1.634635 trillion pounds.
- For 1991: 1.16261 trillion pounds.
- Increase: 472.025 billion pounds, or 40.6 percent.

D. General Budget Deficit:

The deficit rate in the 1992 budget bill is on the decline, and falls within reasonable limits compared to previous budget deficits. The 1990 budget deficit rate was 64.83 percent; the 1991 rate, 62.00 percent; and the 1992 rate, 58.86 percent.

Al-Khalil concluded by saying that the drop in the budget deficit rate is attributable to an improved revenue position and, consequently, higher return estimates.

1992 Draft Budget

92AE0025B Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 8 Oct 91 p 4

[Article: "1992 Draft Budget, Supplements Submitted to Parliament; Finance Committee To Begin Deliberations at End of Month"]

[Text] Competent parliamentary agencies received the 1992 draft budget 15 days before the opening of the second ordinary parliamentary session, in accordance with Article 86 of the Constitution.

The chairman of the parliamentary Budget and Finance Committee, Michael Dahir, announced that the committee would not begin its budget deliberations for at least three weeks, after printed copies of the draft are distributed to the deputies.

Following is the text of the draft budget and allocation schedule, including each allocation's percentage of aggregate budget figures:

Bill: 1992 Draft Budget and Supplementary Budgets
Article 1: General budget and supplementary budget figures for FY 1992, beginning 1 January 1992 and ending 31 December 1992, shall be earmarked in accordance with provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of this law.

Article 2: General budget and supplementary budget appropriations shall be allocated as follows [in Lebanese pounds]:

General budget; Parts 1 and 2.....	1.46955 trillion
Telecommunications budget	85 billion
National Lottery Admin.....	16.1 billion
Beets and Grains Bureau budget.....	63.985 billion
Total.....	1.634635 trillion

This is in accordance with Schedules 1, 2, 3, and 4 attached to this law.

Article 3: General budget and supplementary budget revenues are assessed as follows [in Lebanese pounds]:

General budget, Part 1, regular revenues	604.55 billion
General budget, Part 2, extraordinary revenues	865 billion
Telecommunications budget, Part 1, regular revenues	85 billion
Telecommunications budget, Part 2, extraordinary revenues.....	0
National Lottery Administration budget	16.1 billion
Bureau of Grains & Beets budget	63.985 billion
Total.....	1.634635 trillion

This in accordance with Schedules 5, 6, 7, and 8 attached to this law.

Article 4: All taxes, fees, returns, and proceeds listed in the attached schedules may be collected in accordance with the provisions of this law and other valid or future laws.

Article 5: The minister of finance shall be authorized to transfer, per his order, based on a motion submitted by a competent authority and endorsed by the central comptroller, the necessary funds for health and death benefits payable to individuals who are not members of the government employees' credit union from the budget replenishment reserve appropriation to the various budget sections earmarked for health and death benefits, in accordance with valid laws and regulations, and subject to Article 22 of the 1981 budget law.

Article 6: Total appropriations for various allocations earmarked for medical treatment at private hospitals and institutions and for contracts with private sector doctors shall be apportioned by cabinet decree in accordance with a motion submitted at once by the competent minister and the minister of finance.

Article 7: The government may, within the limits of a sum equal to the actual budget deficit and the limits of a sum comparable to the treasury's needs, issue long-term, medium-term, and short-term bonds in Lebanese pounds, as per decisions issued by the minister of finance.

Article 8: Special treasury accounts shall be opened for loans, and shall be credited with the value of loan payments received and debited with the value of amounts paid out to settle loans and matured bonds.

Article 9: All income tax and real estate tax assessments not exceeding 1,000 pounds shall be written off, and the competent fiscal departments shall be exempted from issuing assessment schedules for such amounts and from collecting them.

Article 10: Appropriations allocated for the prosecutor's office shall be expended for designations 4-2-8-2 [as published] (commonweal expenditures for court of cassation prosecution) and shall not be subject to the provisions of valid fiscal and administrative laws and regulations. Court of cassation prosecution shall be granted quarterly loans for this purpose, and these loans shall be deposited in the treasury, and settled in accordance with rules and regulations.

Article 11: Loan contract and loan settlement appropriations shall be allocated in the general budget for loans contracted by or for the government, in accordance with rules and regulations, per cabinet decrees based on a motion submitted by the competent minister and the minister of finance. All provisions contrary to this article are hereby rescinded.

Article 12: The following clause shall be added to Article 75 of the general accounting law: Salary, wage, pension, and various monthly benefit schedules shall be considered cleared, and do not need to be signed by a receiver. Particulars for the implementation of this clause shall be laid down by a decree issued by the minister of finance, as needed.

Article 13: Collected and expended amounts, including allowances, salaries, wages, and other related matters, shall be rounded off to the nearest Lebanese pound in favor of the treasury.

Article 14: Taxes and fines paid in accordance with emergency assessment orders, and quittances issued by competent tax authorities in the absence of assessment schedules, as of the effective date of this law, shall be added to the treasury's earnings' account without the need for issuing assessment schedules.

Article 15: In compliance with Article 85 of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitutional Law enacted 21 September 1990, the president of the republic may, under extraordinary circumstances calling for emergency spending, issue a decree based on a cabinet decision appropriating emergency or additional funds, or transfer 1992

budget appropriations, provided that such allocations do not exceed 70 million pounds, subject to cabinet approval.

Article 16: This law shall go into effect as of the date of its promulgation.

1992 Budget Allocations
[in Lebanese pounds]

Total 1992 Figures		Allocation Percentage
1. The Presidency	482.6 million	0.03
2. Parliament	5.9662 billion	0.04
3. Premiership	32.794714 billion	2.23
4. Justice	6.31675 billion	0.43
5. Foreign Affairs, Emigration	33.037239 billion	2.35
6. Interior	77.304614 billion	5.26
7. Finance	9.8265329 billion	0.67
8. Defense	241.687982 billion	16.44
9. Education, Fine Arts	81.476178 billion	5.54
10. Health, Social Affairs	68.688884 billion	4.67
11. Justice	1.649682 billion	0.11
12. Information	3.928764 billion	0.27
13. Transportation, Public Works	108.402803 billion	7.39
14. Agriculture	10.047641 billion	0.69
15. Economy, Commerce	540.62 million	0.04
16. PTT	4.755352 billion	0.32
17. Public Planning (abolished)		
18. Hydro-Electric Resources	79.377716 billion	5.4
19. Tourism	3.201,7 billion	0.22
20. Oil & Industry	203.552 million	0.014
21. Housing, Coops	27.11948 billion	1.85
22. Outstanding Debts	336.741 billion	22.91
23. Budget Reserve	336 billion	22.86
Total	1.46955 trillion	100 Supplementary Budgets:
Telecommunications	85 billion	51.49
National Lottery Administration	16.1 billion	9.75
Bureau of Beets & Grains	63.985 billion	38.76
Total	165.085 billion	100
Grand Total	1.634635 trillion	
Increase of 433.55 billion pounds		
Percent Increase over 1991 Budget		41.84
Supplementary Communications Budget		
Part 2.A	32.162 billion	
Part 2.B	25 billion	
Part 2, Total	57.162 billion	

MOROCCO

Chinese Ambassador Comments on Trade Relations

92AF0065E Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French
2 Oct 91 p 3

[Text] The volume of trade between China and Morocco totals more than 100 million dollars. For the most part, trade between the two countries consists of Morocco's exports of phosphates and phosphate derivatives to China and Chinese tea and steel objects imported by Morocco, said the ambassador of the PRC, Mr. Wan Yong Xiang, in Rabat on Monday.

In an interview for "Economap," a daily bulletin of economic and financial news published by the news service MAP [MAGREB-ARAB PRESS AGENCY], China's ambassador expressed satisfaction with, in particular, the "excellent political relations" that exist between the two countries, adding that he hoped their economic relations, which "show positive signs," would reach the same level.

Indeed, said the ambassador, while bilateral cooperation has already proved its merits in the area of sports, with the construction of the Moulay Abdellah Complex in Rabat, as well as in the areas of agriculture, mining, and medicine, the fact remains that the volume of trade falls short of the two countries' potential because of a lack of knowledge about each other's markets.

"China is not a traditional market for Morocco and vice versa," the ambassador pointed out, adding that "China's exports to the Moroccan market represent only 1 percent of Morocco's imports." Much remains to be done in order to expand trade between the two countries, he concluded.

Businessmen, German Counterparts Hold Meeting

92AF0065A Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA
in French 4 Oct 91 p 6

[Excerpts of speech by Abderrahmane Bennani-Smires, president of Moroccan employers' organization, at a meeting of German and Moroccan businessmen in Cologne; first two paragraphs are LE MATIN DU SAHARA introduction]

[Text] The third meeting of the joint committee of the CGEM [Moroccan General Economic Federation] and BDI [Federation of German Industries] was highly awaited as an indication of the strong willingness in Morocco's and Germany's private sectors to take bilateral cooperation further. According to observers, the meeting has produced a good crop of new joint projects.

The following are extensive excerpts from the speech that Mr. Abderrahmane Bennani-Smires, president of the Moroccan employers' organization, made to business owners from Morocco and Germany at the joint meeting.

"Since our last session, many events of importance have brought dramatic change to the international scene, the reunification of Germany, first of all. (Let there be honor to whom honor is due.) Then there are the profound changes in the East European countries led by the Soviet Union, the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union, the Gulf war and its consequences, and the strengthening of the UN's role. Further, there is the reaffirmation of the G-7, as well as the transformations now under way in several African countries, the prospects of peace in the Middle East, and the heralding of a new world order."

The Acceptance of Liberalism

"Finally, at the economic level, there is the establishment of economic, financial, and social liberalism, of individual freedoms and human rights, the only values conducive to the advancement of man, peace, and prosperity. These dramatic changes will inevitably reshape world trade, technological cooperation, and North-South relations. In the wake of all these transformations, our committee meets today for its third session."

"I am convinced that German-Moroccan relations will find the necessary strength and indispensable energy to enter into this new dynamic. Indeed, our longstanding relations, the solidity of our cooperation that can be described as fruitful and positive, and the symbiosis that has always existed between Moroccan and German partners constitute a full guarantee of success."

"There is, already, every indication that our relations are continuing to expand, despite all the events I have just cited."

"In matters of trade, Germany has managed to climb to fourth place among our trading partners. Our sales to your country have grown by more than 30 percent over the past three years, and our purchases from Germany have followed the same pace."

"True, the balance of trade remains unfavorable to us, and the ratio of exports to imports shows a tendency to weaken. But we realize that these trends are not reversible given the gap between the levels of development of our economies. However, the trend in other facets of our cooperation enables us to be optimistic about offsetting the deficit. For example, the amount of German investment in Morocco shows a strong upward trend."

"A favorable trend in financial transfers and tourism can be expected, and technical cooperation is resulting in the completion of major projects, etc."

A Relatively Modest Level

"Nonetheless, beyond the figures and despite the multifaceted and varied nature of our relations, a relatively modest level of evolution is taking place in terms of absolute value. It is precisely in that regard that I would like to call for imagination and creativity on the part of our committee to find new paths for cooperation in all economic activities and new spheres that could be

tapped in partnership, to identify the difficulties that may hinder our cooperation, and to make concrete suggestions to our respective governmental authorities so that no initiative will go unrealized and no potential unfulfilled."

"That is the direction in which the CGEM, for its part, intends to orient its efforts."

"The 1993 common market, the new spheres opened up by changes that have occurred in the countries of the East, and the expansion of cooperation around the Mediterranean (particularly its western shores), constitute the primary axes for action, in our view. And Germany, particularly the new Germany, stands at the intersection of these three spheres. Even with regard to the western Mediterranean, His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, stated in a recent interview with a French newspaper that 'Through Italy, Germany has a stake in the western Mediterranean.'"

"I am convinced that our two organizations, the BDI and the CGEM, have the means within them to endow our cooperation with a dynamic equal to the pace of change."

[Box, p 6]

The joint CGEM-BDI committee is an employers' organization made up of Moroccan and German business executives. Its purpose is to promote bilateral cooperation and to make appropriate suggestions to the governmental authorities of the members's respective countries.

The committee gathered in Cologne on 26 and 27 September for the third meeting in its history. The first meeting, which brought the organization into being, was also held in Cologne. The committee's second session took place in Casablanca in June 1987.

Anniversary of 1975 Green March Remembered

92AF0065B Rabat L'OPINION in French
16 Oct 91 pp 1,2

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: "The Turning Point"]

[Text] The historic date of 16 October 1975 will remain etched in the memories of successive generations and the future of Morocco for centuries to come will bear its stamp.

The announcement that the Green March was being organized to recover the Moroccan Sahara, then under Spanish domination, was an event that turned the parameters of the Saharan problem upside down and won admiration from around the world because it was an original approach to the liberation, decolonization, and recovery of a portion of national territory usurped by colonialism and exposed to covetousness and hegemonic designs.

On the basis of the advisory opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice, which recognized that the Sahara was not a territory belonging to no one and that ties of allegiance did indeed exist between the territory's population and the throne of Morocco, the Green March was announced by His Majesty the King in keeping with international law and the rules and principles set forth in the charter of the United Nations. He announced that 350,000 would participate in the march, armed with the Koran and the national flag as well as their determination to meet the challenges involved and to erase the artificial borders drawn by the colonial powers in a plan to dismember Morocco.

By opting for this peaceful approach to settling a colonial conflict, Morocco—which has not ceased to demand and fight for the liberation of its despoiled territories and its full territorial integrity—gave proof of its commitment to the preservation of international peace and security and to compliance with the law.

For the Moroccan people, the announcement of the Green March was an occasion to demonstrate their boundless enthusiasm, their love for their country, and their spirit of sacrifice.

Thus, in one day, the number of those who enrolled exceeded by far the contingents set aside for each province. All Moroccans, without exception, sought the honor of participating in the march for liberation, unity, and reunion.

They unanimously volunteered to erase the traces of a colonial past and to contribute toward the creation of a new and unified Morocco.

The date of 16 October 1975 was a watershed in the history of Morocco and a crucial phase in the fight to achieve full territorial integrity.

The announcement of the Green March was the culmination of the national liberation process and it imparted new momentum to the effort to consolidate the achievements of independence and unity begun in a climate of mobilization and enthusiasm.

The spirit of 16 October will remain with our people and will enable them to overcome all obstacles and win the battle of the referendum which will confirm the Moroccan identity of the Sahara. It will also enable them to continue the fight to recover the other territories that remain under foreign occupation.

Worsening Trade Deficit Predicted

92AF0065C Casablanca AL BAYANE in French
5 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mimoun Habriche: "The Devaluation Is No Longer Helping!"]

[Text] Will this year bring a worsening of Morocco's trade deficit? The indication given by the results for the first six months, in any case, is that it will: The deficit

reached 12.249 billion dirhams as compared with 10.094 billion at the end of the first six months of 1990. The trend can be traced back to 1989 when the trade deficit for the first half of the year reached 9.539 billion dirhams.

The deficit was caused by a slackening rate of growth for exports against a less pronounced decline in the growth rate for imports. Exports grew by only 2.9 percent while imports grew by 10 percent. In 1990, both exports and imports had grown at the rate of 28.2 percent.

Indeed, Morocco's purchases overseas rose to 28.879 billion dirhams as compared with 26.251 billion for the first half of 1990. A decrease occurred in only one category—primary products of mineral origin. Supplies of these commodities to Moroccan companies decreased from 1.521 billion dirhams to 1.280 billion, a 15.8-percent decline. It remains to be seen, however, whether the decline was caused by a curtailment of activity at processing plants. In contrast, the bills for all other categories were on the rise.

In the area of food products, imports rose by 10.2 percent (from 2.496 billion dirhams to 2.751 billion), despite more advantageous prices as the tonnage imported increased by 78.2 percent. This category was primarily affected by purchases of wheat, the bill for which was 16.5 percent higher, and—to an even greater extent—by purchases of coffee, which rose from a mere 78.3 million dirhams in 1990 to 292.2 million.

The energy balance exerted increased pressure on Morocco's foreign accounts, rising from 3.564 billion dirhams to 4.386 billion, a 23.1-percent rise. This figure is explained by the stronger prices on the world market, as the quantities imported rose by a mere 5.4 percent.

Imports of primary products of plant or animal origin rose from 1.575 billion dirhams to 1.879 billion, up 19.3 percent. Imports of intermediate products showed a similar trend, moving from 6.715 billion dirhams to 7.498 billion, an increase of 11.7 percent.

In the category of capital goods, the agricultural sector paid 267 million dirhams for equipment, 14.1 percent more than the 234 million it spent last year. In contrast, imports of industrial capital goods posted a more modest increase of 6.1 percent, from 6.896 billion dirhams to 7.518 billion.

Imports of finished consumer goods rose by 7.7 percent from 3.250 billion dirhams to 3.501 billion.

Looking at imports as a whole, one may well wonder to what extent the import burden was made worse by the consequences of the devaluation of the dirham. The devaluation has indeed contributed to a definite rise in the prices of imported goods, but their effects on export flows appear to be very slight.

This would only confirm the outcome of similar experiments that have already been attempted around the

world. As to whether the Moroccan economy will be able to surmount this additional handicap, only time will tell.

Fez University Islamists Claim Harrassment

92AF0083B Rabat *L'OPINION* in French 23 Oct 91 p 1

[Text] Immediately after prayers last Friday, 18 October, the various mosques in Fez were the scene of similar events. Students from the University of Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdallah stood up to inform the faithful of provocations and acts of interference, even ending up in violence and torture, affecting students and particularly those belonging to Islamist groups.

These events took place following the mistreatment of students well-known for belonging to Islamist groups at the University of Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdallah.

Regional Approach to Fundamentalism Noted

92AF0065D Casablanca *AL BAYANE* in French 10 Oct 91 p 1

[Editorial: "A Common Destiny"]

[Text] The Algerian prime minister's unexpected visit to Tunis so soon after the Tunisian interior minister, Mr. Kallel, had returned from Algiers is a reflection of the state of mutual exasperation that characterizes relations between Algeria and Tunisia at present.

In the friction between the two countries, we know that the visible tip of the iceberg consists of highly acrimonious criticism by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's Tunisia of the helpfulness shown to Rachid Ghannouchi, the fundamentalist leader who has lived in voluntary exile for the last two years, frequently residing in Algeria when he is not traveling on his Sudanese passport.

Tunis raised its voice all the more after the Ennahda movement was accused of plotting to overthrow the Tunisian republic and assassinate its president, General Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Algiers, having long feigned not to know that Tunisian fundamentalists were using its territory as a "sanctuary" and rear base, was finally willing to react, but its reaction was verbal: Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghazali publicly declared that his country could no longer tolerate being used toward seditious ends against its brotherly neighbor Tunisia.

But, beneath this business about a "plot," the dispute between Tunisia and Algeria is about the way in which the governments of the Maghreb ought to treat the fundamentalist phenomenon.

Indeed, Tunis and Algiers have taken two different—if not opposite—approaches.

The Tunisian authorities opted not to legalize the fundamentalist movement, thus turning it into a "demon" and forcing it to favor destabilizing tactics in its conquest of power and control over civilian society.

President Benjedid's Algeria, in contrast, believed it possible to neutralize fundamentalism by making it commonplace, inviting it to join in the democratic, pluralistic dynamic.

But Algerian and Tunisian officials will have to agree that neither the tactics of the one nor the approach of the other has managed to halt the advance of fundamentalism and its influence.

Are we in Morocco in a position to give advice on this matter to our brothers of the Maghreb?

Nothing could be less certain. Nonetheless, the entire Maghreb must confront this set of problems. We believe that a broad debate across the Maghreb would make it possible to define a few guidelines, for all of our societies have an imperious need for democratization. They are also faced with such structural problems as unemployment, underdevelopment, and the unsatisfied aspirations of their people.

Our societies are all haunted by the drift toward misogyny, and they are slow to give the women of the Maghreb the place and the rights that are owed to them.

Without renouncing the culture and civilization they have inherited, our societies must become more modern and, at the same time, retain all that is healthy and constructive in tradition. The Maghreb has a common destiny. It is with one mind that the Maghreb must apprehend the fundamentalist phenomenon, without seeking to eliminate it physically and without conceding it a clear field.

Human Rights League President Honored

92AF0083C Rabat L'OPINION in French
19 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Text] At its last meeting the National Council of the Istiqlal [Independence] Party applauded the important role played by the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights in ensuring that these rights are respected and that the dignity of Moroccan citizens and their freedoms are guaranteed.

Mohamed Ben Abdelhadi Kabbab, the president of the league, was congratulated for his splendid performance as the director of the organization, despite the pressures and dangers that threaten him. In response to these expressions of confidence in him Kabbab made the following remarks:

In the name of God, the most clement and merciful. May the blessings of God be on the greatest of the prophets.

Dear brothers and sisters, I am speaking on this occasion to extend my deepest regards to you and to express to the party my pride over the support that you are providing to me and the solidarity that you have shown, following the attempts to assassinate me on 4 and 29 July 1991.

In reality facts speak louder than words. There are no words to express my feelings. However, despite that and, as I said previously to a group of lawyers, seeing all of those people turn toward me and give me all of their support, reduces the next attack to nothing, as well as the attacks following that, if necessary.

Dear brothers and sisters,

The inspectors of the party, the provincial secretaries, and the parallel organizations have given me a great deal of comfort. The noble feelings that have been expressed have been crowned by the visit that the secretary general of the party made to my home. During this visit he told me of the active solidarity of all members of the party. He told me how useful were the activities of the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights. I thank the whole party for its support and I offer my life to the party.

I did not think that my efforts were worth all of this support. Let me say this to you graciously. I wish that your support would take concrete form in action and that you could do everything possible to set up local sections of the league in every city and in every region. I will be at your service as long as I have your support. You can provide your encouragement to the newspaper published by the league, which is making enormous efforts to ensure that the various issues of the paper come out. I will not let this occasion pass by without expressing my regards to brothers Abdelkader Alami and Mohamed Bouzid, who is ill. I hope that he will recover quickly.

Brothers and sisters,

I have received the support of political organizations and many cultural associations. I have received messages of solidarity from foreign radio and television stations. Poems have been sent to me, as well as prose compositions. I did not want to make them public because I do not deserve these honors. That does not keep me from thanking those poets, those writers, those associations, and all of those Moroccan and foreign organizations. I thank the press of the party, which covered these events and which expressed a wave of solidarity on my behalf in its columns.

Brothers and sisters,

I can tell you that the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights has changed many things in this country, whether within the framework of the league or in the coordinating committee.

The league contributed to the relative change that has taken place in the attitude displayed by the state. The league has been able, to some extent, to end abuses, as I said on 18 October on the "Voice of America." The fight carried on by the league and the coordinating committee has had an impact abroad, since the Fourth Commission of the United Nations is discussing the situation affecting human rights in Morocco. We can say the same thing regarding Amnesty International.

As far as all of that is concerned, what happened to me is not something that normally occurs. The consequences of what happened to me are very real, and, above all, they affect human rights.

First, there was the publication of the communique regarding the four deaths. Then there was the National Charter of Human Rights, which can be considered an achievement of great importance. Then there was the speech that I made when I presented this charter to the public. Recently, I was surprised to receive a letter from abroad, in which I found a translation of the charter and of the speech that I made. An American organization translated the charter and distributed it throughout the world.

There was also the speech that I made in Agadir and a whole group of other matters, which ended up by making me a target. I state once again that we, as the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights, can receive Amnesty International. I would say to those who wish to put an end to these contacts to begin at the airport and not to wait for us to end them.

Let us return to the incident and say that the press, which is hostile to us, published a report that the attacker was mentally disturbed and was unable to make any clear statement. The file covering this case first lost any trace of Kabbab. Then the defense presented a memorandum to formulate the charge. Let me say before you that what happened to me has only increased my faith and my courage and that it has further helped me to act.

In conclusion I would say that if I were offered the sun on my right hand and the moon on my left to stop my activities in the league, I swear to God that I would not do this, even if I were to lose my life as a result.

Authorities Release Military Prisoners

92AF0088C Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Oct 91 p 4

[Text] The Moroccan authorities this week released eight military men who had been imprisoned, some of them for more than 20 years, at the secret penal colony at Tazmamart. The announcement was made on Thursday 24 October by the Moroccan Human Rights Association. They were among a group of 61 military men imprisoned after aborted coups d'etat against Hassan II in 1971 and 1972. According to Amnesty International, detention conditions in this recently demolished penal colony were so horrible that 29 prisoners died there.

Six of the eight military men to be freed had served their full sentences. Five had been imprisoned for taking part in an attack on the plane that was carrying the King of Morocco back from a visit to France in August 1972. The others were implicated in an attack on the royal palace in Skhirat, near Rabat, in July 1971. In September, another detainee, Lieutenant M'Barek Touil, who is married to an American, was freed on the eve of Hassan II's visit to the United States. A representative of the Moroccan Government told the UN Human Rights Committee on

Tuesday that the fate of the military detainees was "in the process of being settled."

In addition, after a Moroccan Government representative declared to the UN Human Rights Committee that the family of General Oufkir was free to move about, the family's lawyer, Mr. Bernard Darteville, told us on Thursday that the general's widow and children "wished to travel abroad but could not do so as they have been unable to obtain a favorable response from the authorities regarding their applications for passports." He went on to inform us that two of the children, Raouf and Malika, have in fact made up their minds to settle in France for professional reasons.

SUDAN

Al-Mirghani Back in Spotlight

Gives Conditions for Return

92AF0057A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 11 Oct 91 p 1

[Article: "Al-Mirghani: I'll Return to the Sudan When the Reasons for My Departure Are Removed"]

[Text] Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, leader of the Sudanese Democratic Unity Party, said he would return to the Sudan only when the reasons for his departure have been eliminated.

A statement released by his office to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT yesterday said that it is up to the Khartoum administration if it wanted to withdraw Mr. Mirghani's diplomatic passport, which he has carried since [Sudan's] independence, and which is his own affair

Mr. Mirghani criticized recent statements by Sudanese Minister of Information 'Abdallah Muhammad Ahmad, which contained threats to Mr. Muhammad 'Uthman and his brother Ahmad al-Mirghani. Al-Mirghani said that the statements by 'Abdallah Muhammad Ahmad were "contrary to fact."

Mr. al-Mirghani disclosed that Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council in Khartoum, indicated in a message to him that a decree was issued returning some Mirghani family properties, particularly the "garden of Mr. 'Ali al-Mirghani."

He added that the reported release of al-Mirghani bank funds was not an exception in his favor alone, but a resolution extended to all detainees that were freed at the time.

'Number-One Oppositionist'

92AF0057B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
15 Oct 91 p 1

[Report from Khartoum: Sudanese Minister of Information: Al-Mirghani Is Premier Oppositionist, Is Funded by Foreign Powers To Topple Regime"]

[Text] Sudanese Minister of Information 'Abdallah Muhammad Ahmad once again warned Mr. Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unity Party, against "persisting in his opposition."

Mr. Ahmad told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that "the authorities now consider Mr. al-Mirghani to be the No. 1 oppositionist and that he must bear the consequences of his position, especially since it is foreign powers that are driving him into the spotlight." He added: "We are aware that al-Mirghani moves with certain (foreign) powers that would like to see an end to the present regime. Instead of ambiguity, such as in his most recent statement, Al-Mirghani should have the courage to state unequivocally that he is working with those powers to topple the regime."

The Sudanese Minister of Information went on to explain once again the reasons why the authorities agreed to issue diplomatic passports to Mr. al-Mirghani and his brother, Ahmad. He said that "when our ambassador in Egypt was negotiating with al-Mirghani and his brother, they discussed nothing but personal matters, such as renewal of the diplomatic passport. That passport is not an absolute right, but must be renewed annually at the discretion of the minister in charge of foreign affairs." He added that al-Mirghani "attempted, by his statement, to raise doubts on the matter of 'Ali Mirghani's garden. In fact, the return of the garden depends on their posture. They are working abroad to undermine the regime."

Nuqud on Communism, Garang, Domestic Fighting

92AF0043A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
2 Oct 91 p 8

[Interview with Sudanese Communist Party leader Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud by Kamal Hamid in Khartoum; date not given; "My Conversation With al-Bashir Did Not Change My Positions; Struggle in Moscow Not Over Yet"]

[Text] Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud, leader of the Sudanese Communist Party [SCP], has daring views regarding many current issues. AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT had a long interview with him following his release from detention by a decision of Lt. Gen. 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir. The interview caused repercussions inside and outside Sudan. An academy for political and strategic research in Paris sent one of its men to Khartoum in order to seek clarifications regarding certain views which AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT published quoting him in its 24 May issue.

When I asked Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud to continue his talk about political developments, he wished to clarify some of what was said in the previous interview in response to messages he had received from inside and outside Sudan. He said:

"I received a researcher from a French academy who came with a copy of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in his hand. He asked for further clarifications of my views regarding perestroika, which Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has launched. I have prepared several points which I believe are suitable to be the subject of a full panel discussion. But in response to your desire and the desire of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT readers, I have no objection to begin this part of the dialogue on Sudanese political issues with an elaboration of some parts of the previous interview."

Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud then produced a copy of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, in which the previous interview was published, and read some parts which he underlined with red. He said:

"I was quoted as saying, in a comment on the "Islamic awakening," that Islam is an idea and, this being its character, it cannot sleep and awaken. The fact is that this sentence came from the editor, who included it with my approval. Another one is the part on the Islamic tide following the 1967 defeat. This was taken out of context from the rest of the sentence, which refers to the failure of the nationalist, liberal, and socialist plan, and says that the peoples' return to their heritage and beliefs does not necessarily mean that they support the existing Islamic political parties.

"In my talk I also told you, in response to your expression of surprise at my interest in Islam, that you should not be surprised also if your were told that leader of the SCP used to lead the worshippers in prayer in Kubar prison. The truth and for the record, the leader I am referring to is not me. It is Dr. Hammudah, an SCP leader and the party's candidate in the recent elections in the town of Kosti. Briefly, these are some of my remarks regarding the previous interview, with which I am happy because it was given to a newspaper with an international reputation. Now I am quite ready for the new interview and to continue the dialogue."

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] First, I have noticed that the name of the SCP was not mentioned this time in connection with the coup attempt in Sudan last August. What is your comment?

[Nuqud] (laughing) No comment.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] But it is the right of some people to link omitting the mention of any role [in the coup] by the Sudanese communists in your meeting with President al-Bashir which you characterized as "successful".

[Nuqud] The meeting in question was not a dialogue in the political sense, nor was it opening a door to another

dialogue, because the elements of a national dialogue are nonexistent in Sudan. We have met and talked, but each of us maintained his views, position, and stance. That's it.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] How do you explain the conflict and disagreement that broke out inside John Garang's rebel movement.

[Nuqud] I have no more information than what I hear from Western broadcasts. Therefore, I cannot express a definite view, though I can draw a general outline of several possibilities that could be the reason for the conflict and struggle within the movement. One of these possibilities could be war weariness. A second possibility could be the revival of secessionist aspirations and hopes following the independence of Eritrea, the breakdown of federal entities in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the increase in the number of provinces in Nigeria from five to more than twenty. The third possibility could be the impact of the change in Ethiopia. The fourth possibility concerns the tribal situation in the south. Yet a fifth possibility should not be overlooked, which is the movement's feeling that it alone is shouldering the military burden of opposition to the existing regime.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] To what extent do you believe that disputes and secession in the rebel movement would lead to the achievement of peace in southern Sudan?

[Nuqud] As I have already said at the beginning of the interview, my information on this matter is limited; they are no more than what I glean from Western broadcasts. I will continue to research and investigate the reasons and dimensions of the disagreements, but I would not wager on these disputes eventually leading to an end of the war.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] I often hear you talk about Garang's movement in spite of what I know and is often being asked about this movement's relationship with the SCP.

[Nuqud] (laughing) Perhaps you mean that John Garang is a Communist. I also ask if he is so. Talk about John Garang's affiliation with the SCP is a question that has been outstanding since June 1983, that is, after Ja'far Numayri's Information Minister Muhammad Khujali Salihayn announced in a newscast at 1500 hours that fighting broke out in Bor. He said the fighting was led by the well-known Communist, Garang. He confused John Garang with Joseph Garang, member of the SCP Politburo, who was executed in 1971 following the coup by Major Hashim 'Ata.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] I do not think so. I have heard and read about John Garang's leftist ideas.

[Nuqud] I assure you that there are no relations between the SCP and John Garang. He never was a Communist or a Marxist. He is a member of a group of southern intellectuals who belong to the Anyanya I Movement.

They were educated in East Africa and have been influenced by the ideas of Julius Nyrere, founder of the Dar es Salaam School of African Socialism. He was a distinguished person.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What is your comment on the strategic Marxist alliance between John Garang and former Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam?

[Nuqud] The alliance between Garang and Mengistu was absolutely not on an ideological basis. Rather, it was an alliance based on interests and a counter-balance to the alliance between the Sudanese governments and the Eritreans. What I said about Garang applies to his colleagues, even those who split with him, such as Lam Akol and Eric Mashar. They are educated and are proud of their southern identity, culture, and political views.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] I agree with the desire you expressed at the beginning of this interview to dedicate a special dialogue session to changes in the Soviet Union. But I would like to ask you a question about what I have often heard about your present attitude and that of the Sudanese Communists toward Gorbachev.

[Nuqud] We are in favor of Perestroika. What happened and is happening in the Soviet Union will be judged by the people there. Even during the days of the 19 August coup, I said that it was a repetition of what happened in 1965 when Khrushchev was overthrown, and the reform campaign which the 20th CPSU congress approved was aborted. I believe that any change or reform should be carried out within the elected constitutional institutions. Experience has proved that it is impossible to develop socialism without democracy. I also believe that what happened is not the final chapter in the conflict. The conflict has not ended yet.

Editorialist on New Twist to Secessionism

92AF0043B London AL-SHARQ ALL-AWSAT
in Arabic 5 Oct 91 p 15

[Article by al-Sirr Sayyid Ahmad]

[Text] Controversy over the secession of southern Sudan from the north is once again back in the Sudanese political arena. It is an ever-renewing old controversy that goes back to Sudan's pre-independence days more than three decades ago. But what's new this time is evident in two factors: First, the rise of dissident voices within Garang's movement advocating the idea of secession, which indicates the existence of a secessionist trend within the movement that adopted a unitary line when it was first launched eight years ago. Second, the existence of a power in Khartoum that is accused of being ready to do anything to stay in power and implement its program regardless of the outcome. Talk about partitioning is likely to become a reality, and for the first time is becoming a possibility. What makes this even more likely is that Garang's group accuses foreigners of being behind the secessionist group led by Dr. Lam Akol, and

of providing it with media facilities and communications. Garang's group pointed accusing fingers at individuals working with relief organizations, though not at the organizations themselves.

The talk about secession of the south from the north appears to be easy, but it is more difficult than imagined when viewed from a practical standpoint. There are more than two million southern Sudanese citizens living in the north because of the war. This is a new tendency stemming from a unionist perspective, which is in contrast with what happened during the first civil war, when the southerners moved mostly to the neighboring countries. On the other hand, large numbers of Arab tribesmen and their cattle moved to the areas under control of Garang's movement in search of water and grazing land, and in order to escape the drought that their areas are suffering from. This goes to show that the future of Sudan is based on a unity founded on solid principles that take into account the resources and rights of both sides. Moreover, there is the historical experiment when the British administration, during the colonialist era, took practical steps to separate the south from the north and close the door to any influence of Arabic or Islamic culture for a quarter of a century in the hope of eventually separating it, so as to become a state on its own or annex it to East Africa. But the attempt failed, after which the British administration went back to the idea of a united Sudan.

So far there are four principal reasons that make it difficult for the present government to go ahead with the secession plan. The first two reasons might not be greatly important. The first is purely academic, since the government of the National Islamic Front [NIF] does not wish to go down in the annals of history as having forsaken Sudan and its sovereignty and accepted secession. The second is that it will have to deal with thousands of officers and soldiers stationed in the south who should be repatriated in case of secession. These will return with the bitterness of the civil war only to add yet another element of instability to the regime. As for the two more important factors, they are represented in the fact that the regime is trying to adopt a missionary strategy. Therefore, southern secession, whether with the north's approval or without it, would be a defeat for this strategy, whose basic objective is to break out of the regime's isolation. If the NIF's regime is unable to preserve the united Sudan and to spread into the neighboring south, its ability to spread into the rest of the continent and the leading role it is trying to assume in the area will be in question. Most important is that opening the door to secession will not be confined to the south. Rather, it could spread to the rest of Sudan. What's currently happening in Darfur Region is an indication of that. The regime, in the face of the deteriorating security situation, was forced to send al-Tayyib Ibrahim, its strong man and former minister of presidential affairs, to become the regional governor. Not content with using the infantry, Ibrahim used the Air Force to strike at the positions of those whom he calls "armed

looters." This goes to show that the security situation there is complicated and grave, and that underneath it lies various economic and political issues that need to be resolved by force.

Perhaps it would be useful to recall that the biggest unpleasant surprise for the NIF in the post-uprising elections came from Darfur, on which it depended greatly. But the results disappointed it, for the majority in Darfur voted for Ummah Party. Also, the only instance in past democratic experiments in which deputies left their party and joined another was that of three deputies from Darfur who left the Islamic Front and joined the Democratic Unionist Party, because they objected to the NIF's policy toward Darfur. All of this would automatically make the NIF's government a party to any conflict in that region and not an honest arbiter, as it is trying to pretend to be.

Along with that, and despite the role the war in the south is playing in weakening the present regime in Khartoum, toppling the regime usually takes place in the north at the hands of the political forces there. It is not only a question of the opposition's abilities and activities, but rather of the policies of the present government, which contributes to diminishing its own political base because of its structure and views which, in spite of itself, puts it in the service of a base that is daily diminishing. The majority of the public feel they have had enough and will no longer care for any reaction or deterrent measures by the regime, at which point the regime reaches a total impasse.

There is no better proof of that than the fact that the Islamic movement has almost completely lost control of the students' movement, which is the pulse of public feelings. The government's violent reaction to the military coup attempt last year, when it executed 28 officers within two hours, did not stop coup movements. This is evident in the current trials.

The question of southern secession can be presented and discussed as a public right in any forum that allows all the political forces and individuals to express their views. Certainly, it is not a question that one political power, or a regime whose legitimacy is based on the force of arms, can alone decide without consulting the other political forces, or contrary to their will.

It is worth noting here that a person like Dr. Lam Akol is leading the secession. He is the man who lived in the north for a long time and took part in the uprising against Numayri's government when he was an engineering professor at Khartoum University and member of its union, which played a major role. He was also the movement's senior negotiator in talks with the government. In this capacity, he insisted on putting Sudan's unity at the top of the agenda. It is obvious that the political paralysis that has blocked the path to solutions, and the regime's evident inability to resolve the civil war, has opened the door to such tendencies. The regime's policies have closed the door to peace without

finding a satisfactory substitute for it. It also wasted the possibility of improving the economic situation, since capital assets are eroding and inflation has gotten out of control. The regime's isolation is evident in the fact that other countries are closing down their embassies in Sudan. It is evident that the same policies are about to lead Sudan into a dangerous situation and to partitioning. In the final analysis, this is a natural result of the policies of coercion and narrow-mindedness, as historical experiments show.

TUNISIA

Mourou Discusses Efforts To Resolve Issues

92AF0094A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
9 Oct 91 pp 30, 31

[Article by 'Abd-al-Latif al-Furati: "Mourou: Clandestine Group Within Our Movement Responsible for Conspiracy; No One Has Monopoly on Islamism, Patriotism"]

[Text] Shaykh 'Abdelfettah Mourou is one of the Islamist political figures in Tunisia. He broke up last spring with Al Nahdhah and with Shaykh Rachid al-Ghannouchi. He initially deactivated his membership, along with a number of prominent leaders, then proceeded to create a new party. Two factors are responsible for the rift. Primarily, Mourou and his group reject Al Nahdhah's strategy of violence, which he considers contrary to stated platforms and even to Islamic ethics. The second reason is sharp disagreement with the [movement's] position on the Gulf conflict. Mourou does not at all condone Shaykh Rachid al-Ghannouchi's support of Iraq. He believes that the events of 1990 are but unjustified intransigence against Kuwait, an Arab country, and that Islamic movements should have supported the victim, not the victimizer.

Shaykh Mourou discussed recent developments with AL-MAJALLAH.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Would you comment on recently announced discoveries of arms caches and plots to assassinate the head of state and a number of ministers, create chaos in the country, and disrupt the political process?

[Mourou] I have previously expressed my opposition in principle to the use of violence in politics, even when violence meant graffiti on a wall or a Molotov cocktail hurled by a demonstrator. How do I feel now? I believe that this sort of conduct is not proper for conditions in the country. It can't be condoned by any Tunisian, and especially by political groups.

There can be no justification for it, in my opinion. The Tunisian people are the loser when violence is used, because it undermines its meager capabilities and economic potential. The people need political stability in order to tackle their problems. The Tunisian people

depend on fragile economic sectors that could be seriously hurt by any clouding of the political climate. This is especially true of the services sector, which is the mainstay of the Tunisian economy. It can be profoundly disturbed by any disorder, not to mention the use of violence and political assassination. All that could derail the efforts of the nation as a whole, while serving no one's political interests.

[AL-MAJALLAH] About the issue of recognizing party rule? There are those who bring up the issue of the violence you now abhor in Al Nahdhah. They wonder how you were unaware of the groundwork for it, even though you were ranked second in the movement's hierarchy. How could you be oblivious to all the preparations, conferences, amassing of weapons, and the physical arrangements for a coup d'etat?

[Mourou] First, I was away from Tunisia for more than two years. On my return, I was not actively involved in any of the movement's apparatus, with the exception of the Political Bureau, whose involvement in the so-called hoarding of weapons was not proven by the Interior Ministry. It is to be noted that this phenomenon of violence is something new that was not there in the beginning. I joined an organization whose leaders I helped to formulate activities, regulations, and objectives. It was a political organization—or more precisely, a segment of it—which later developed into a clandestine group that escaped notice by the authorities. This was only recently uncovered when the phenomenon of violence evolved through those who belong to that movement.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But you were in a very prominent leadership position—second in command. How could you not know?

[Mourou] I later learned that violent segment was supervised by the so-called "organization." I had absolutely nothing to do with it and I did not even know that it existed.

[AL-MAJALLAH] That is no excuse and does not explain your obliviousness to such a dangerous situation!

[Mourou] There were two sides [to the movement]. Some movement members were active in politics while others were active elsewhere. There was a delicate link between the two branches, in which I was never involved.

Official Recognition

[AL-MAJALLAH] This is why some people question whether you should be acknowledged as an Islamic party when there is a distinct possibility that it might experience the same developments as Al Nahdhah. The fact that a clandestine faction could develop and resort to violence does not bode very well for the recognition of your party.

[Mourou] My perception of the issue is totally different. It is my view that depriving this segment of the Tunisian people of its right to overt political action within the law can only give impetus to covert underground activity and drive those who oppose clandestine action to it as an outlet for expression. I believe that it would be a great service to extremists to ban all Islamists, when we should deal reasonably in the Islamic arena, allow overt political action within the law, and come down hard on those who opt for covert activity. The authorities, all government agencies, and security apparati are dedicated to exposing covert activity.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What progress have you made in creating the party, developing a platform, and applying for the necessary authorization?

[Mourou] We have completed our work in the political, cultural, economic, and social aspects. We have devised a platform as an introduction to our association, which can not be considered a party on the basis of the number of members, contacts, or authorization applications. We are not at that stage yet, but the group has potential for future development into a political entity should it find acceptance, especially by the authorities. I also would like to point out that its purpose is to promote a measure of tranquility in the Islamic arena in Tunisia, or at least among participants in that arena who reject violence in favor of calm, organized political action within the law and by authority of the constitution. We wish to lay the foundation for law-abiding Islamic political action and to grant this group its lawful right to political activity.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Have you set a date yet for the authorization application?

[Mourou] The application would depend on a number of variables controlled by others, and not by us. I emphasize that we are ready to enter the political arena in the very near future, God willing, and we have hopes that our project will evolve.

[AL-MAJALLAH] You reportedly had a meeting with the political advisor to President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. How did that meeting turn out? Are the authorities willing to give and take with your platform?

[Mourou] The meeting with the President's advisor was fruitful and touched on a number of issues that we view as fundamental. As a whole, the tone was positive. We ended up with no direct solutions, but we left optimistic that they are not far away. The willingness of the authorities to deal with us on that level indicated responsiveness that we matched in the same spirit. We hope that this will help crystallize our plans.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Let us go back to your projected platform. What are your objectives? Are they religious objectives for political action? How do you visualize the society that you seek?

[Mourou] I wish to point out that Islam is a comprehensive religion that deals with all aspects of life. The

characteristics of political activity differentiate it from religious activity. But even though Islam is a comprehensive religion, one cannot mix political activity with religious activity because each has distinctive objectives and disparate means for attaining those objectives. Political activity, in our perception, involves advancing platforms to be debated. I don't believe that our association will find acceptance if it entered the political arena with preconceptions and announced itself to be an Islamic religious organization. This is why we founded a political party to deal with political issues as prescribed by the constitution and stipulated by the Party Law of May 1988. Our platform was not conceived with the idea that we have a monopoly on the Islamic character or that we are spokesmen for Islam. Nor do we deny our opponents their Islamic character. We believe that Islam is the common denominator among all our people and that it should be safeguarded by all of us. No one—not us nor anybody else in the political arena—has a monopoly on the defense of Islam or is sole spokesman in its name. Our initial entry in the political arena will be a problem resolution program. We will compete with other political parties for solutions to the issues at hand and to offer the Tunisian people options to accept or reject. We shall not denounce the Islamism or patriotism of those who disagree with us, because no one has a monopoly on that. It would be wrong to believe that one has a monopoly on patriotism, that one alone is sole spokesman for patriotism, or that the opposition is unpatriotic. Such dogma would inject the political process with an element that is not too far removed from the belief in religious affiliation as the essence of political action.

Personal Affairs

[AL-MAJALLAH] Practically speaking, society today is teeming with dealings that have a very significant impact on family affairs, on economic and banking transactions, and ultimately on border issues. What are your views on all that?

[Mourou] We do not hold the view that all family problems should be resolved through Islamic law. We believe that Tunisia's laws governing personal affairs are more than adequate in this respect, and that some family problems are better resolved by expanding the rights of both parties under the law rather than regressing with them into Islamic law.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Does this mean that the Family Affairs Law contradicts Islamic law and conflicts with it?

[Mourou] We believe that the Family Affairs Law is an evolvment and a reinforcement of Islamic law. The law, in my opinion, contains discrepancies attributable, perhaps, to the haste with which it was drafted at the time. Its implementation over 36 years was liable to underscore deficiencies that should be reviewed by legal and social experts in order to develop the family and protect it against the many adulterations to which it is exposed. Our platform does not deal with those issues which we do not hold to be of primary importance. We address

economic issues instead, and take positions on such challenges to Tunisians as economic imbalances, indebtedness, festering unemployment, the fragility of Tunisian economic sectors, and the need for gradual economic development into a degree of stability that would insulate us from foreign developments. We have taken positions on all such issues. We have adopted a liberal three-sector option, but on the basis that the wealthiest party in the economic sector must be based on individual initiatives that require banking transactions. We see no place for interfering in its operations or calling for its abolition, since this is not in our domain. We never even raised the issue.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What sort of society would you create should you come into power someday?

[Mourou] We are proponents of civilian society as a scholarly concept developed in 18th-century Europe. Contrary to popular belief, a civilian society is not antithetic to a religious society. Rather, it is a societal concept rooted in safeguarding individual rights and interests through organizations that challenge government excesses and impunity in violating the rights of the individual. We advocate a civilian society that would safeguard individual rights through organized entities. We do not advocate a return to theocracy, which I believe was never known in Sunni Islam. It was known in Shi'a Islam only, and was never practiced in our country except for the brief period when the Fatimids ruled Tunisia. We are, therefore, advocates of a civilianian system of government in a civilian society. Such a government, however, should remember that the populist base for the aspirations of individual Tunisians is rooted in Islamic Arab civilization and culture, and should keep that in mind.

WESTERN SAHARA

Polisario Minister's Statements Derided

92AF0067B Casablanca AL BAYANE in French
4 Oct 91 p 1

[Editorial: "Ould Saleck's Delirious Ideas"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Ould Saleck, who vies with Mustapha Bachir Sayed for the dubious privilege of being the foreign policy voice of the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro], is a turncoat of the first degree.

He recently told the Spanish press that colonialism under Franco never forced Saharawis to flee north during the colonial crackdown....

A lie of that magnitude, reiterated with customary enthusiasm by the Spanish media, is aimed at denying those of our Saharawi compatriots who sought refuge in the northern provinces the right to vote in the referendum of self-determination.

The itinerary that Ould Saleck (alias Maa El Ainine) has traveled in his own life offers glaring proof that his statements are indeed lies: A native of Smara who taught Arabic in El Aaiun, he himself was forced to leave Saguia el Hamra (where, at the time, he defended just and patriotic ideas) and go to Marrakech where he obtained his secondary school diploma. From there, he enrolled in law school in Rabat (where he was an activist in the ranks of the PLS [Party of Liberation and Socialism], which was later to give rise to the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism]). After being hired by a bank in Casablanca, he decided to enroll at the university of Grenoble in 1975 for a doctorate in economics. In order to do this, he applied for and received a Moroccan scholarship. And it was then that he choose to betray his country and his people and run off to Algiers where, ipso facto, he was suddenly reincarnated as a "member of the Political Bureau" of the Polisario.

And there you have Ould Saleck a.k.a. Maa El Ainine, who has the audacity to deny something that happened to him personally. In this case, the act of denial verges on paranoia. This individual, fully absorbed in his secessionist affair, has gone even further: He has called upon Spain to demand that the United Nations adhere solely to the 1974 census in establishing voter lists. The idea is all the more delirious in that the self-same Ould Saleck, who was in Rabat at the time of the census, would thus deprive himself of the right to vote in the referendum because he was not counted by the census takers of Franco's occupation army!

The tactic is unmistakably clear. Like his friend at the "defense ministry of the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic]," Ould Saleck, the "foreign affairs minister" of this mythical entity, rejects the referendum and its predictable and expected outcome. And that is why he has the indecency to insult the memory of his Saharawi compatriots who fell on the field of honor in 1958 in the joint Franco-Spanish repression under "Operation Mop-Up" [Ecouvillon], "which crushed the Saharawi tribes that were integrated into Morocco's ALN [National Liberation Army?] of the south.

The same indecency accounts for his boldfaced lies in the face of the fact that his rival, Bachir Mustapha Sayed, himself grew up in a refugee camp near Tan Tan, his family having been driven out of El Aaiun during the colonial crack-down of 1958-59.

How much credibility can foreign entities, including Spain and the United Nations, continue to lend to wretches who spout such blatant, shameless lies?

Today, our Saharawi compatriots who were forced to take refuge in the northern portion of the Moroccan homeland are going back to the locales where they were born and where their parents and ancestors lived.

They are living in temporary quarters in El Aaiun, waiting for the United Nations identification commission to consent to register them as applicants for voting privileges in the referendum.

Their presence in the Sahara, where they can provide complete proof of their origins, is the best rebuttal to the delirious notions of Ould Saleck. For, what good is a renegade's word against the facts!

Polisario Green March Accusations Scorned

92AF0067C Casablanca AL BAYANE in French
9 Oct 91 p 1

[Editorial: "A Matter of Counting...."; italicized words as published]

[Text] In a state of agitation, the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] is emitting squeals of protest like a polecat being neutered. If we are to believe its "ambassador" in Algiers, Ibrahim Hakim (alias Ould Derouiche, a national and former diplomat of Mauritania), Morocco has organized "a second Green March to settle several hundreds of thousands of Moroccan colonists" in the southern provinces. According to the secessionists' propaganda, this massive dislocation is aimed at flouting the Spanish census of 1974 (which "establishes" the population at 74,000 inhabitants).

Naturally, the Polisario's assertion is absolutely preposterous and contrary to fact. What is happening in our Saharan provinces, more particularly in El Aaiun, cannot be compared to the Green March: Neither the goal nor the intensity is the same.

The Green March, as everyone will remember, rallied 350,000 Moroccan patriots in a peaceful effort to drive Spanish colonialism out of our southern provinces. The March of the People, an unprecedented approach in the history of anti-colonial struggle, achieved its goals.

Today, Morocco's Saharan lands are no longer in need of being liberated. Morocco's present task, in view of the upcoming formality of the referendum, is simply to confront the international community with the incontestable reality of the legitimacy of its national cause.

It is from that perspective that all our Saharawi compatriots who, between 1958 and 1970-71, were forced to take refuge in Morocco's liberated north are now back in their home province. These fellow citizens are justly determined not to be kept from voting in the referendum. They have thus returned to be registered as voters, and they are willing and certain of being able to prove beyond all doubt to the UN identification commission that they have all the requisite qualifications to vote in the referendum.

Thus, there is no possible comparison to Green March, which was an act of decolonization and liberation, whereas this is an action of confirmation.

The Polisario will have to get used to the idea: It has neither the power nor the means to prevent authentic Saharawis from registering as voters. Nor does it have

the right to demand that the incomplete—if not truncated—1974 census be used as the sole basis for defining the electorate qualified to vote in the referendum.

But haven't those who obligingly serve as "loud-speakers," repeating the Polisario's rhetoric without question, had enough of being "taken in" by its contradictory assertions? Only yesterday, they echoed the Polisario in proclaiming that "the entire Saharawi people"—which they estimated at more than 700,000 persons (nearly 1 million!)—were living in the camps of Tindouf.

Today, they have brought that number down from 700,000 to 70,000!

In so promptly removing one zero, they demonstrate the nullity of the secessionists' assertions. They also confirm their insincerity. History will give them a final mark of...zero!

Action Against Polisario Infiltrations Urged

92AF0067D Rabat L'OPINION in French
10 Oct 91 pp 1,3

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: "Repelling Aggression"]

[Text] Taking advantage of the cease-fire declaration, the mercenaries of the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] are attempting to present the United Nations and Morocco with a fait accompli by conducting operations of infiltration across the internationally recognized borders of our Sahara.

The mercenaries would like to hurriedly build structures in the no-man's-land to house individuals recruited from the countries of the region and a portion of the population sequestered in the camps of Tindouf.

The infiltrations constitute a flagrant and premeditated violation of the UN's peace plan and an ill-intentioned, deceitful, and illegal exploitation of the cease-fire ordered by the United Nations. They are also an outright and unacceptable infringement of Moroccan sovereignty, as they are occurring in an area that is an integral part of Moroccan territory.

By engaging in such operations, the Polisario is attempting to achieve several objectives at once, namely:

- to use the cover offered by the cease-fire and the UN's passivity to settle in the Moroccan Sahara;
- to gain acceptance for the notion that "liberated territories" exist, and thereby continue to mislead international public opinion;
- to build housing and administrative offices in this uninhabited sector of the Moroccan Sahara so as to force the United Nations to open polling places here for the referendum; and
- to establish attack bases in the no man's land by bringing in weapons intended for use in terrorist,

destabilizing operations against the provinces of the Moroccan Sahara with the goals of disrupting the climate of security and peace that prevails there, intimidating the local population, and sowing confusion in their minds.

But, aware of the mercenaries' designs and machinations, Morocco remains wary and watchful of their every plan and determined to thwart their plots and schemes against our country's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The FAR [Royal Armed Forces], who defend our soil heroically without shrinking from sacrifice in the face of any danger threatening our country, will not allow the mercenaries a single opportunity to establish themselves on any portion of our territory and, through combing and clean-up operations, will end the mercenaries' presence and all attempts at infiltration whatever their form.

In destroying the mercenaries' bases, Morocco will merely be repelling aggression and conducting itself in a lawful and legitimate manner.

Morocco has the right to defend its territorial integrity and its national sovereignty by any means.

On numerous occasions, we have warned the United Nations and the international community against the mercenaries' intrigues and their repeated attempts to scuttle the United Nations' peace plan and prevent the referendum from taking place. Today, Morocco has every right to ensure its own defense and put an end to a situation that is detrimental to its security and sovereignty.

Former Polisario Members Discuss Referendum

92AF0067A Rabat L'OPINION in French 13 Oct 91 p 1

[Text] The deficiencies of the census conducted by Spain in the Sahara in 1974 were pointed out Friday in Paris by Moulay Abbas, a former military leader of the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro], who gave a detailed personal account as a guest of "Press Club de France" revealing that certain members of his family were not included in the census.

"My mother and my sisters do not appear in Spain's rolls, whereas my father and some of my brothers were included," he told the international press. Moulay Abbas is a former member of the Polisario's political bureau and former commander of the 8th military region. He returned to Morocco in May 1991.

Mr. Omar Hadrami, a founding member of the Polisario, also gave proof of omissions in the census which was deliberately truncated by the Spanish occupier to exclude all those of Saharan origin who were expelled or forced to flee into northern Morocco as well as those who indicated their feelings of attachment to their country, Morocco.

Mr. Hadrami cited several examples of individuals who were included in Spain's count without having any tie to the Sahara, while authentic Saharawis were excluded by

the same census takers. He revealed, for example, that Mohamed Khaddad, a Polisario official, was counted in person by the Spanish despite the fact that he is widely known to be the son of a sheik of a Mauritanian tribe from Zouerate.

Mr. Hadrami went on to add that "Mohamed Khaddad, who once represented the Polisario in Paris, under the name of Mohamed Abdelfattah, was a member of the Mauritanian People's Party led by the former president of Mauritania, Ould Daddah. He later went to study in Algiers where he joined the Polisario without ever having seen the Sahara and without being able to claim to be descended from a Saharawi tribe. [quotation marks as published]

In addition to that example, Mr. Hadrami revealed that the names of six important Mauritanian tribal chiefs were wittingly included in the 1974 census rolls. He cited a document of the Spanish special services of that era ordering that the Mauritanian side be counted so as to "tip the balance" in Spain's favor in the event of a referendum that would pit Spain against Morocco.

"The referendum was supposed to go against Morocco and that is why the positions of Spain and the Polisario are today in agreement on the subject of the census," he stated.

"Spain's objective at the time of the operation was to exclude all those who had settled in Morocco, those who had been pushed back and those who had taken refuge in the north of the country as a result of military operations, and all those who claimed Morocco as their country. It is obvious that all of these individuals should be counted in the rolls because they will have no difficulty in proving to the United Nations' identification commission that they are of local lineage."

"Morocco," he stated, "is justified in demanding that the census be up-dated and completed, and it is Morocco's duty to defend the right to vote" of all those who were left out of the count.

Mr. Hadrami emphasized that Morocco has given its full cooperation to the United Nations to see this operation to conclusion and facilitate the referendum procedure.

The Polisario Has Failed

Mr. Bellahi Lakhlifa is a former director of the newspaper SAHARA LIBRE and a former secretary general of the Polisario journalists association. After hearing the royal appeal which proclaimed that "the homeland is clement and merciful," he returned to Morocco. For his part, he stated that "the Saharawis have the opportunity to integrate into Morocco without having to renounce any aspect of their personality." Questioned by a journalist about the conditions of his return to Morocco, he answered that "Morocco opened all doors to us." "I was

influenced by nothing other than reality," he said, adding that "the public administrative offices in the Saharan provinces are almost entirely in the hands of Saharawis, and there is a very extensive plan to develop the region to its full potential."

Reiterating his unequivocal opposition to the idea of independence for the Sahara, Mr. Bellahi Lakhliifa explained that "the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] had been a total failure at the economic, social, and cultural levels." In addition, he emphasized, "the times are no longer favorable to small states which can no longer survive in conditions of poverty in Africa. These are times of broad groupings."

Further, he compared the Polisario regime to the dictatorship of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot, indicating that the Polisario "wants to keep up a constant current of tension in order to advance interests other than those of the Saharawis." The majority of "Saharawi leaders" are not of Saharan origin and they have interests in conflict with the interests of the Saharawis [quotation marks as published], he added.

"The Polisario is living out its failure," Mr. Bellahi emphasized, pointing out that "in internal affairs, it plays the card of tribalism, while, in external relations, it markets the image of multi-party tolerance and liberalism."

He also denounced the violence and the exactions that are common in the camps, particularly since the move to rebel in 1988. He revealed that "hundreds of women and old people" have been and continue to be "victims of repression by the Polisario army, incarcerated and tortured" for reasons of "ideology, religion, and tribal affiliation." The situation there is "unbearable and intolerable," he added.

"Popular dissent was very strong in 1988, and the crackdown that followed not only failed to crush dissent but reinforced it," he continued. "The number of dissenters grew last June with the dissolution of institutions," Mr. Bellahi noted, going on to state that the Polisario is now nothing more than a "tribal organization with a national secretariat made up of three members each of whom represents a tribal division."

He also indicated that the Polisario was projecting abroad "the image of refugees, in order to amass wealth" through humanitarian aid which goes essentially to the benefit of the leaders and not to the benefit of the camps where the situation "is only worsening." "All this aid is sold or used" toward other ends, he noted, citing as an

example the fact that assistance vehicles are used exclusively by the leaders. He indicated that the Polisario has bank accounts in Switzerland, Italy, France, Belgium, and Great Britain. (MAP)

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Leaflets Demand That Officials Return Property

92P40032A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
28 Oct 91 p 1

[Text] Sanaa—The southern half of Yemen has witnessed a political boil over as the result of land and building owners' demand for the return of their property, which was appropriated by members of the pre-unification ruling party in a matter of days at reduced prices. The [original] owners have distributed proclamations and leaflets in every province, embassy, and international organization calling on the government to return this property to them, as was done with agricultural land.

The leaflets contain the text of a memo by the owners to the prime minister, members of parliament, the house of representatives, and the cabinet denouncing the support of the former Marxist regime in Aden for the appropriation of homes by members of the ruling party, whom they describe as benefiting in the three days before the announcement of unification.

The leaflet says that the staff and members of the Yemeni Socialist Party "legislated seizure" of the people's property by buying it at reduced prices. Some of them were ministers who bought the most luxurious expatriate real estate for mere hundreds of dollars. Some of them were party staff who seized real estate that the leaflet says went for "absurd prices" not even covering the value of one window in these houses.

This angry declaration by the owners of housing and real estate comes in the midst of a severe housing crisis, especially in the southern part [of Yemen], which has lead to an increase in rents and housing prices, particularly with the return of many expatriates and tremendous population growth. They [the original owners] also refused compensation, which was offered to them by the [new] owners at the prices assessed at the time of nationalization in 1972.

The declaration points out that some of the ministers and officials are members of the Socialist Party who are renting their housing secretly for inflated prices, ranging from \$3,000 to \$8,000 a month, to companies and foreigners.

IRAN

Daily on U.S. Intentions Behind Madrid Conference

NC0411145891 Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
23 Oct 91 pp 1, 11

[Editorial: "Threat Against Islam"]

[Text] Once again Iran is a victim of threats and terror for supporting the Palestinian ideal and defending its own revolution's values and principles. The scope of these threats shows the serious impact Iran's actions have had on Middle East developments, particularly the Palestine problem. The three-day gathering in Tehran of personalities, groups, and parliamentary delegations from Islamic countries, and the conference supporting the Palestinians' hope and revolution, while the Middle East is in a sensitive position, are significant. Although America and its officials tried to stay cool, American press circles, which reflect American statesmen's views, express rage and concern about a process capable of seriously impeding many years of American and Zionist efforts. The major weapon America and the Zionists are trying to use is the psychology that rules Arab countries and Islamic public opinion. After the oil war, America resorted to the mass media to create it an exceptional and special position. It spread the notion that Arab and Islamic countries need American support to survive. The resulting psychological pressures led to Arab leaders' despair and isolated revolutionary and combatant ideas. Under these conditions America seriously follows the peace conference scenario, and tries to exploit time, historic opportunity, and the psychological atmosphere in Islamic countries to reach its objectives. The Madrid conference will never solve the Palestine problem. The intention is to shape security arrangements and form special relations, creating a balance and ultimately establishing American and Zionist domination in the Middle East. The Palestine problem has been turned into one between the Arabs and Palestinians, and the point of the talks and efforts is to create a feeling of security and calm for the Zionists and to prepare for a wretched guarantee preserving reactionary and treacherous Arab heads. Under such conditions and circumstances, the Tehran conference supporting Palestinian Muslims hopes ended the existing psychological situation, and expressed determination for support by those who feel responsible toward Palestinian aspirations. Threats by America and its allies in isolating Iran once again, and propounding such issues, are more psychological than real. The Muslim Iranian nation has shown that it will not give in to pressure in supporting its ideals.

The oppressed Palestinian nation cannot be sacrificed nor can the holy land of Palestine be cast into oblivion. Jerusalem is the first qiblah of the world's Muslims, and is a holy land whose occupation will never be recognized by any Muslim. Even if America and the Zionists put on paper what they want through pressures, threats, and terror, they will be unable to implement it. America's

strategic mistake is pride in its position, and thinking that by drawing a few traitors into talks it can carry out the dreamed of transaction. It is an empty thought, showing that they still do not know Muslims after years of contacts with Islam. They ruled this area for years by force, terror, and bayonets, but it will not last. The young Islamic generation is waking up and the hatred it felt after years of crimes, treachery, and bullying will turn into a bullet, tearing the chest of traitors and defeating America in the fight.

Tehran Stresses Anti-U.S. 'Struggle' on 4 Nov Anniversary

NC0511081491 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0430 GMT
4 Nov 91

[Central News Unit Research Group commentary]

[Text] In the name of God.

Every year, on 4 November, three unforgettable events of contemporary history are observed: The anniversary of Imam Khomeyni's exile in 1964, the anniversary of the savage killing of the students by the agents of the Shah's regime in 1978, and the occupation of the U.S. den of spies in 1979. Therefore, 4 November has a special significance because of the importance of the events, which took place on that date.

Observing 4 November as the day for combating world arrogance is not segregated from the realization of the true nature of world arrogance and its overall performance at all times. In the political lexicon, world arrogance includes governments and powers that are seeking hegemony over all the countries of the world with the concomitant trampling of the rights of the weak countries.

On principle, the history of the powers of world arrogance has an inseparable bond with the domineering and aggressive acts of all arrogant powers, with the United States as the flag bearer. For example, the performance of the United States in the past year, its deployment of forces in the Middle East region, the undermining of the military capability of the countries of the region, its overt interference in all stages of decision making in the region, as well as its blatant support of the Zionist regime, are conspicuous examples of its trampling the rights of the shackled nations under its domination.

In addition, the convocation of the so-called Madrid peace conference for destroying the rights of the oppressed Palestinian people also is considered an overt plot, which is in the process of implementation. The Middle East region—in which Iran is also situated—is the main objective of the plots of world arrogance.

Along with the recognition of the nature of world arrogance, combating its plots also is of immense significance. In this path, the Islamic Republic of Iran has

experimented with certain innovations that merit appreciation, such as the convocation of the conference for the support of the Palestinian Muslim people's revolution, with its display of serious opposition to the extensive presence of foreign forces in the region and the need to combat the domineering U.S. policy in the name of its new world order.

Besides, the Islamic revolution has been one of the pioneers of struggle and the fight against domineering policies in the past 12 years, the nature of which was highlighted in the occupation of the U.S. nest of spies in 1979, which was a center of terrorism and conspiracy. In this bold action, the leadership and people were side by side with one another and did not permit a belligerent foreign government to interfere in our country's internal affairs.

The Westerners recall this incident with bitterness, which was termed as the second revolution by Imam Khomeyni. Political observers termed it the secret to shattering the myth of the U.S. superpower's might. From this point of view, the adoption of this stance indicates the importance of practical measures in tandem with the raising of symbolic slogans. The respect our people have for the proclaimed policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the positive and supportive viewpoint that Muslims have for the Iranian stance stems from this source. There are many in contemporary history who raise vehement and revolutionary slogans but have never gone a step further. Combating world arrogance can only have the desired and positive effects when it exceeds mere slogans.

Similarly, it should be noted that if the government and the people of Iran want the continuation of the struggle against world arrogance and the protection of the Islamic and national values, there is no other path except to strengthen themselves in all areas. A country which is economically and militarily strong, but without a strong cultural and scientific backing, cannot achieve a guaranteed victory.

The insistence of His Eminence Imam Khomeyni—may his soul be sanctified—in his addresses to the people and the officials that attention be paid to the young generation, their thoughts and talents, and their scientific prowess affirms the importance of the above.

Today, when it is also Students' Day, a renewed emphasis on stepping up efforts for attaining the necessary specialization is of immense importance. This is because the needs of the Iranian society and the self-reliance of the country is not possible without a generation endowed with wisdom and intelligent thinking.

In this regard, His Eminence Imam Khomeyni stated: Striving on the path of science and the attainment of specialization in the various fields should be the basis of the activities of our students, as the needs of the homeland can only be met by them and our country can only become self-sufficient with their efforts. Unfortunately, in the past eras everything was based on making us

dependent in all fields and reduced our nation to such a state that for everything we had to extend our hands before others. You, dear ones, should endeavor to emerge from this dependence and to cater to your country's needs yourselves. Do not neglect the strength of your humanitarianism and faith or refrain from relying on foreigners and insure your independence in all fields.

In any case, the heirs to the generation of the 4 November incident should—now that the country's massive phase of reconstruction has commenced—pay greater attention to the specialized scientific education. One must observe that the enemies of the independence of our country are striving to corrupt the younger generation and to undermine the dynamism and ability of our society and that general vigilance is necessary to combat such a danger.

Parents, the society and the officials all have an obligation to protect the physical and mental health of their offspring, who are the future builders of this land.

Economic Issues, Reconstruction Discussed

92AS0144A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic
23 Sep 91 pp 28, 29

[Article: "Unusual Diplomatic Movement in Tehran, New War for Reconstruction"]

[Text] Tehran, AL-SHIRA' exclusive—The Iranian capital witnessed unusual diplomatic movement during the second week of September. A visit by the UN secretary general coincided with a visit by Pakistani president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In addition, the foreign minister of the Sultanate of Oman arrived as a Gulf emissary to discuss Gulf security with Iranian leaders and refresh the Arab-Iranian atmosphere. During the same week, the Iranian Foreign Ministry arranged an international human rights conference attended by representatives from various European countries and by the Arab Republic of Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan, and Libya, represented by university professors.

The diplomatic movement in the Iranian capital naturally did not lack European ministers, among them the Belgian minister of foreign trade and the German minister of communications.

Iran's external moves come in the context of mounting foreign challenges and surrounding changes. These can be detailed as follows:

First, America's tireless preparations to convene the peace conference; This represents a test and challenge for the slogans of the Islamic republic, which, for its part, is preparing for a counter-conference this October to back the Palestinian cause.

Second, approaching settlements on the subject of Gulf security, inasmuch as the wall of confidence between the GCC countries and Tehran has not been fully cemented yet.

Third, the Afghan issue. It has taken far too long to settle and has posed a heavy burden on Iran for more than 10 years (about 2 million refugees). There is also the possibility that the Americans may reach an agreement with the weak Russians to settle the issue without Iran and its ally, Pakistan.

Fourth, continuing American pressure on allies and friends to maintain a kind of isolation and embargo against Iran in various fields. Pakistan's former foreign minister has revealed that the United States warned Pakistan not to strengthen its relations with Tehran. Pakistan was deprived of American aid some time ago because of its nuclear program.

Common Market

For the purpose of economic cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan, Tehran has revived the ECO [Economic Cooperation Organization], a regional organization that operated before the victory of the Islamic revolution. Tehran now wants to turn this organization into the nucleus of an Islamic common market that it hopes will soon expand with the entry of "Islamic" Afghanistan and the Soviet Union's Asian republics after they gain independence. The organization might broaden to include some of the Gulf countries or other friendly Arab states.

In this context, Tehran is preparing to hold a top-level summit of the leaders of the ECO countries soon and wants the Afghan issue to be on the threshold of a complete and just settlement. The weight of Tehran's recent Asian moves has therefore leaned toward reopening the Afghan issue as widely as possible with the variously-aligned factions of Afghan mujahidin, the leaders of Pakistan, and the UN secretary general. During the latter's recent visit to Tehran, Tehran was able to convince the international official that any negotiations with the Kabul government would be futile. This will greatly facilitate agreement among the mujahidin factions on a unified position toward the UN proposal for resolving the issue peacefully. This was recently supported by the American-Soviet agreement calling for a halt to arms supplies to the various parties on the Afghan scene as of next January.

This will greatly contribute to lowering the tension on Iran's eastern borders and to a return of millions of Afghan refugees to their country, thereby alleviating Iran's economic burdens. Tehran, which is experiencing many difficulties in rebuilding its economy, which was destroyed by the Iraq-Iran war, and which was not rescued after the results of the second Gulf war, is trying to build the hub of its foreign policy for the coming period on the ambitious five-year plan of President Hashemi Rafsanjani's government. One therefore sees

Tehran going to the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers' Conference with ideas based on developing cooperation between south-south regional groups to create the needed balance in the south-north dialogue, thereby helping break the siege of these countries. At the same time, Tehran is encouraging cooperation between the EC and Third World countries, and is considered to be an important contributor to the new world order. This was stated in Velayati's speech in Accra. There have also been rapid attempts to normalize relations with Iraq following the change in the regional balances of forces. Rapid Soviet developments have helped quicken Iran's steps toward a renewed shift toward the Middle East and its critical issues, after a tactical withdrawal to the periphery to confront the American political attack and the economic and technological blockade.

If normalization steps with Iraq—implementation of the provisions of Resolution 598 regulating peace in the region, and payment of compensation to the victim after identification of the aggressor—are completed with the help of the UN secretary general, who has promised to carry out Iran's conditions, and has taken this responsibility on himself; if there are definite steps with the GCC, which is preparing for talks with Iran in the UN on Iran's role in Gulf security arrangements; and if progress is made on closing the file on the hostages held in Lebanon, then Tehran will have made long strides on the road to reconstruction and rebuilding.

Future Developments

Whatever the perspective of the Iranian Government's diplomatic moves, future developments that Iran can expect in the course of the third year of President Rafsanjani's five-year plan will remain largely controlled by pressing economic factors.

Late this August, the Iranian president dealt at length with this subject in the press conference he held especially for this purpose, and in the Friday sermon following the conference. He discussed the enormous losses, estimated at \$1 trillion, that the Iranian economy suffered because of the Iraq-Iran war. He accused the Western powers of continuing to blockade Iran despite the good intentions Iran has shown on the path of peace and reconstruction. Japan, for example, has refused to complete the Abadan oil refinery, on which hundreds of millions of dollars have already been spent. Germany has refused to complete a nuclear-fueled power plant. France is still delaying paying its debts to Iran, not to mention the Iranian funds frozen in American banks. There is also the American veto on selling Iran Western military equipment or even civilian equipment containing American-manufactured components.

True, the figures that Iranian officials are announcing about climbing production curves, rising non-oil exports, and a 10.1 percent growth rate for last year certainly are record-breaking and encouraging figures for a Third World economy. However, the enormous difficulties and accumulated problems, whether in the high

unemployment rate; the relatively high inflation; the record [population] growth rate of 2.9 percent; the aging land, air, and maritime transportation fleet; and overall economic machine—all these things confront implementers of the economic reform policy with difficult and limited options.

If one adds that Iran is forced to borrow from international banks and that the World Bank's pressures for lifting subsidies from basic commodities are increasing daily, so that Iran is being forced to sell public-sector companies to the private sector. This puts pressure on the poorer classes, so one can understand Iran's foreign moves and how they are essentially based on an economic background. They aim at paving the way for reconstructing everything that the war destroyed, enabling Iran to face the accelerating challenges around it, and successfully carrying out the reconstruction and rebuilding program that Ayatollah Khamenei has called "a new war for rebuilding and reconstruction."

Gas Pipeline Reaches Final Stages

LD0511122191 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1530 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Text] The work of laying the main gas supply pipeline from Hamadan to Qorveh and Sanandaj which was due to be completed in accordance to plans, by the end of the year 1372 [1993], has reached its final stages. This pipeline, which is part of a huge project of gas supply to the province of Kordestan, is 172 km long and has 20-inch-diameter pipes. The work of setting up gas control stations along the length of the main pipeline also started several months ago and final tests of the pipes have been carried out on more than 50 km of this pipeline. Parallel to the implementation of the project for laying the national grid's main gas supply pipeline from Hamadan to Kordestan province, the operations for supplying gas to the Qorveh township that began last Tir [22 June to 22 July] are progressing at a quick pace.

IATA Permits Sale of Planes, Parts to Iran

LD2910203491 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1030 GMT 29 Oct 91

[Text] Thanks to the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran's delegation at the 47th annual meeting of the International Air Transport Association, IATA, a resolution was unanimously approved, which removes the ban on the sale of planes and spare parts to the countries previously subjected to sanctions.

In their resolution, the participants at the IATA session stressed the need for the sale of spare parts for old planes and the replacement of some of these planes with new ones.

More than 200 delegations from various regions of the world, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, took part in this session, which began in Nairobi yesterday. In the

course of this session, the managing director of the Islamic Republic of Iran airlines was elected a member of the seven-man committee in charge of training IATA manpower.

Paper Criticizes Official's Reaction to Terrorism

NC2610210091 Tehran SALAM in Persian
17 Oct 91 p 15

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The deputy foreign minister, in an interview with the TEHRAN TIMES, has condemned the attribution of terrorist activities to Iran, including the murder of Shahpur Bakhtiar.

Although in his remarks he criticized the conduct of the European governments during the past few weeks and the attacks made against Iranian officials by the counterrevolution, at times with the collusion and concurrence of the European governments, these comments are questionable. An Islamic system official condemning the murder of a hateful element such as Bakhtiar is incredible and regrettable.

This regret is even greater when the French judge is audacious enough to say that he is going to send an investigating judge to Iran and no firm approach has been made toward this remark. Unfortunately, when Iranian-French relations were traversing a logical path toward expansion, we witnessed a multifaceted attack in the French media and public opinion against Iran because of Bakhtiar's murder.

Until now, Iran officially has denied any involvement in the incident, but to prevent the disruption of ties with France and Mitterrand's scheduled visit to Iran, is it necessary to display such a reaction to the murder of a traitor to the aspirations of the oppressed Iranian nation and an individual whose hands were stained with the blood of the nation's youth in the last few days of the Pahlavi regime?

When the Monafeqin [Mojahedin-e Khalq] terrorists martyred Beheshti and the associates of the revolution on 28 June [1983], fled to France in a military plane, were in practice placed under that country's protection, and shortly afterward the president and prime minister of our country were martyred, was the French Government prepared to condemn these crimes and to answer to our judicial officials about these crimes?!

The French Government should be made to understand everything will be available to them if they forge equal relations based on mutual respect and that any factor which places the French side at an advantage in our opinion will be an element of failure in expanding bilateral relations.

What effect will the remarks by our deputy foreign minister have on the conclusion drawn by the French? We leave the verdict to our readers.

SRI LANKA

LTTE Blamed for Government's Troubles

92AS0165C Colombo DAILY NEWS in English
27 Sep 91 p 6

[Text] The LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] factor in the present crisis is gradually taking centre stage. Notice of a motion of no confidence in the government has been given. The basis of this motion is the rapport that was built between the government and the LTTE and certain alleged activities that followed this new friendship.

The government has claimed that the government and the LTTE had come to some understanding about the ways to deal with the Tamil National Army and certain steps like helping each other materially and otherwise had taken place. The LTTE, according to an AFP report published in the HINDU, has rejected the government's claim that they co-operated with Sri Lankan armed forces to battle the rival Tamil Group—the Tamil National Army.

In an earlier statement the LTTE called for the overthrow of President Ranasinghe Premadasa's government.

A relationship that began with great hopes and offered lasting solutions to the ethnic problem has come to an end. Not that it did not come to end a year ago with the resumption of fighting. Flickers of hope of negotiations were there. Offers were made. Certain mediation was attempted. Even Minister S. Thondaman was on the sidelines to take off to Jaffna to play his role. In the midst of all this, the LTTE has called for the overthrow of the government.

What became of the trust the Premadasa government placed in the LTTE? It was called the triumph of the policy of the three C's—consultation, compromise and consensus. Has not the LTTE let down the government in the most despicable way? The LTTE has stuck to itself. Slippery and distrustful. The government has now been forced to carry a land mine or even a time bomb that was born of this government—LTTE relationship. This relationship though in tatters, its ghost will entwine the government in such ways that it might rue the day the decision was taken to hug the tiger.

One would learn from experience. But others might not pay the cost all the time.

Newspaper Denies Being LTTE's 'Vehicle of Propaganda'

92AS0165A Colombo DAILY NEWS in English
27 Sep 91 p 4

[Text] Understandably, there are many people who are rightly indignant about the extensive publicity the LTTE's [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] recent "open letter" to the Sinhala people had in the news media. We

have received letters expressing this point of view. Why, the writers ask, do the national media assist LTTE propaganda?

The answer to that is not difficult to provide. The LTTE, undoubtedly for reasons of its own, decided to make public at the present time that it stood for the toppling of the incumbent administration. It said in its letter that it was fighting to "dismantle a fascist and chauvinist regime" implying in the current context that it supported the effort of the SLFP [Sri Lanka Freedom Party] and its allies, including the UNP [United National Party] dissidents, to impeach President Premadasa.

Where the LTTE stands on this issue is very relevant to the politics of the moment. That is why this newspaper did not choose to blackout the LTTE propaganda. We know that the vast mass of the people of this country are discerning enough to separate the grain from the chaff and will not be brainwashed by patent Tiger falsehoods.

The Liberation Tigers are a terrorist organisation, and they have long sought to cloak their terrorism by calling it a "Tamil national struggle." The Tamil people, in the war-torn areas, know best what the LTTE has done, heaping untold suffering on their backs.

The Tigers like to trumpet that they are revolutionaries leading a "national liberation struggle." The people of the north-east know that among other things this has required extortion of taxes, the conscription of children barely in their teens and ruthless executions, including the massacre of other Tamil groups who have stood against them, among countless other crimes.

Can any Tiger statement claiming that those poor villagers, killed like fleas in remote outposts on the borders of the claimed "homeland" are armed ex-convicts used by the Government to attack Tamil villages, be believed by our people? They know too well that the victims of such massacres are the poorest of the poor struggling to eke out a precarious living in inhospitable territory.

Women and children, often babies and infants, have been among the hundreds of victims of such LTTE attacks. Are these, then, the attack forces the Government uses against Tamil villagers? Nobody would believe such tripe; but it is necessary that the people of this country keep themselves aware of what the LTTE is saying.

That "open letter" was not faxed to this newspaper. It was sent to the big news agencies because the Tigers are well aware that they will not be able to sell such rubbish to the Lankan people. They look for gullible foreign audiences although even that field is narrowing now in the wake of the mounting evidence on the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.

The need for the people of Sri Lanka to be aware of what the LTTE is saying does not necessarily mean that the Lankan media will function as a vehicle for Tiger propaganda. Far from that. We are confident that the media,

along with all patriotic people, will continue to see the Tigers for what they are, just as the people of Tamil Nadu who once provided them moral and material support are even belatedly seeing the light.

Chief Minister Jayalalitha Jayaram went on record a few days ago branding the LTTE issue as not just a matter relevant to Tamil Nadu alone but a "national problem for India." The Gandhi assassination has made that all too clear. She said that Tamil Nadu was seeking special financial assistance from New Delhi to deal with the LTTE and urged that they be treated as a border State and provided with the fullest support.

While we, in Sri Lanka, can second that proposition, it will be difficult for us to forget that it was Jayalalitha's mentor, Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran, who played a major role sharpening the Tigers' fangs and claws with patronage and crores of rupees publicly paid.

The vast majority of the Lankan people are well able to read "open letters" from the LTTE without being brain-washed by their blatant lies. They would perhaps get angry that the Tigers had a platform from the national media, but never will they fall for that kind of line. That much is certain in this uncertain world of ours.

Legislators' Conduct in Parliament Condemned

92AS0165B Colombo DAILY NEWS in English
27 Sep 91 p 4

[Text] At the end of Tuesday's opening of the fourth session of the incumbent Parliament, Speaker M.H. Mohamed was quoted having told President Ranasinghe Premadasa that he almost had a heart attack during the tumultuous sitting. The President, who had demonstrated both tremendous lung power as well as single-minded determination in making a 50-minute address above the din, good-naturedly brushed off the Speaker's apology saying he's an old war-horse whose 40-year political career had taught him to deal with many situations.

Even the ranks of Tuscany must even grudgingly admire the Premadasa performance. It demonstrated both a strong will and a sense of purpose, a determination to complete the task before him whatever the obstacles. Those who had tuned in to their radios had an inkling of what was going on in the chamber before the SLBC abruptly cut off the live broadcast without an explanation.

Tuesday night's television did not give the viewer even a hint of what had gone on in the chamber. The acutely discerning might have observed that the President was throwing everything he had in his voice into that speech and they may have guessed why. Until the final moments of the programme when the Speaker's apology to the President was telecast without extraneous sound cut off, the viewer did not get a true picture.

We are not passing judgment on how the radio and television handled an undoubtedly difficult situation. The Speaker, whose impartiality the Opposition has

often praised, has already pronounced judgment on the Opposition performance which certainly will be of little credit to our Parliament.

Still, the people of Sri Lanka can take some consolation from a REUTER report we published yesterday which said that Opposition parliamentarians in Taiwan had jumped on to tables, screamed and pounded desk-tops with shoes and books and unfurled banners. Unlike in Taipei, Sri Jayewardenepura-Kotte did not witness missiles being flung around. There were no shield-bearing police in our chamber, such as in the Taiwan Parliament, protecting the Speaker and the Prime Minister.

Speaker Mohamed has not yet decided what he is going to do about the impeachment resolution he had entertained on August 28. In a short statement he made at the commencement of sittings yesterday morning, the Speaker said that subsequent to the entertaining of the resolution, written and oral representations had been made to him questioning the validity of some of the signatures on it.

"I am looking into this matter at present. My decision will be conveyed to the House soon," Mr. Mohamed has said.

In the course of his address, President Premadasa noted that the Speaker had not yet decided to include the resolution in the order paper. Saying that he was taking this up only because the matter had been raised after he arrived for the opening of Parliament, the President requested both a speedy decision as well as the early communication of such decision to the country. Mr. Mohamed's statement yesterday morning, saying his decision would be conveyed to the House "soon," indicates that he has taken cognizance of this matter.

As we have repeatedly urged in these columns, an impeachment resolution cannot be left hanging fire indefinitely. It creates uncertainty at best and instability at worst in the country and it is not good for democracy. As President Premadasa himself said on Tuesday, he has not been found guilty of any offence and like any wrongdoer—high or low—facing charges, must be presumed innocent until proved guilty.

We are living through a period of high drama right now, and Tuesday's events in Parliament are directly attributable to the rapid unfolding of events bearing a high potential for conflict. Speaker Mohamed has pronounced that the behaviour of some members of the Opposition was "indecorous" and regretted that an undertaking given to him had not been kept.

The people will arrive at their own conclusions. Whatever they be the country has a right to expect a high standard of conduct from its legislators. As we said on Monday, our Parliament is not without fine traditions. Hopefully, each generation of legislators will enrich them for the future, and events like Tuesday's will be few and far between.

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